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This chapter is organized as follows. The economic problem on which this book focuses is
motivated in Section 1.1. The two tools used to study this economic problem, which are
real options theory and game theory, are discussed in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, respectively.
Section 1.4 surveys the contents of this book. In Section 1.5 some promising extensions
of the research presented in this book are listed.
1.1 Technology Investment
Investment expenditures of companies govern economic growth. Especially investments
in new and more efficient technologies are an important determinant. In particular, in the
last two decades an increasing part of the investment expenditures concerns investments
in information and communication technology. Kriebel (1989) notes that (already) in
1989 roughly 50 percent of new corporate capital expenditures by major United States
companies was in information and communication technology. Due to the rapid progress
in these technologies, the technology investment decision of the individual firm has become
a very complex matter. As an example of the very high pace of technological improve-
ment consider the market for personal computers. IBM introduced its Pentium personal
computers in the early 1990s at the same price at which it introduced its 80286 personal
computers in the 1980s. Therefore it took less than a decade to improve on the order of
twenty times in terms of both speed and memory capacities, without increasing the cost
(Yorukoglu (1998)).
In the beginning of the twentieth century technological developments did not show
such a rapid progress compared to recent years. Therefore, the technology investment
problem of the firm mainly was a timing problem, in which the optimal time to replace the
current technology had to be determined. For example, one of the technology investment
decisions of a railway company dealt with the decision when to replace its steam shunters
1
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with diesel shunters. Up to the present day most railway companies still work with diesel
shunters.
Nowadays, a firm should take into account that the current state of the art in infor-
mation and communication technology will be old fashioned in a few years. Thus the
investment decision problem is no longer only a question of when to adopt a new tech-
nology but also a question of which technology should be adopted. Therefore, in order to
design a theoretical framework that is useful to analyze the technology investment deci-
sion, it is important to consider models in which several new technologies appear. The
timing of the technology investment is (still) very relevant. The reason is that due to
the rapid technological progress of information and communication products the prices
of those products drop significantly over time. As an example in Figure 1.1 the price
development is drawn of two Intel Pentium III processors within the Netherlands.



























Pentium III 600 Mhz
Pentium III 550 Mhz
Figure 1.1: Price development of two Pentium III processors within the Netherlands (source: Personal
Computer Magazine).
Another significant feature of the last decade is that firms more and more face com-
petition on their output markets. One reason is the abolition of monopolistic markets
created by government. In the Netherlands examples are the opening of the markets for
telecommunication, railway, and power supply. Until September 1995 KPN Telecom was
the only provider on the mobile telecommunication market in the Netherlands. Due to
the legislation of the European Community concerning the liberalization of telecommu-
nication markets, the Dutch government organized a contest with as prize a license to
operate a mobile telephone company. Libertel won that contest and its network came
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into use in September 1995. Telfort entered the market in September 1998 and after that
Ben and Dutchtone started their services at the end of 1998. Currently these five players
are still active on this market. It is obvious that due to the entrance of these four rivals,
KPN Telecom had to change its investment strategy dramatically.
Another reason for the existence of and development towards oligopolistic markets is
the, still ongoing, process of mergers and takeovers, which due to legislation will not end up
with only one supplier in a market. There are plenty of examples of mergers and takeovers
in the last decade. In the car industry we have the merger of Daimler and Chrysler in 1998.
In the telecommunications market examples are the takeover of AirTouch by Vodafone
(partly owner of Libertel) in 1999 and this year’s offer of Vodafone to the shareholders
of Mannesmann, who entitled it a hostile takeover. However, when Vodafone succeeds in
taking over Mannesmann, it has to hive off Orange (which is owned by Mannesmann),
otherwise Vodafone’s market share in the United Kingdom would become too large. The
result of Vodafone’s announcement is that there are already four potential buyers for
Orange: France Telecom, KPN Telecom, NTT DoCoMo, and MCI Worldcom. This
year’s announcement of the merger of the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank is an
example in the financial market. The lawsuit between Microsoft and the government of
the United States of America is an example of governmental interference to try to reduce
Microsoft’s (supposed) monopoly power. The overall result of these mergers, takeovers,
and governmental interference is that markets with only one supplier and markets with
many suppliers seem to disappear in the long run. Thus, in their private investment
decisions, more and more firms should take into account the investment behavior by its
competitors nowadays.
The existing literature dealing with the technology investment decision of a single
firm can be split up into two categories. The models that belong to the first category,
which is called decision theoretic models, deal with the technology investment decision
of one firm in isolation. On the other hand, in the game theoretic models the optimal
technology investment strategy of the firm is derived while taking explicitly into account
the technology investment actions of the firm’s rival(s). From the economic observations
described above, it can be concluded that there is a strong need to use game theory with
respect to the theoretical modelling of technology investment by the individual firm. A
literature overview of the decision theoretic models and the game theoretic models are
given in the first sections of Chapters 2 and 4, respectively. Part I of this book deals with
decision theoretic models and in Parts II and III two different game theoretic models are
considered.
In the following section we discuss the topic of investment under uncertainty in more
detail, whereas in Section 1.3 we concentrate on investment under competition.
4 1.2. Investment Under Uncertainty
1.2 Investment Under Uncertainty
Investment is defined as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the expectation of
future rewards (see Dixit and Pindyck (1996, p. 3)). Most investment projects possess
the following three characteristics: irreversibility, uncertainty, and possibility of delay.
An investment is irreversible when the investment cost is a sunk cost, that is it is im-
possible to recover the investment cost once the investment is made. This surely holds for
investments in information and communication goods. It is impossible to sell a one-year-
old personal computer for the same price as for which it was bought. More generally, most
industry or firm specific investments are irreversible. For example, the marketing and ad-
vertisement expenditures of KPN Telecom are firm specific and cannot be recovered, i.e.
KPN Telecom cannot sell this investment project to another telecommunication company.
An example of an industry specific investment is the construction of a new mobile net-
work by Libertel. This investment will be (at least partially) sunk, because whenever
it is no longer profitable for Libertel to exploit this network it will not be profitable for
another mobile provider as well. Due to the lemon’s problem (see Akerlof (1970)) a lot of
investments that are not firm or industry specific are also irreversible.
An investment project (almost) always has to deal with uncertainty. For most invest-
ments the future revenues are stochastic, due to uncertainties in, e.g., the firm’s market
share and the market price. It is also possible that the investment cost is uncertain, which
is the case in many infrastructure projects. For example the actual costs of the Ooster-
schelde Stormvloedkering, which is one of the last projects of the Dutch Delta works,
turned out to be much higher than what was forecasted.
From a technical point of view it is almost always possible to defer an investment for
some time. This possibility to delay an investment gives a firm flexibility. Though, eco-
nomically this postponement can be costly in the sense that the firm looses market share
if it refrains from the investment. On the other hand, by postponing an investment the
firm can acquire more information about the investment project, for example concerning
the market conditions.
The net present value method is the commonly used (and taught) method to evaluate
investment projects (see for example Brealey and Myers (1991)). This method states that
an investment should be undertaken when the expected (discounted) present value of the
revenue stream resulting from this investment project exceeds the expected present value
of the expenditures. However, the underlying assumption of the net present value method
contradicts the characteristics of investments we mentioned before. More precisely, the net
present value method assumes that either an investment project is reversible or when it
is irreversible it is a now or never decision, that is, the firm can undertake the investment
project today or never. As a result, applying the net present value method leads to
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suboptimal investment decisions. Especially the ignorance of the possibility to delay is
an important abuse, since most investment projects are irreversible. The real options
literature succeeds in explicitly valuing this so-called option value of waiting.
In the real options theory the analogy between a firm’s investment opportunity and
a financial call option is exploited. A financial call option gives the holder the right, but
not the obligation, to buy one piece of the underlying derivative (e.g. stock, bond) for a
specified price (before or) at a specified time. See Hull (1993) and Merton (1992) for a
detailed exposition of the financial options theory. Similar to a financial call option, an
investment opportunity gives a firm the right, but not the obligation, to carry out some
investment project. Note that, following the analogy, an investment project is an infinitely
lived call option on a dividend paying derivative. From the financial options theory it is
known that such an option should only be exercised when the option is sufficiently deep
in the money, that is when the current price of the underlying derivative is sufficiently
larger than the exercise price. Therefore an investment project should only be undertaken
when the net present value exceeds the option value of waiting.
Due to the close link with financial options theory, most real options models assume
that the revenue stream of the investment project follows some geometric Brownian motion
process. A geometric Brownian motion process is a continuous time stochastic process of
which the increments are distributed according to a normal distribution. In McDonald and
Siegel (1986) the basic continuous time real options model is examined. In that model
a firm can acquire a project, of which the value follows a geometric Brownian motion
process, by making an irreversible investment. McDonald and Siegel derive an explicit
expression for the option value of waiting, and show that for reasonable parameters the
optimal investment trigger is twice as large as the net present value trigger, i.e. for an
investment to be optimal the value of the project should be twice as large compared to
the required value under the net present value method. The basic real options model
has been extended in various ways. An excellent overview is given in Dixit and Pindyck
(1996). In Trigeorgis (1995), Trigeorgis (1996), Smit (1997), Pennings (1998), Lander
and Pinches (1998), and Amram and Kulatilaka (1998) practical applications of the real
options theory are presented and discussed.
However, most of the extensions of the basic real options model assume that the firm is
the only one having the investment opportunity, that is, strategic interactions are ignored.
In the previous section we stressed the importance of taking strategic interactions into
account. In the next section we give an overview of the models that do incorporate these
strategic interactions.
6 1.3. Investment Under Competition
1.3 Investment Under Competition
Investment models that incorporate strategic interactions make use of game theory. In
most of these models non-cooperative game theory is used since in general the firms are
competing against each other and there is no willingness to cooperate. For a rigorous
introduction to game theory we refer to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). In Tirole (1988) a
nice overview of industrial organization models is given. In this book we mainly use and
extend the game theoretic concepts presented in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), in which a
deterministic investment model of two competing firms is extensively analyzed, especially
from a mathematical point of view.
One of the first real options models that incorporates strategic interactions is the
duopoly model in Smets (1991). This model is also considered in Dixit and Pindyck
(1996, Chapter 9) and in Nielsen (1999). As in the basic real options model the revenue
stream of the investment project follows a geometric Brownian motion. However, in this
model the actual revenue stream of one firm depends on the investment decision of the
other firm. Nielsen proves that due to the introduction of a second identical firm, the first
investment will be made sooner. Like in Smets (1991), also in Pennings and Sleuwaegen
(1998) a model of foreign direct investment in a real options setting is studied.
Other continuous time real options models with strategic interactions are studied
in Grenadier (1996), Baldursson (1998), Lambrecht and Perraudin (1999), and Weeds
(1999). Grenadier models the real estate development. In Baldursson’s model the firms
can adjust their capacity continuously over time and optimal strategies to do so are
derived. Lambrecht and Perraudin consider a model with incomplete information, in
which they assume that the other firm’s profitability of the investment project is not
known and there is only one firm that can implement the project. Finally, Weeds models
a research and development race between two firms.
Also related are the models in Smit (1996), Smit and Ankum (1993), Kulatilaka and
Perotti (1998), and Somma (1999). The difference with the contributions mentioned above
is that, instead of a continuous time model where uncertainty is incorporated by, e.g., a
geometric Brownian motion process, in each of these models binomial trees are used to
model strategic interactions between firms. Consequently, most of these models are in
discrete time.
1.4 Overview
This book is divided into three parts. The first part consists of two decision theoretic
models in a real options setting. In the second part three game theoretic technology
adoption models are considered, whereas in the third part three general game theoretic
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real options models are presented.
1.4.1 Decision Theoretic Models
Chapter 2 starts with a literature overview of the decision theoretic models of technology
adoption. The model of Chapter 2, which is a generalization of Farzin et al. (1998), studies
the technology adoption of a single firm. A firm can adopt a better technology by making
an irreversible investment. The investment cost of a certain technology is assumed to
be constant over time. With a better technology the firm can produce more efficiently
and will therefore make higher profits. New technologies arrive over time according to
a stochastic process and the efficiency increment of a new technology is also stochastic.
First we solve the model for the case that the firm may invest only once and after that
the multiple switch case is discussed. The multiple switch case is only solvable when the
efficiency increments of the new technologies are known beforehand. Finally, the optimal
investment strategy is compared with the strategy resulting from the net present value
method. It turns out that in making the investment decision the option value of waiting
cannot be ignored, which is also shown in a numerical example. In the Appendix to
Chapter 2 we give an introduction to a technique that is frequently used in this book:
optimal stopping.
The model of Chapter 2 is extended in Chapter 3 by making the investment cost
decreasing over time. The motivation for this model feature is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The efficiencies of the new technologies are assumed to be known beforehand. The optimal
investment strategy for the single switch case is derived and compared with its net present
value counterpart. After that, it is explained why it is not possible to solve this model
for the multiple switch case.
1.4.2 Game Theoretic Adoption Models
In Chapter 4 we first give a literature overview of game theoretic models of technology
investment. After that we analyze the most important and basic deterministic model
in this research area (see Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)) in de-
tail. Two identical firms that are currently active on an output market can make an
irreversible investment that will increase their own and decrease their rival’s profit. The
investment cost is decreasing over time. This investment game is solved using timing
games. In the Appendix to Chapter 4 we present an introduction to this specific class of
games. The player that moves first in a timing game is called the leader and the other
is the follower. Reinganum assumes in her analysis that one of the firms is given the
leader role beforehand. In Fudenberg and Tirole’s analysis the firm roles are determined
8 1.4. Overview
endogenously, that is both firms can become the leader by making the investment before
its rival. It turns out that the result is that each firm’s payoff is equal in equilibrium.
The remainder of Chapter 4 deals with the extension of Stenbacka and Tombak (1994)
to the Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model, which is also is considered in Huisman and
Kort (1998a) and in Götz (2000). Stenbacka and Tombak assume that the time between
the adoption and successful implementation of the new technology is stochastic.
Chapter 5 is based on Huisman and Kort (1998b). The model of that chapter is an
extension of the basic model by incorporating two new technologies and upgrading. At
the beginning of the game none of the two firms is active on the output market. To
become active a firm has to pay a sunk cost, for which the firm receives the current
best technology. The firm can also decide to postpone the entrance and buy the better
technology that becomes available at a known point of time in the future. Furthermore,
there is a possibility to upgrade the current technology with the new technology. There
are learning effects involved in this upgrading strategy, since it is cheaper to buy the new
technology when the firm already produces with the current technology. Two of the nine
possible scenarios are worked out in detail.
Chapter 6, which is based on Huisman and Kort (1999b), extends the model of Chapter
4 by adding uncertainty to the arrival process and by considering multiple new technolo-
gies. Further it is assumed that the two firms can invest only once. After introducing
a new concept in timing games, namely the waiting curve, a general algorithm for solv-
ing this kind of technology investment games is presented. The algorithm is clarified by
applying it to a specific example.
1.4.3 Game Theoretic Real Options Models
In Chapter 7 the model of Huisman and Kort (1999a) is presented. This model differs
from the model in Smets (1991) since in that chapter the firms are already active on
the output market. We show that abolishing the new market assumption considerably
changes the result of Nielsen (1999). No longer it is always the case that the introduction
of a new firm precipitates investment. Furthermore, the model is the stochastic variant
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and we discuss what the effect of the introduction of the
uncertainty is on the equilibrium outcome.
The new market model of Nielsen (1999) is studied in Chapter 8, but then with
asymmetric firms. The asymmetry is modelled via the investment costs of the firms.
Both the case of negative and positive externalities are considered. In case of negative
externalities a firm earns the highest profits when its rival is not active, whereas in the
positive externalities case the firm’s profit is higher when the other firm is also active, e.g.
when there are network effects or when the firms are producing complementary goods. We
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show that also in this asymmetric setting the introduction of a second firm precipitates
investment. The chapter is based on Huisman and Nielsen (2000).
Chapter 9, which is based on Huisman and Kort (2000), brings together Chapters 2,
5, and 7. Two firms can become active on a output market, i.e. a new market model is
considered, by buying a technology. In the beginning only one technology is available,
but at an unknown point of time in the future a better technology becomes available.
Both firms can invest only once and the investment cost is constant over time. We show
how the equilibrium outcome depends on the expected speed of the arrival of the new
technology.
1.5 Extensions
In this section we present some promising extensions of the research of this book.
1.5.1 Incomplete Information
Thijssen et al. (2000) consider a monopolistic firm that can enter a new market by incur-
ring an irreversible investment cost. It is assumed that the market can either be good or
bad. When the market is good it is profitable to start producing and when the market is
bad the firm will never produce. In the beginning of the game the firm believes that the
market is good with probability one-half. At stochastic points in time the firm receives
signals, being either good or bad, about the condition of the market. At these points in
time the firm updates its belief that the market is good in a Bayesian way. The proba-
bilities of receiving a good or a bad signal are such that the uncertainty about the state
of the market vanishes in the long run. As such the model is a promising extension of
the existing real options models, since in the latter models uncertainty never disappears.
An interesting extension of this model is to include strategic interactions by the introduc-
tion of a second firm. The firm that invests first and finds out that the market is good
becomes Stackelberg leader and the other firm the Stackelberg follower. The advantage
of the other firm is that it leaves the risk of investing in a bad market to its competitor,
since after one investment the true status of the market is revealed. In this way there are
incentives to become both the first investor and the second investor.
Pawlina (2000) extends the basic real options model by making the investment cost
subject to a possible upward switch. The value of the project again follows a geometric
Brownian motion process. The firm does not know when the switch in the investment
cost takes place, but has a certain belief about it. As such the model is also an extension
of Lambrecht and Perraudin (1999). Lambrecht and Perraudin assume that once a firm
has invested the other firm is left with a zero payoff. Here the investment cost switch can
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be interpreted as a reduced profitablity resulting from the investment of the other firm,
so that there is still a positive payoff possible for the firm.
1.5.2 Risk Aversion
Most real options models assume that either the firm is risk-neutral or that the markets
are complete, so that any risk in an investment project can be hedged and as a result the
risk free interest rate can be used. In other models (see for example Sarkar (2000)) risk
aversion is modelled by adding a risk premium to the discount rate. In van den Goorbergh
et al. (2000) the real options literature is extended by considering a risk averse firm in
a world with incomplete markets. In the model risk aversion is taken into account by
making the firm’s utility function concave. First, van den Goorbergh et al. derive the
properties that an utility function should possess. After that the existence of a threshold








The literature on technology adoption can be divided into two classes: the first class is
called decision theoretic models and the second class game theoretic models. See Bridges
et al. (1991) for an overview of literature from both classes. In a decision theoretic model
the profit of the firm is only influenced by its own technology adoption decisions, whereas
in a game theoretic model the profit of the firm is also influenced by the decisions of its
rivals. In the second and third chapter we study decision theoretic models of technology
adoption. This implies that either the firm is a monopolist or a price taker on its output
market. From Chapter 4 onwards strategic interactions are incorporated in the technology
investment problem.
Though Baldwin (1982) does not explicitly model technology adoption, in that pa-
per sequential investments can be looked upon as investments that upgrade the firm’s
technology in use, while the state variable resembles the efficiency of the best technology
that is available. Due to the fact that the investments are not completely reversible, the
firm will only carry out those investment opportunities that yield a net present value that
exceeds a certain threshold. Of course, this threshold is the option value of waiting.
Nair (1995) uses a dynamic programming framework to solve the technology adoption
problem for a firm. First the model is solved for a finite planning horizon before which
a fixed number of new technologies will arrive. Then it is shown that the results can be
extended to a model with an infinite planning horizon by using forecast horizon proce-
dures. A time τ is a forecast horizon when the initial period decision is optimal for all
models with planning horizon larger than τ . The investment cost and revenue function of
a technology may depend on time, which is discrete in the model of Nair. The drawback
of the analysis is that there are no expressions for the option value of waiting.
In Rajagopalan (1999) three technologies are taken into account. The first technology
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is the one that the firm uses at the beginning of the (infinite) planning horizon, the second
technology is the best technology available at that point of time, and the third technology
becomes available at a yet unknown point of time in the future. The reason for considering
only three technologies is that the author focuses on the impact of investment costs and
other factors on the replacement time. Once the firm has adopted a newer technology it
can produce against lower marginal costs. Rajagopalan derives how the optimal adoption
time of the second technology depends on the probability distribution of the arrival of the
third technology. He specifies for what parameters it is optimal: (i) to adopt the second
technology immediately, (ii) to wait with adoption for some finite time, and (iii) never to
adopt the second technology.
Balcer and Lippman (1984) model the arrival time and the efficiency of new technolo-
gies in a two step procedure. Every time the discovery potential changes, a new technology
is invented. The time between two consecutive changes of the discovery potential and the
increase of the discovery potential are both stochastic and depend on the current dis-
covery potential. The efficiency of a new technology is a stochastic function of the new
discovery potential and the efficiency of the current best technology. To be able to solve
the model, Balcer and Lippman assume that the firm’s profit increase and the investment
cost are both linear functions of the efficiency of the new technology. They show that the
firm is going to upgrade its current technology with the current best technology if the
technological lag exceeds a certain threshold. Further, if the arrival of a new technology
takes too long, adopting an already existing technology may become optimal.
In the models of Baldwin (1982), Nair (1995), Rajagopalan (1999), and Balcer and
Lippman (1984), a general distribution is used to model the arrival of new technologies.
We use a Poisson process to model the technology arrivals. This implies that the inter-
arrival times are exponentially distributed, i.e. the time elapsed since the last technology
arrival does not influence the probability of a new technology arrival. This will hold espe-
cially when the firm does not have a clue of what is going on at the research companies.
We take the real options approach (see Dixit and Pindyck (1996) for an excellent
survey) to be able to explicitly derive the option value of waiting that is present in
technology investments. Purvis et al. (1995) and Dosi and Moretto (1997) also use the real
options approach to model a technology investment problem, but both models consider
only one new technology. Purvis et al. (1995) try to derive ex ante the effects of uncertainty
and irreversibility on the investment decision of Texas farmers, who can change from
conventional open lot to free stall housing for their dairy. Dosi and Moretto (1997)
show that lowering the uncertainty about future profits is a better policy to stimulate
investment than lowering the investment cost.
Another model that uses the real options approach and incorporates technical change
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is introduced in Ekboir (1997). He studies the effect of partial irreversibility and tech-
nological change on the purchase and sale of capital. Ekboir shows that if the desired
capital stock is in between an upper and a lower bound it is optimal for the firm not to
invest. After hitting the upper (lower) bound the firm purchases (sells) new capital and
due to technical change the average capital productivity increases (decreases). Therefore
both the upper and lower bounds increase (decrease) significantly and the desired capital
level increases (decreases). It is possible that the firm is going to buy (sell) more new
capital, because the desired capital level is not in between the new bounds. This process
stops when the desired capital level is again between the bounds.
The analysis of this chapter adds a multiple switching technology adoption model to
the existing real options literature. On the other hand we extend the traditional decision
theoretic models on technology adoption with a model in which the technologies arrive
according to a Poisson process.
In Section 2.2 the model is described. This model is a generalization of the model
that was introduced in Farzin et al. (1998). The original model of Farzin et al. is used
as an example. The single switch case is solved in Section 2.3 and the multiple switch
case is treated in Section 2.4. In that last section we also point out and correct a mistake
in Farzin et al. (1998). In Section 2.5 the net present value method is used to solve the
technology investment problem and the outcome is compared with the results of Sections
2.2 and 2.3. The last section concludes.
2.2 The Model
A risk-neutral firm is considered, whose profit flow is only determined by its own tech-
nology choice. The efficiency of a technology is completely captured in one parameter,
in such a way that a higher value of the parameter implies a more efficient technology.
We use two symbols to refer to this technology efficiency and the technology itself. The
efficiency of the technology that the firm uses at time t, t ≥ 0, is denoted by ζ (t) . With
θ (t) we refer to the efficiency of the most efficient available technology at time t, t ≥ 0. Of
course it must hold that 0 ≤ ζ (t) ≤ θ (t) , for any t ≥ 0. The firm’s profit flow when the
firm produces with technology ζ, ζ ≥ 0, equals π (ζ) , where π :IR+ →IR is an increasing
function of ζ.
Example 2.1 Let us analyze the firm that is considered in Farzin et al. (1998). The
firm’s production function is given by
h (v, ζ) = ζva, (2.1)
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where v (≥ 0) is a variable input, ζ (≥ 0) is the efficiency parameter, and a ∈ (0, 1) is the
constant output elasticity. Further we assume that the output price and the input price
are fixed and equal to p and w, respectively. The profit flow equals
π (ζ) = max
v
(pζva − wv) . (2.2)
Solving equation (2.2) yields the following expression for the profit flow of the firm
π (ζ) = ϕζb, (2.3)
with











Over an infinite planning horizon the firm maximizes its value and discounts with
rate r (> 0). At the beginning of the planning horizon (t = 0) the firm produces with
a technology whose efficiency equals ζ0 (≥ 0) . As time passes new and more efficient
technologies are invented. The firm can not influence the innovation process, i.e. it is




u with probability λdt,
0 with probability 1− λdt, (2.6)
θ (0) = θ0, (2.7)
where θ0 ≥ ζ0. Concerning the size of the jump, u, two cases are considered. In the
first case u is constant and in the second case u is stochastic. Let us introduce some
more notation. Take i ∈ IN. The efficiency and the arrival time of the i-th technology
are denoted by θi and Ti, respectively. We use τ i to refer to the time between the arrival
of technologies i − 1 and i, i.e., τ i = Ti − Ti−1. The jump in the θ process at time Ti is
denoted by ui, thus ui = θi − θi−1. We set T0 = 0 and u0 = 0. N (t) is the stochastic
variable that counts the number of technology arrivals on the interval [0, t) . Therefore,




Since θ follows a Poisson process with parameter λ, N (t) is distributed according to a
Poisson distribution with parameter λt. In Figure 2.1 two sample paths for the technology
process are plotted. In the left panel the jump size is constant and in the right panel the
jump size is uniformly distributed.
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Figure 2.1: Sample paths of θ (t) . In the left panel the jump size is fixed and equal to u and in the right
panel the jump size is uniformly distributed on [0, 2u]. Parameter values used: λ = 1, u = 0.1, θ0 = 1.
The firm can adopt a new technology by paying a sunk cost I (> 0). In this chapter
the investment cost is assumed to be constant over time, whereas in the next chapter the
investment cost decreases over time. Due to the constant investment costs, the exponential
interarrival times, and due to discounting, the firm will adopt a technology only at its
arrival date.
The problem we want to address concerns the timing of the firm’s technology switches.
Two extreme solutions are easy to identify. The first is to adopt a new technology every
time that one becomes available. The advantage of this strategy is that the firm always
produces with the most efficient technology. The drawback of this strategy is, of course,
the large amount of investment costs that has to be paid. The other extreme solution is
to never adopt a new technology. The advantage is that the firm does not have to pay
any sunk costs. Since the firm keeps on producing with an (in the long term) inefficient
technology, the drawback is that the firm misses the potential higher profits it could
have made when a more efficient technology was adopted. The optimal solution will be
somewhere in between these two extreme solutions.
The problem that the firm faces is an optimal stopping problem. For an introduction
to optimal stopping problems we refer to Appendix 2.A. In our model stopping means
that the firm invests and thus adopts a new technology and continuation resembles waiting
with investing. Therefore, it is obvious that stopping will be optimal for θ large enough
and waiting is optimal for θ low enough. Hence, intuition suggests that there is some
unique value of θ for which the firm is indifferent between investing and waiting. That
specific θ is denoted by θ∗ and is called the critical level or threshold (value). Once the
threshold is known, the investment problem is solved, since it is optimal for the firm to
wait with the investment when θ is below the threshold θ∗ and it is optimal for the firm to
make the investment the first time θ is above the threshold. In Appendix 2.A we present
a theorem that gives sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the threshold.
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2.3 Single Switch
In order to find the threshold in the single switch case we first derive an expression for the
termination payoff. That is the firm’s value at the moment that the firm undertakes its





π (ζ) exp (−rt) dt = π (ζ)
r
. (2.9)
Equation (2.9) implies that the termination payoff is given by the following expression
V (ζ)− I. (2.10)
The following proposition which is proved in Appendix 2.D gives a sufficient condition
for the existence and uniqueness of the threshold θ∗.
Proposition 2.1 There exists a unique threshold θ∗ ∈ IR+ if the function π is concave in
θ.
Given ζ0 and θ (t) = θ the value of the firm is denoted by F (θ, ζ0). Let θ
∗ be (again)
the unique threshold value. From equation (2.10) we derive that in the stopping region,
{θ| θ ≥ θ∗}, F is given by
F (θ, ζ0) = V (θ)− I. (2.11)
In the continuation region, {θ| θ < θ∗}, F must satisfy the following Bellman equation
(see Appendix 2.A)




E [dF (θ, ζ0)] . (2.12)
To proceed we must first specify the properties of u, the size of the jump. In Subsection
2.3.1 we assume it to be constant and in Subsection 2.3.2 to be stochastic.
2.3.1 Constant Jump Size
Let us assume that the jump size is constant and equal to some u, u ≥ 0. Thus ui = u for
i ∈ IN. Given that u is a constant we can split up the continuation region into two parts.
In the first part investing is not optimal even after the next jump, i.e. {θ| θ < θ∗ − u} ,
and in the second part investing is optimal after the next jump: {θ| θ∗ − u ≤ θ < θ∗} .
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In the first part of the continuation region, applying Itô’s lemma (see Appendix 2.A)
gives
E [dF (θ, ζ0)] = λdt (F (θ + u, ζ0)− F (θ, ζ0)) + o (dt) . (2.13)
The definition of o (dt) is stated in Appendix 2.C. Substitution of (2.13) in (2.12) gives
rF (θ, ζ0) = π (ζ0) + λ (F (θ + u, ζ0)− F (θ, ζ0)) . (2.14)
From Proposition 2.4 in Appendix 2.B we know that the solution of equation (2.14) is
given by










To determine the constant c we must use the continuity condition at θ = θ∗−u. Therefore
we need an expression for F in the second part of the continuation region.
The equivalent of equation (2.13) in the second part of the continuation region is
E [dF (θ, ζ0)] = λdt (V (θ + u)− I − F (θ, ζ0)) + o (dt) . (2.16)
Together with (2.12) this last expression leads to
rF (θ, ζ0) = π (ζ0) + λ (V (θ + u)− I − F (θ, ζ0)) . (2.17)
Rewriting gives






(V (θ + u)− I) . (2.18)







(V (θ∗)− V (ζ0)− I) . (2.19)
Summarizing, the value of the firm is given by











(V (θ + u)− I) if θ∗ − u ≤ θ < θ∗,
V (θ)− I if θ ≥ θ∗.
(2.20)
In case θ < θ∗ − u the value of the firm consists of two terms. The second term
resembles the value of the firm when the firm produces with technology ζ0 forever. The
first term is the value of the opportunity to invest, in other words the option value. This
option value is a multiplication of two parts. The last part is the net present value when
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the firm adopts technology θ∗. The firm exchanges the profit flow π (ζ0) for π (θ
∗) and
pays I for that exchange. The first part of the option value is the discount factor. The
investment takes place in the future and therefore the net present value has to be properly
discounted. The factor λ
r+λ
is the discounted value of one unit of money that the firms
receives after the next technology arrival (see Lemma 2.3 in Appendix 2.D). This factor
is raised to the power θ
∗−θ
u
, because it takes (continuously spoken) exactly that many
arrivals before the firm invests.
The firm is going to switch technologies after the next technology arrival if in the
continuation region it holds that θ∗ − u ≤ θ < θ∗. This implies that the value of the firm
consists of the discounted profit flows generated from now until that technology arrival
(first part) and the discounted value of the termination payoff (second part). Notice that
in the first part λ is added to the discount rate, so that this is another example of the
general notion Dixit and Pindyck (1996) present on page 87: ”... if a profit flow can
stop when a Poisson event with arrival rate λ occurs, then we can calculate the expected
present value of the stream as if it never stops, but adding λ to the discount rate.”
The critical level θ∗ is found by solving the value matching condition (see Dixit and















The value matching condition ensures the continuity of the value function at the threshold,
i.e. the point where the firm is indifferent between investing right away (right-hand side of
equation (2.21)) and investing after the next technology arrival (left-hand side of equation
(2.21)).
Define the adoption time t∗ as follows
t∗ = inf (t| θ (t) ≥ θ∗) . (2.22)
Since the size of the jump is constant we can calculate after how many technology arrivals








 is equal to the integer part of x. Using equation (2.23) it is not hard to see that
Pr (t∗ ≤ t) =
∞∑
n=n∗
Pr (N (t) = n) . (2.24)
The following proposition gives expressions for the expected value and the variance of t∗.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.D.
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Example 2.1 (continued) Let us continue our example. Since the profit function is
convex, we can not apply Proposition 2.1. However, in Appendix 2.A we show that a







. Solving equation (2.21) for the
parameter set of Farzin et al. (1998), i.e. a = 1
2
, p = 200, w = 50, r = 0.1, λ = 1, u = 0.1,
ζ0 = θ0 = 1 and I = 1600, yields θ
∗ = 2.703, so that n∗ = 18. Note that the condition
for uniqueness is satisfied for these parameters. With Proposition 2.2 we find that the
expected value of the adoption time is 18 years with a standard deviation of 4.243 years.
The left part of Figure 2.2 compares the value of the firm and the termination payoff. The
value of the option to invest is plotted in the right part of Figure 2.2, where also the net
present value of the investment is plotted.













































F( θ,θ0) −V( θ0)
V( θ) −V( θ0) −I
Figure 2.2: In the left part: value of the firm as function of θ and termination payoff as function of θ. In
the right part: value of the option to invest as function of θ and the net present value of the investment
as function of θ.
2.3.2 Stochastic Jump Size
In this subsection we repeat the exercise of Subsection 2.3.1 for a stochastic jump size. We
solve two cases. In the first case we assume that the ui’s are independently and identically
distributed according to a uniform distribution and in the second case we assume that the
ui’s are independent and identical distributed according to an exponential distribution.
22 2.3. Single Switch
Uniform Distribution
Let u be distributed according to a uniform distribution on the interval [0, u] . As in
Subsection 2.3.1 the continuation region is split up into two regions: {θ| θ < θ∗ − u} and
{θ| θ∗ − u ≤ θ < θ∗}. The Bellman equation for F in the first part of the continuation
region is given by
rF (θ, ζ0) = π (ζ0) + λ
u∫
u=0




The solution of (2.27) is (see Proposition 2.5 in Appendix 2.B)




where γ0 will be determined by solving the continuity condition at θ = θ
∗ − u and γ1 is
the positive solution of the following equation
λ (exp (uγ1)− 1)− (r + λ)uγ1 = 0. (2.29)
Lemma 2.1 in Appendix 2.B ensures that γ1 exist and is indeed positive.
The firm is going to switch technologies after the next technology arrival with a positive
probability when θ (t) is in the second part of the continuation region. This gives rise to
the following Bellman equation

















(V (θ + u)− I) 1
u
du. (2.30)
Proposition 2.6 in Appendix 2.B states that the solution of (2.30) is given by
F (θ, ζ0) =
λ
(r + λ)u






















(V (θ∗ + u)− I) du, (2.31)
where h (θ) is implicitly defined by
∂h (θ)
∂θ
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An expression for the constant γ0 can be found by equating equations (2.28) and (2.31)
at θ = θ∗ − u.
Summarizing, the value of the firm F is given by
F (θ, ζ0) =

γ0 exp (γ1θ) + V (ζ0)
λ
(r+λ)u





















(V (θ∗ + u)− I) du if θ∗ − u ≤ θ < θ∗,
V (θ)− I if θ ≥ θ∗.
(2.33)





(r + λ) u
u∫
u=0




We can not give an equivalent of Proposition 2.2 in this case, because there does not
exist a closed form expression for the n-th fold convolution of the uniform distribution.
Example 2.1 (continued) In Appendix 2.A we show that the threshold is unique if ζ0 ≥
u, which is satisfied for our parameters. Solving equation (2.34) for our parameter set and
u = 0.2, thus E [ui] = 0.1 and V ar [ui] = 0.00333, yields θ
∗ = 2.713. Thus introducing the
uncertainty in the size of the jump causes a very small change in the threshold, namely
0.36 percent. Using simulation we calculated that the expected value and the standard
deviation of the adoption are equal to 17.79 years and 4.87 years, respectively.
Exponential Distribution
The main difference with the analysis above is that in this case for every θ in the con-
tinuation region there is a positive probability that the next jump is large enough to lift
θ above the threshold. Therefore we do not have to split the continuation region in two
parts. The following Bellman equation must hold in the continuation region














(V (θ + u)− I)µ exp (−µu) du. (2.35)
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Applying Proposition 2.8 (stated in Appendix 2.B) to equation (2.35) gives
















µr (θ − θ∗)
r + λ
))
V (ζ0) . (2.36)
Expressions (2.10) and (2.36) together give the value of the firm




















V (ζ0) if θ < θ
∗,
V (θ)− I if θ ≥ θ∗.
(2.37)













Proposition 2.3 The expected value and the variance of the adoption time t∗ are equal
to
E [t∗] =
µ (θ∗ − θ0) + 1
λ
, (2.39)
V ar [t∗] =
2µ (θ∗ − θ0) + 1
λ2
. (2.40)
Example 2.1 (continued) Let µ = 10 then E [ui] = V ar [ui] = 0.1, i ∈ IN. In Appendix
2.A we derived that the threshold is unique if ζb−10 ≥ λr Γ(b)µb−1 , which is satisfied for our
parameters. Solving equation (2.38) gives θ∗ = 2.732. Table 2.1 shows the thresholds and
the expected value and standard deviation of the adoption times of the three cases. We
conclude that the distribution of the size of the jump does not matter very much. Huisman
(1996) showed that there are also hardly any changes when the interarrival times are
constant instead of exponentially distributed. The standard deviation of the adoption time
in the exponential jump size case is the largest because the variance of the jump size is
the largest in that case.
2.4 Multiple Switches
In this section we solve the technology investment problem if the firm can switch technolo-
gies n times. One of the conclusions of the last section is that the probability distribution
of the size of the jump, degenerate, uniform or exponential, does not influence the out-
come very much. Therefore, in this section, we only explicitly solve the model for the
case that the jump size is constant. After that we discuss the stochastic case.
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ui’s θ
∗ E [t∗] Sd [t∗]
constant 2.703 18.00 4.24
uniform 2.713 17.79 4.87
exponential 2.732 18.32 5.97
Table 2.1: Thresholds, expected value and standard deviation of the adoption time in the three different
cases.
2.4.1 Constant Jump Size
The investment problem of the firm consists of n optimal stopping problems, where the
outcome of the i-th optimal stopping problem, the threshold θ∗i , is an input for the (i+ 1)-
th optimal stopping problem. The n-th optimal stopping problem has already been solved
in the previous section.































(V (θ + u)− I) if θ∗n − u ≤ θ < θ∗n,
V (θ)− I if θ ≥ θ∗n.
(2.41)
From the analysis of the previous section we know that the threshold θ∗n is defined as the









(V (θ∗n + u)− I) = V (θ∗n)− I. (2.42)
Next let us analyze the i-th optimal stopping problem for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. The






























(Fi−1 (θ + u, θ + u)− I) if θ∗i − u ≤ θ < θ∗i ,
Fi−1 (θ, θ)− I if θ ≥ θ∗i .
(2.43)













i + u, θ
∗
i + u)− I) = Fi−1 (θ∗i , θ∗i )− I. (2.44)
The following theorem states how the n thresholds are calculated.
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Theorem 2.1 The thresholds θ∗i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are found by simultaneously solving the











i + u, θ
∗









(V (θ∗n + u)− I) = V (θ∗n)− I,
where ζ i = inf (θj | θj ≥ θ∗i and j ∈ IN0) , i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, and the functions Fi and V
are defined by equations (2.43) and (2.9), respectively.
Although the theorem tells us what equations we should solve in order to find the
solution to the technology investment problem, it seems impossible to do so in practice.




+ 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} , but it is impossible to solve the system of equations after
substitution of these expressions.
In case the jump size is constant the technology investment problem can be solved in
the following way. Therefore we introduce some more notation. Let j denote the number
of the technology currently in use by the firm and k the number of the best technology
available, i.e. at time t we have ζ (t) = θj and θ (t) = θk. Define the following functions




fi+1 (j,m, k) if i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} ,
V (θj) if i = n,
(2.45)
and for i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},












gi+1 (m,m) . (2.46)
The function g gives the value of the firm as function of i, j, and k, where i equals the
number of switches the firm has made so far. When the firm’s i-th technology switch is
from technology θj to technology θm and the current best technology is θk, the value of
the firm is given by fi (j,m, k) . Note that
fi+1 (j,m, k) = V (θj) + E [exp (−r (Tm − t))| t ∈ [Tk, Tk+1)] (gi+1 (m,m)− V (θj)) .
(2.47)
From Lemma 2.3 (see Appendix 2.D) we know that






Substituting this last equation into equation (2.47) gives equation (2.46). Taking all this
into account brings us to the following theorem.
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Theorem 2.2 Let the efficiencies levels θi, i ∈ IN0 be given and set ζ0 = θ0. Then it is
optimal for the firm to adopt the technologies with the following efficiency levels at the
moment that these technologies become available:
ζ i = θm∗i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,
in which









, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,
where m∗0 = 0. The value of the firm equals g0 (0, 0).
Note that Theorem 2.2 can be applied for any given set of efficiency levels, i.e. the
jump sizes do not have to be constant.
Example 2.1 (continued) Table 2.2 gives the results of applying Theorem 2.2 to our
parameter set and n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} . From that table we conclude that increasing the firm’s
flexibility, i.e. the ability of making more technology switches, increases the firm’s value.
Further we see that the more switches the firm can make, the earlier the first switch is
made.
n 1 2 3 4 5
gn (0, 0) 4172.69 5181.28 5722.92 6041.76 6236.30
ζ1 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0
ζ2 - 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.8
ζ3 - - 4.5 4.0 3.6
ζ4 - - - 5.3 4.5
ζ5 - - - - 5.8
Table 2.2: Value of the firm and efficiencies of technologies adopted for n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} .
2.4.2 Stochastic Jump Size
Theorem 2.1 also holds in case the jump size is stochastic. The only things that change
are the functions Fi. In the stochastic jump case the values of ζ i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ,
are not known beforehand. However, to obtain a solution the efficiency parameters of the
technologies that arrive in the future must be known. Therefore, the best that can be done
is to design an approximation of the solution. For instance, the following approach can be
chosen. In order to obtain approximations of the thresholds set ζ i = θ
∗
i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
28 2.5. Net Present Value Method
Of course, after each technology adoption we know the exact value of that ζ i and we update
the new approximations.
Hence, when we replace V (θj) by E [V (θj (t))| t] in equations (2.45) and (2.46), The-
orem 2.2 can be used to make a prediction about the efficiencies of the technologies that
the firm should adopt in case the jump size is stochastic. However after each technology
arrival these predictions must be corrected.
Now we are in a position to point out a mistake in Farzin et al. (1998). The cor-














i + u, θ
∗
i + u)− I) du = Fi−1 (θ∗i , θ∗i )− I. (2.49)
Neglecting the possibility that the firm is going to adopt successive technologies, i.e.
θ∗i + u < θ
∗
i+1, it holds that (cf. equation (2.27))










Fi−1 (θ∗i + u, θ
∗
i ) du. (2.50)













i + u, θ
∗




Due to the fact that Farzin et al. (1998) did not take into account the dependence of F on
ζ, i.e. the efficiency of the technology that the firm currently uses, they cancelled out the
integral on the left-hand side of equation (2.51). Since the value of the firm is increasing
in the efficiency of the technology in use, we conclude that the optimal triggers are larger
than the ones derived in Farzin et al. (1998, Section 4). Notice that the integral on the
left-hand side of equation (2.51) resembles the value of the option to invest.
2.5 Net Present Value Method
The net present value method states that an investment should be made when the present
value of the cash flows generated by that investment exceeds the investment cost. The
net present value method implicitly assumes that an investment is either reversible or
if irreversible it is a now or never opportunity. Dixit and Pindyck (1996) extensively
discuss that most investment problems do not satisfy these assumptions. In the technology
adoption framework it is clear that the investment is irreversible. As an example think
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of buying a personal computer. Clearly it is possible to postpone such an investment.
Therefore for applying the net present value the investment should be reversible. In
the case of a personal computer this is (almost surely) not true, i.e. the investment is
irreversible.
To incorporate the irreversibility and the possibility to delay an investment, the real
option theory was developed. For a good introduction and overview we refer to Dixit
and Pindyck (1996). In the real option theory investment opportunities are looked upon
as options. The firm has the right but not the obligation to make the investment. At
the moment that the firm invests the option is killed and because the option is valuable
the firm looses money. Therefore the lost option value should be incorporated in the
investment analysis. In the technology investment problem the option to invest is valuable,
because with positive probability the firm can buy a better technology for the same amount
of money if it waits just a little with 7making the investment.
The following theorem states what technologies the firm should adopt if the firm uses
the net present value method to solve the investment problem.
Theorem 2.3 According to the net present value method the firm adopts the technologies
with the following efficiencies:
ζNPVi = inf
(
θj| θj ≥ θNPVi and j ∈ IN0
)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,




)− I = V (ζNPVi−1 ) , (2.52)
and ζNPV0 = ζ0.
The theorem is easily verified by looking at equation (2.9). Comparing equations
(2.52) and (2.51) yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 The net present value prescribes the firm to make the investments too
early, i.e. ζNPVi < ζ i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
Example 2.1 (continued) We calculated the efficiencies of the first five technologies
that should be adopted according to the net present value method. The results are put
in Table 2.3. Comparing this table with the last column of Table 2.2 we see that indeed








Table 2.3: Efficiencies of the first five technologies that should be adopted according to the net present
value method.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyzed the technology investment problem of a single firm. New
technologies arrive according to a Poisson jump process and the efficiency increases were
modelled in three ways. It turns out that the probability distribution of the jump size
(degenerate, uniform, or exponential) does not influence the result very much (see Exam-
ple 2.1). This conclusion holds generally whenever the expected value of investing after
the next technology arrival is almost the same for each approach.
It is only possible to completely solve the multiple switch case at the beginning of the
planning period if the efficiencies of the new technologies are known beforehand. This
implies that in the stochastic jump size case the solution of the model must be updated
after each technology arrival.
In Section 2.5 the incorrectness of the net present value method is proved. The example
showed that there is a significant difference between the optimal adoption pattern and
the one proposed by the net present value method.




Consider the following dynamic problem of a risk-neutral and value maximizing firm that
discounts against rate r (> 0). The firm has the opportunity to undertake a project. The
value of the project depends on one state variable, x (t) ∈ IR, which evolves stochastically
over time t (≥ 0) according to an Itô process or a Poisson jump process.
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Definition 2.1 The stochastic variable x (t) behaves according to an Itô process if and
only if for t ≥ 0
dx (t) = f (t, x (t)) dt+ g (t, x (t)) dω (t) ,
x (0) = x0,
where dω (t) is an increment of a Wiener process, i.e. dω (t) is distributed according to a
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance dt, and x0 ∈ IR.
Definition 2.2 The stochastic variable x (t) behaves according to a Poisson jump process
if and only if for t ≥ 0
dx (t) =
{
u (t, x (t)) with probability λdt,
0 with probability 1− λdt,
x (0) = x0,
where u (t, x (t)) is deterministic or distributed according to some probability distribution
and x0 ∈ IR.
Let Ω (x (t)) , with Ω : IR → IR, be the termination payoff when the firm undertakes
the project at state x (t) . Before the project is undertaken the firm receives a profit flow
π (x (t)) , with π : IR → IR. This profit flow stops at the moment that the firm undertakes
the project. This investment problem is called an optimal stopping problem (see also
Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 4)).
Denote the value of the project before stopping by F (x (t)) . Then given state x (t)
and given that the firm has not stopped before, the value of the project is given by
F (x (t)) = max (Ω (x (t)) , π (x (t)) dt+ exp (−rdt)E [F (x (t+ dt))|x (t)]) . (2.53)
The first argument within the maximization operator is equal to the value of stopping at
time t (≥ 0). The second argument equals the value of not stopping at time t, and acting
optimally from time t + dt onwards. This is called the Bellman principle of optimality.
In the continuation region the second argument within the maximization operator is the
largest. This implies that F must satisfy the following so-called Bellman equation in the
continuation region




E [dF (x (t))] . (2.54)
The expectation in equation (2.54) can be calculated with Itô’s lemma.
Itô’s lemma Let x (t) behave according to an Itô process or a Poisson jump process and let
G (t, x (t)) be a function that is once differentiable with respect to t and twice differentiable
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with respect to x (t). Then
dG (t, x (t)) =
∂G (t, x (t))
∂t
dt+





∂2G (t, x (t))
∂ (x (t))2
(dx (t))2 + o (dt) .
For deterministic processes as well as for Poisson process the term (dx (t))2 is of the
order (dt)2 and can therefore be added to the o (dt) term. Since (dx (t))2 is of order dt
for Itô processes it is stated explicitly in Itô’s lemma. For a proof of Itô’s lemma we refer
the interested reader to Karatzas and Shreve (1991).
Suppose that the termination payoff is increasing in x (t) and that the profit flow is
constant. Then intuition suggests that there exists a threshold x∗ such that undertaking
the project is optimal when x (t) > x∗ and waiting is optimal if x (t) < x∗. Hence, the
stopping region is defined to be equal to {x ∈ IR |x ≥ x∗} and the continuation region is
given by {x ∈ IR |x < x∗}.
Let F (x (t)) be the solution of equation (2.54). Then the threshold x∗ is found by
solving the value matching condition at x∗ :
F (x∗) = Ω (x∗) . (2.55)
Whenever the x (t) process can pass the threshold continuously the smooth pasting con-











The interested reader is referred to Dixit (1991, 1993) for a more rigorous treatment of
smooth pasting and the control of Brownian motion.
The following theorem gives sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of this threshold.
The proof follows Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Appendix 4.B).
Theorem 2.4 Let Φ (x (t+ dt)|x (t)) , with Φ : D → [0, 1] and D ⊆ IR, be a cumulative
probability distribution function such that
E [g (x (t+ dt))| x (t)] =
∫
y∈D
g (y) dΦ (y|x (t)) ,
where g (y) , with g : D → IR, is a given function. Then given that there exists a threshold
x∗, this threshold is unique if the following two conditions are satisfied.




E [dΩ (x (t))| x (t)] is decreasing in x (t) .
2. There is positive persistence of uncertainty, i.e. let x1 < x2 then it holds for all
y ∈ D that Φ (y| x1) > Φ (y| x2) .
Chapter 2. Constant Investment Cost 33
Proof of Theorem 2.4 Define
G (x (t)) = F (x (t))− Ω (x (t)) , (2.57)
then
G (x (t)) = max (0, π (x (t)) dt− Ω (x (t)) + exp (−rdt)E [F (x (t+ dt))|x (t)])
= max(0, π (x (t)) dt− Ω (x (t)) + exp (−rdt)E [Ω (x (t+ dt))| x (t)]
+ exp (−rdt)E [G (x (t+ dt))| x (t)]). (2.58)
Given the two conditions the function G must be decreasing in x (t) . Consider the second
part within the maximization operator. The first condition ensures that the first three
arguments together are decreasing in x (t). If G is decreasing in x (t) , the fourth argument
is also decreasing in x (t) , because of the second condition. This implies that, given a
decreasing function G, the right-hand side of (2.58) is again a decreasing function. A
higher x (t) shifts the probability distribution Φ uniformly to the right and therefore the
expected value decreases. Thus G is decreasing in x (t) which implies that, given that
there exists a threshold x∗, this threshold is unique. 
Note that Theorem 2.4 does not guarantee the existence of a threshold, but if we
can derive a threshold and the conditions are satisfied this threshold is unique. On the
other hand, Theorem 2.4 provides sufficiency conditions which are by no means necessary.
Next we rewrite the conditions in Theorem 2.4 for two specific cases. In the first case x (t)
follows a Brownian motion and in the second case x (t) follows a Poisson jump process.
2.A.1 Brownian Motion Process
Let x (t) follow a Brownian motion with parameters µ and σ for t ≥ 0, i.e.
dx (t) = µdt+ σdω (t) , (2.59)
x (0) = x0, (2.60)
with dω (t) the increment of a Wiener process. Thus dω (t) is distributed according to a
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance dt, which implies that dx (t) is distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean µdt and variance σ2dt. In this case the
cumulative probability distribution Φ is equal to
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From the last equation it follows that the second condition of Theorem 2.4 is satisfied
if x (t) follows a Brownian motion. Now, let us turn to the first condition. Expanding
E [dΩ (x (t))|x (t)] with Itô’s lemma gives








dt+ o (dt) . (2.62)
Uniqueness of the threshold is guaranteed if the function









is decreasing in x (t) .
2.A.2 Poisson Jump Process




u with probability λdt,
0 with probability 1− λdt, (2.64)
x (0) = x0, (2.65)
where u is distributed according to some probability distribution with density function
φ, with φ : S → [0, 1] and S ⊆ IR+. Let z = inf
w∈S
(w) and z = sup
w∈S
(w) . The cumulative
probability distribution Φ is given by
Φ (y| x) =

0 if y − x < z,
y−x∫
z=z
φ (z) dz if z ≤ y − x < z,
1 if y − x ≥ z.
(2.66)
Hence, the second condition of Theorem 2.4 is satisfied in this case. Applying Itô’s lemma
gives for this case
E [dΩ (x (t))| x (t)] = λdt
∫
z∈S
(Ω (x (t) + z)− Ω (x (t)))φ (z) dz + o (dt) . (2.67)
This implies that the first condition of Theorem 2.4 is that the following function should
be decreasing in x (t)
π (x (t))− (r + λ) Ω (x (t)) + λ
∫
z∈S
Ω (x (t) + z)φ (z) dz. (2.68)
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Now we can derive sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the threshold in Example
2.1. In that example we have





First let the jumps be constant, then equation (2.68) becomes













This last equation is decreasing in θ if and only if
− (r + λ) bθb−1 + λb (θ + u)b−1 < 0. (2.72)









which is strongest for θ = θ0. Therefore, given the fact that θ0 = ζ0, equation (2.72) holds









When the jumps are uniformly distributed a sufficient condition for uniqueness is
ζ0 ≥ u. To see this, note that in this case equation (2.68) equals


















which is decreasing in θ for ζ0 ≥ u since
− (r + λ) bθb−1 + λ
u
(
(θ + u)b − θb
)
≤ − (r + λ) θb−1 + λ
u
(
θb + ub − θb)
= − (r + λ) θb−1 + λub−1
< −λζb−10 + λub−1
≤ 0.
Lastly we derive a sufficient condition for the case that the jumps are exponentially
distributed. The equivalent of equation (2.68) is














µ exp (−µz) dz. (2.76)
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Differentiating equation (2.76) with respect to θ and multiplying by r
ϕb
gives
− (r + λ) θb−1 + λ
∞∫
z=0
(θ + z)b−1 µ exp (−µz) dz
≤ − (r + λ) θb−1 + λ
∞∫
z=0
θb−1µ exp (−µz) dz + λ
∞∫
z=0
zb−1µ exp (−µz) dz






zb−1 exp (−µz) dz
= −rθb−1 + λΓ (b)
µb−1
,









Proposition 2.4 Let the constants a0, a1, and a2 be positive constants. The solution of
f (x) = a0 + a1f (x+ a2) , (2.78)
is given by




1− a1 , (2.79)
where c is a constant to be determined by some boundary condition.
Proof of Proposition 2.4 The correctness of the proposition is easily verified after sub-
stitution of equation (2.79) into equation (2.78). 
Proposition 2.5 Let the constants a0, a1, and a2 be positive constants. The solution of
f (x) = a0 + a1
a2∫
y=0
f (x+ y) dy, (2.80)
is given by
f (x) = c0 exp (c1x) +
a0
1− a1a2 , (2.81)
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where c1 is the solution of
a1 (exp (a2c1)− 1)− c1 = 0, (2.82)
and c0 is a constant to be determined by some boundary condition.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 Substitution of equation (2.81) in equation (2.80) and rear-
ranging gives equation (2.82). 
Lemma 2.1 Let a1 and a2 be positive constants. Equation (2.82) has a unique positive
solution c1 if and only if a1a2 < 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 Define
g (c1) = a1 (exp (a2c1)− 1)− c1 = 0.
Then the first and second derivative of g are given by
∂g (c1)
∂c1






2 exp (a2c1) > 0,





Further it holds that g (0) = 0 and lim
c1→∞
g (c1) = ∞. Therefore the other root will be
positive if and only if c∗1 > 0. Since a2 is positive by assumption, the condition for a
positive root can be written as a1a2 < 1. 
Proposition 2.6 Let a0, a1, a2, and a3 be positive constants and x ∈ [a2 − a3, a2]. The
solution of
f (x) = a0 + a1
 a2−x∫
y=0
f (x+ y) dy +
a3∫
y=a2−x
g (x+ y) dy
 , (2.83)
is given by
f (x) = a1 (h (x)− h (a2)) exp (−a1x)
+
a0 + a1 a3∫
y=0
g (a2 + y) dy




= g (x+ a3) exp (a1x) . (2.85)
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Proof of Proposition 2.6 Define ∂F (x)
∂x
= f (x) and ∂G(x)
∂x
= g (x), then equation (2.83)
can be written as
∂F (x)
∂x
= a0 + a1 (F (a2)− F (x) +G (x+ a3)−G (a2)) . (2.86)



















exp (a1x) dx+ c
)
exp (−a1x) , (2.88)






exp (a1x) dx+ c
)
exp (−a1x) dx. (2.89)
Using the definition of h (see equation (2.85)) and integrating by parts gives






exp (−a1x) +G (x+ a3) . (2.90)
Substitution of equation (2.90) in equation (2.86) gives
c =
a0 + a1 a3∫
y=0
g (a2 + y) dy
 exp (a1a2)− a1h (a2) . (2.91)
Equation (2.84) is found by substituting equation (2.91) in equation (2.88) and rearrang-
ing. 













exp (a3 (a4 − x))− a1
a2 − a3 exp (−a2x) + c, (2.93)
where c is a constant to be determined by some boundary condition.
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Proof of Proposition 2.7 Differentiating both sides of (2.92) to x gives
∂2f (x)
∂x2
= −a2a1 exp (−a2x)− a3∂f (x)
∂x
. (2.94)
Solving this differential equation gives
∂f (x)
∂x
= δ0 exp (−a3x) + δ1 exp (−a2x) . (2.95)
Substitution of (2.95) in (2.94) gives
δ1 =
a1a2
a2 − a3 . (2.96)
Integrating equation (2.95) after substitution of equation (2.96 ) gives the following ex-
pression for f :
f (x) = −δ0
a3
exp (−a3x)− a1
a2 − a3 exp (−a2x) + c. (2.97)




a2 − a3 exp (−a2a4)
)
exp (a3a4) . (2.98)
Equation (2.93) is found by substituting equation (2.98) in equation (2.97). 
Proposition 2.8 Let a0, a1, a2 and a3 be positive constants. Then the solution of
f (x) = a0 + a1
 a2−x∫
y=0
f (x+ y) a3 exp (−a3y) dy +
∞∫
y=a2−x





a1 exp (a2a3) ∞∫
y=a2
g (y) a3 exp (−a3y) dy − a0a1
1− a1
 exp ((1− a1) a3 (x− a2))
+
a0
1− a1 . (2.100)
Proof of Proposition 2.8 Equation (2.99) can be written as
f (x) = a0 + a1 exp (a3x)
 a2∫
y=x
f (y) a3 exp (−a3y) dy +
∞∫
y=a2
















g (y) a3 exp (−a3y) dy. (2.103)
So, F must satisfy the following differential equation
∂F (x)
∂x
= a1a3a4 + a0a3 exp (−a3x) + a1a3 (F (a2)− F (x)) . (2.104)




1− a1 exp (−a3a2)− a4
)
exp (a1a3 (a2 − x))− a0








1− a1 exp (−a3a2)
)
exp (a1a3 (a2 − x)) + a0a3
1− a1 exp (−a3x) .
(2.106)








Substitution of (2.106) into equation (2.107) gives equation (2.100). 
2.C Definitions
2.C.1 Probability Distributions
Definition 2.3 The variable X is distributed according to a Poisson distribution with
parameter µ > 0 on IN0 if the probability function, pk, of X is given by
pk = Pr (X = k) =
µk
k!
exp (−µ) , for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (2.108)
Definition 2.4 The variable X is distributed according to an exponential distribution
with parameter µ > 0 on the interval (0,∞) if the probability density function, p (x), of
X is given by
p (x) = µ exp (−µx) , for x > 0. (2.109)
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Definition 2.5 The variable X is distributed according to a gamma distribution with
parameters µ > 0 and n > 0 on the interval (0,∞) if the probability density function,




xn−1 exp (−µx) , for x > 0, (2.110)




tn−1 exp (−t) dt. (2.111)
Thus for n ∈ IN we have that Γ (n) = (n− 1)!.
Definition 2.6 The variable X is distributed according to a normal distribution with
parameters µ ∈ IR and σ > 0 on the interval (−∞,∞) if the probability density function,












, for x ∈ IR. (2.112)
Definition 2.7 The variable X is distributed according to a uniform distribution on the
interval [a, b] if the probability density function, p (x), of X is given by
p (x) =
1
b− a, for x ∈ IR. (2.113)
2.C.2 Sets
Definition 2.8 IN is the set of natural numbers without zero, thus IN = {1, 2, 3, . . . }.
Definition 2.9 IN0 is the set of natural numbers including zero, thus IN0 = {0, 1, 2, . . . } .
Definition 2.10 IR is the set of real numbers.
Definition 2.11 IR+ is the set of non-negative real numbers, thus IR+ = {x ∈ IR| x ≥ 0} .
2.C.3 Other






42 2.D. Lemmas and Proofs
2.D Lemmas and Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1 From the analysis of Subsection 2.A.2 we know that the
threshold is unique if the following function is decreasing in θ
π (ζ0)− (r + λ) (V (θ)− I) + λ
∫
z∈S
(V (θ + z)− I)φ (z) dz, (2.114)
where φ, with φ : S → [0, 1] and S ⊆ IR+, is the probability density function of the
probability distribution of the jump size. Due to the concavity of π and since φ is a
probability density function we have∫
z∈S
∂π (θ + z)
∂θ
φ (z) dz ≤ ∂π (θ)
∂θ
. (2.115)
Differentiating equation (2.114) with respect to θ and substitution of equation (2.115)































Thus equation (2.114) is decreasing in θ and the threshold is unique. 
Lemma 2.2 Let X be a stochastic variable that is distributed over the interval [0,∞)
according to some distribution with distribution function F (x) = Pr (X ≤ x). Let f (x)
be a continuous and differentiable function on [0,∞) . Then





(1− F (t)) dt+ f (0) . (2.116)
Proof of Lemma 2.2 The proof is straightforward:
E [f (X)] =
∞∫
x=0

























(1− F (t)) dt+ f (0) .

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Lemma 2.3 The discounted value of one unit of money the firm receives after the n-th









(−r (TN(t)+n − t))] . (2.118)
Since the technologies arrive according to a Poisson process, the time between two tech-
nology arrivals is exponentially distributed. We denote the number of technologies that
arrive over an interval [t, t+ s) by R (s). Thus, it holds that R (s) = N (t+ s) − N (t).
Due to the fact that N is a Poisson process with rate λ, the stochastic variable R (s) is









Pr (R (s) = k) . (2.119)
Using Lemma 2.2 we can derive the following expression for E
[
exp




(−r (TN(t)+n − t))] = 1− r ∞∫
s=0
exp (−rs) (1− Pr (TN(t)+n − t ≤ s)) ds. (2.120)


















Pr (R (s) = k) ds. (2.121)





















(r + λ)k+1 exp (− (r + λ) s) sk
k!
ds. (2.122)
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The integral equals one, since it equals the cumulative distribution of a gamma distributed
























Thus equation (2.117) holds. 









































In the second step we substitute equation (2.24) and in the fourth step the probability
function of Poisson distribution (see Definition 2.3). The last equality holds, because
the expression that is integrated is the density function of a gamma distribution with
parameters λ and n+ 1 (see also Definition 2.5).














V ar [t∗] = E
[
(t∗)2
]− (E [t∗])2 = n∗
λ2
.
Thereby the proposition is proved. 
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(1− Pr (t∗ ≤ t)) dt =
∞∫
t=0
(1− Pr (θ (t) ≥ θ∗)) dt =
∞∫
t=0




















∣∣∣∣∣∣N (t) = k
Pr (N (t) = k) dt. (2.126)
Noting that the sum of k independent and identically exponentially distributed variables
(with parameter µ) is distributed according to a gamma distribution with parameters µ
and k (see Definition 2.5) and that the probability that u0 is less than θ



























exp (−λt) dtdx+ 1
λ
.
Seeing that the second integral equals one (probability density function of gamma distri-














µ (θ∗ − θ0) + 1
λ
.










V ar [t∗] =








We consider a firm whose profit is only influenced by its own technology choice. There
are two differences with the model of Chapter 2. First, it is assumed that the efficiency
improvements of the new technologies are known. In practice this does not seem to be
a very restrictive assumption. For example, when Intel launched the Pentium processor
everyone knew that one day they would come up with a processor that is twice as fast as
the Pentium processor. The only thing not known for sure was when this processor would
become available. Second, the prices of new technologies are assumed to drop over time,
implying that a firm needs to invest less in case it decides to buy a new technology at a
later point of time. The reason for this price decrease is that, as time passes, the demand
for a particular technology declines because of market saturation and the invention of
newer technologies that are better than this particular one.
The problem of the firm is (1) to decide whether to invest in a new technology or not,
(2) if the firm decides to invest, which technology to choose, and (3) at what time it is
optimal to invest. The sooner the firm invests the higher the price it has to pay for a new
technology, but the sooner the firm can produce more efficiently. Another disadvantage
of investing very fast is that there exists a risk that a much better technology will become
available just a little later. Both the single switch and multiple switch case will be
analyzed.
The model will be solved using dynamic programming. Similar to the previous chapter
we compare the optimal investment strategy with the one that would have been found
when the widely used net present value method was applied. The net present value method
prescribes that the firm should go ahead with investing as soon as the discounted cash
flow stream exceeds the initial sunk cost investment. In doing so the net present value
method does not take into account the advantage of delaying investment, which arises
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from the fact that the later a firm invests in a new technology the lower the sunk cost
investment will be. Also, this method does not take into account the probability that a
better technology will be invented at a later point of time. Hence, applying the net present
value rule will lead to a suboptimal outcome, because the option value of postponing the
investment is not taken into account. In this respect this model contributes to a recent
stream of literature in which investment decisions are analyzed as real options (for an
overview see the well received book by Dixit and Pindyck (1996)).
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the basic model, while
in Section 3.3 the optimal investment strategy for the single switch case is derived. The
multiple switch case is discussed in Section 3.4. We compare the optimal strategy with
the one that is the result of applying the net present value rule in Section 3.5. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider a risk-neutral firm whose profit is not influenced by the technology choice of
other firms. Since the firm can make more profits with a more efficient technology we
assume that the firm has a profit function π which is increasing and concave in ζ (≥ 0) , the
technology-efficiency parameter. We analyze a dynamic model with an infinite planning
period and assume that the firm maximizes its value and discounts against rate r (> 0).
Initially, at time t = 0, the firm produces with a technology designated by ζ (0) = ζ0,
with ζ0 ≥ 0. As time passes new technologies become available, and the firm has the
opportunity to adopt a new technology. At time t (≥ 0) the efficiency of the most efficient
available technology is denoted by θ (t) and the efficiency of the technology that the
firm uses is denoted by ζ (t) . We assume that the process of technological evolution is
exogenous to the firm. Technologies become more and more efficient over time, and the
more efficient a technology the larger the associated parameter θ. Thus 0 ≤ ζ (t) ≤ θ (t)
for all t ≥ 0. However, the arrival process of the new technologies is a stochastic process.
On the other hand, the efficiency improvements of the new technologies are assumed to
be known. The i-th new technology has an (known) efficiency level equal to θi (> θi−1)
with i ∈ IN and θ0 ≥ ζ0. In the remainder of this chapter we will use the efficiency level
of a technology to refer to that specific technology. For example we write technology θi
instead of technology i. We denote the number of technology arrivals over the interval
[0, t) by N (t). Therefore θ (t) = θN(t) for all t ≥ 0. For notational convenience we write θ
instead of θ (t) . We assume that N (t) is a Poisson process with rate λ > 0. We denote
the time elapsed between the invention of technology i − 1 and technology i by τ i. We






thus Ti is equal to the point in time at which technology θi becomes available. Let T (t) ,
with t ≥ 0, be the set which contains the arrival dates of theN (t) technologies that arrived
over the time interval [0, t) . Thus T (t) = ∅ if N (t) = 0 and T (t) = {T1, . . . , TN(t)} if
N (t) ≥ 1. Further it holds that |T (t)| = N (t) , where |S| is defined to be equal to the
number of elements of a finite set S.
When the firm adopts technology θi at time t it incurs a non negative sunk cost
investment which is denoted by Ii (t) , with Ii : [Ti,∞) → IR+. At the moment that
a new technology becomes available to the market, the investment cost instantaneously
declines with a certain fraction, which is given a Poisson jump. Here the investment cost
is subject to the same Poisson process as the one that determines the arrival rate of new
technologies. The reason for this can be that the suppliers of technologies put the old
technology for sale against a lower price to get rid of these less efficient technologies.
For t ≥ Ti the investment cost Ii (t) decreases according to the following process
dIi (t) =
{
−αiIi (t) dt− βiIi (t) with probability λdt,
−αiIi (t) dt with probability 1− λdt,
(3.1)
Ii (Ti) = Ii0, (3.2)
where Ii0 ≥ 0. αi, with αi ≥ 0, is the parameter that determines the speed of the determin-
istic decline of the investment cost and βi ∈ [0, 1) corresponds to the size of the jump the
investment cost makes when a new technology arrives. The deterministic decline of the
investment cost can be explained by market saturation: the price of a certain technology
decreases over time due to the fact that the demand for that technology decreases.
The following proposition gives the solution of the system of equations (3.1)-(3.2).
The proof is given in Appendix 3.A.
Proposition 3.1 The investment cost of technology i at time t ≥ Ti is equal to
Ii (t) = (1− βi)N(t)−i Ii0 exp (−αi (t− Ti)) . (3.3)
The general problem facing the firm is: (1) to choose to which technology to switch
and (2) to choose the right moment to switch to that technology.
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3.3 Single Switch
In this section we assume that the firm is allowed to switch technologies only once. One
reason that a firm cannot invest more than once can be that the firm’s financial means
are limited. There are an infinite number of possible investment strategies for the firm.
The first strategy is ”never invest” and the others are of the form: ”invest in technology
θi ”, i ∈ IN. Although there are an infinite number of investment strategies, only a finite
number need to be considered. The reason is that the strategies ”invest in technology
θi” for i sufficiently large may be ignored. Thus, the values of these strategies are the
same as the value of the strategy ”never invest” and therefore they can be ignored for
the moment. An equivalent application of this so-called forecast horizon procedure can
be found in Nair (1995).
We know that the firm is going to invest at some time anyway. The reason for this
is a combination of (i) that the investment costs go to zero as time goes to infinity, (ii)
that the efficiency levels of the new technologies are higher than the efficiency level of the
technology that is currently in use, and (iii) the profit function is increasing and concave
in the efficiency level of the technology in use.
We obtain the optimal investment strategy for the firm by comparing, for all values
of the investment costs Ii, i ∈ IN, the value of the firm under the possible strategies.
Therefore we consider that the firm is going to invest in some technology θi, with i ∈ IN,
determine the optimal time to invest in this technology, and derive the value of the firm
conditional on this investment strategy.
The expected value of the firm at time t, if the firm has not invested yet, is denoted
by F (t, T (t) , ζ0) and is equal to
F (t, T (t) , ζ0) = max
i∈IN
(Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0)) , (3.4)
where Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0) equals the value of the firm at time t if the firm decides to invest in
technology θi, given T (t) and ζ0. In order to derive an expression for Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0) we
first consider the case where technology θi is already available at time t (i ≤ N (t)) and
after that the case where technology θi is not yet invented at time t (i > N (t)).
3.3.1 Technology Being Available
In this subsection we derive the value of the firm when for some i ∈ IN the firm is going
to invest in technology θi and technology θi has already been invented. The only thing
that is left is to determine the timing of the investment. The problem facing the firm is
an optimal stopping problem. For an introduction we refer the reader to Appendix 2.A.
Intuition suggests that there will be a critical level I∗i such that it is optimal for the firm
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to invest when the investment cost is equal or below the critical level, Ii ≤ I∗i , and it
is optimal to wait with investing otherwise, Ii > I
∗
i . The following proposition, that is
proved in Appendix 3.A, guarantees the uniqueness of the threshold.
Proposition 3.2 The threshold I∗i is unique.
There are two ways for the investment cost to fall below the critical level (see Figure
3.1). One possible way is by a jump and the other possibility is that the investment
cost passes the critical level smoothly. Therefore we can identify three regions for the
investment cost. In the first region the investment cost is above the critical level and it is
not possible that the investment cost falls below the critical level after the next jump. The
second region is characterized by the facts that the investment cost is above the critical
level and that the investment cost will be below the critical level after the next jump. In
the last region the investment cost is below the critical level. The first two regions together
are called the continuation region. The boundary between the continuation region and
the third region is of course the critical level I∗i . The cut-off point between the first and
the second region is determined by the critical level and the size of the jump, so that it
equals
I∗i
(1−βi) . The next step is to derive expressions for the value of the firm, denoted by
fi (Ii, ζ0), in each of these three regions and an expression for the critical level.


















Figure 3.1: Sample paths of Ii (t) . In the left panel the investment cost decreases smoothly through the
critical level I∗i and in the right panel the investment cost jumps through the critical level I
∗
i .
In the termination region, {Ii |0 ≤ Ii ≤ I∗i } , it is optimal to invest right away in tech-
nology θi. Since the firm can make only one technology switch, the firm will produce with
technology θi forever after the switch. Thus, in this region the value of the firm equals




−rsds− Ii = π (θi)
r
− Ii. (3.5)
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The value function fi must satisfy the following Bellman equation in the continuation
region (cf. Appendix 2.A):




E [dfi (Ii, ζ0)] . (3.6)
In the second part of the continuation region, where
{
Ii
∣∣∣I∗i < Ii ≤ I∗i(1−βi) }, the firm is
going to switch after the next jump of the investment cost. Since the firm can make only
one technology switch, we know that the firm is going to produce with this technology θi
forever after the technology switch. So the value of the firm after the technology switch
equals π(θi)
r
. Expanding E [dfi (Ii, ζ0)] using Itô’s lemma (see Appendix 2.A) and equation
(3.1) gives










− (Ii − αiIidt− βiIi)− fi (Ii, ζ0)
)
+ o (dt) . (3.7)
Substitution of equation (3.7) into (3.6) and rewriting gives

















The solution of this differential equation is given by















in which Bi is a constant to be determined. Hence, the value of the firm in the second
region consists of four parts. The first part is equal to the value of the option to invest in
technology θi. Note that this option value increases over time with rate αi (not αi + λβi)
since the firm kills this option after the next technology arrival. The latter is also the
reason for the arrival rate λ being added to the discount rate (see also Subsection 2.3.1).
The second part is the discounted value of the investment cost to be paid when adopting
technology θi. To explain this, let S denote the time till the next technology arrival, so
that
E [exp (−rS) Ii (S)] =
∞∫
s=0




exp (−rs) (1− βi) Ii exp (−αis)λ exp (−λs) ds
=
λ (1− βi)
r + αi + λ
Ii.
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The third part is the expected value of the discounted profit flow the firm generates from
now until the next technology arrival. Therefore λ is added to the discount rate. The last
part is the discounted value of the firm after the technology switch. A general derivation
and interpretation of the discount factor λ
r+λ
is given by Lemma 2.3 in Appendix 2.D.
Expressions for Bi and the critical level I
∗
i can be derived by considering the case
that the investment cost decreases smoothly through the critical level. Then the value
matching and smooth pasting conditions must hold at the critical level.
In the first region, i.e.
{
Ii
∣∣∣ I∗i(1−βi) < Ii ≤ Ii0} , we know that the firm is not going to
switch after the next jump of the investment cost. In this case the function fi must satisfy
the following equation









The solution of this differential equation equals







where Ai is a constant to be determined later on. From (3.11) we obtain that the value
of the firm in the first region consists of two parts. The first part can be looked upon as
the value of the option to invest in technology θi. The second part is equal to the value of
the firm if it decides to produce with technology ζ0 forever, which then equals the value
of the firm when the firm never exercises the option to invest. The constant Ai can be
determined by making use of the continuity condition at the boundary between the first
and the second region.
Now we can derive expressions for the constants and the cut-off points using the
following three conditions. First the continuity condition at the cut-off point between the



























Second the value matching condition at the cut-off point between the second and the
third region, stating that the firm at this cut-off point is indifferent between investing





αi − λ (1− βi)














− I∗i . (3.13)
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r + αi + λβi







Substitution of (3.15) in (3.13) and solving for I∗i gives
I∗i =
π (θi)− π (ζ0)
r + αi + λβi
. (3.16)
An economic interpretation of (3.16) is given in Subsection 3.3.4. Note that the critical
level does only depend on technologies 0 and i. This is for the reason that the critical
level is derived conditional on the fact that the firm is going to switch from technology
ζ0 to technology θi. By combining equations (3.12), (3.15) and (3.16) an expression for
Ai can be derived.
We conclude that the value of the firm at time t conditional on the strategy ”invest
in technology θi” when technology θi is available at time t is given by





























− Ii if 0 ≤ Ii ≤ I∗i .
(3.17)
Using this equation we get the following expression for Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0) with t ≥ Ti :
Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0) = fi (Ii (t) , ζ0) , (3.18)
where Ii (t) is calculated using equation (3.3).
3.3.2 Technology Not Being Available
If at time t technology θi is not yet available for the firm, the value of the firm under
the strategy ”invest in technology θi ” is equal to the sum of the discounted profit flows
generated on the time interval (t, Ti) , where Ti is the moment of time that technology θi
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is invented, and the discounted value of the firm under the strategy ”invest in technology
θi” at time Ti, i.e.









































Substitution of the equations (3.18) and (3.20) in equation (3.19) yields for t < Ti,

















































if 0 ≤ Ii0 ≤ I∗i .
(3.21)
3.3.3 Optimal Investment Strategy
From the above analysis it can be concluded that the following theorem states the optimal
investment strategy.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a time t (≥ 0) . Let k = argmax
i∈IN
Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0) . Given that the
firm has not invested before, it is optimal for the firm to invest in technology θk at time t
if the following two conditions are fulfilled:
(1) Ik (t) < I
∗
k , (3.22)
(2) k ≤ N (t) , (3.23)
and otherwise it is optimal to wait with investing. The value functions Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N (t)} and for i > N (t) are calculated with equation (3.18) and (3.21),
respectively. The investment costs Ii (t) , i ∈ {1, . . . , N (t)} , are calculated with equation
(3.3) and Ii (t) = Ii0 for i > N (t). The optimal switching levels I
∗
i , for i ∈ IN, are given
by equation (3.16).
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The first condition ensures that the sunk cost investment is already below the critical
value so that it is optimal to invest right now in θk. The second condition says that
technology θk is already available. If at least one of these conditions is not fulfilled, it is
optimal for the firm to keep on producing with the old technology and wait with investing.
As mentioned before, only a finite number of technologies need to be considered. The







= 0, the value of the firm under the strategy ”invest in technology
θi” for sufficiently large i will equal
π(ζ0)
r
(let i go to infinity in equation (3.21)). Thus,
the values of these strategies are the same as the value of the strategy ”never invest” and
therefore they can be ignored for the moment.
Example 3.1 In this example we again analyze the firm from Example 2.1. Thus the
profit flow is equal to π (ζ) = 200ζ2 and the discount rate is given by r = 0.1. We assume
that on average each five years a new technology arrives, i.e. λ = 1
5
, and that the efficiency
of the i-th technology is given by θi = θ0+
1
2
i. Further we set ζ0 = θ0 = 1. The parameters
for the investment cost are the same for all new technologies and equal to Ii0 = I0 = 1600,
αi = α ∈ [0, 0.9] and βi = 0, for all i ∈ IN. We consider an interval of α values rather than
a unique number, because we want to analyze the effect of α on the optimal investment
strategy of the firm.
For the parameter values concerned it holds that I∗4 ≥ I0, which implies that it is
optimal to adopt technology θ4 at its arrival date. Consider the decision problem of the
firm at time T4. Investing in technology θ4 gives a payoff of
π (θ4)
r
− I0 = 16400.












It turns out that the expected value of the firm is even lower when it waits for better
technologies than technology θ5. Therefore the optimal strategy at time T4 is to adopt
technology θ4.
Further it can be obtained that technologies θ1 and θ2 will never be adopted by the firm,
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− I3 (t) ≥ 11600,










Thus the probability that the firm adopts technology θ3, given α, equals






With the complementary probability technology θ4 is adopted:






These probabilities are plotted in Figure 3.2. Notice that when α = 0 we are back in the
analysis of Chapter 2 and the firm is going to adopt technology θ4 for sure. Increasing α
increases the probability that technology θ3 is adopted. This for the reason that increasing
α increases the probability that the investment cost of technology θ3 has decreased enough
to make its adoption optimal.












α) Pr( θ3| α)
Pr( θ4| α)
Figure 3.2: Probability of adopting technology θ3 and probability of adopting technology θ4, both as
function of α.
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3.3.4 Comparative Statics
By partially differentiating equation (3.16) we can show that the critical switching level I∗i
will be higher, implying that the firm is willing to pay more for technology θi, the smaller
the discount rate, the higher the efficiency level of the new technology, and the lower the
efficiency level of the technology that is currently used. The intuition for these effects
is straightforward: the opportunity cost of waiting in anticipation of a lower investment
cost consists of the discounted forgone profits during the waiting period, which clearly
will be greater the smaller is r. A relatively higher efficiency level of the new technology,
or a relatively lower efficiency level of the technology currently in use, makes a technology
switch more attractive. Therefore the optimal switching level will be higher, which implies
an earlier technology adoption.
Further we see that the critical switching level I∗i will be lower, the higher αi, the
higher λ and the higher βi. This means that the firm anticipates to a more rapid decline
of the sunk cost investment by waiting for a smaller sunk investment cost.
3.4 Multiple Switches
In this section we try to extend the analysis of the previous section to the case where
the firm is allowed to make n technology switches. Let Gn
(
t, T (t) , ζn−1
)
denote the
value of the firm before the n-th technology switch at time t when the firm produces with








t, T (t) , ζn−1
)
, (3.24)
where F is defined by equation (3.4). In the same fashion we define the value of the firm
before the i-th technology switch, with i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} :
Gi
(






t, T (t) , ζ i−1
)
. (3.25)
In the last equation Gij is the expected value if the firm makes its i-th technology switch to
technology θj. Assume for the moment that technology θj is available at time t, j ≤ N (t),
and that there exists a unique threshold I∗ij . Hence, adopting technology θj is optimal if
the investment cost is equal or below the threshold and waiting is optimal when the
investment cost is larger than the threshold. By gij
(
Ij, T (t) , ζ i−1
)
we denote the value of
the firm when ζ i−1 is the current technology in use, the firm is going to adopt technology
j, which is available, but the investment cost Ij is currently above the critical level I
∗
ij and
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T (t) is the set with arrival dates. Then gij must satisfy the following Bellman equation
rgij
(














Ij, T (t) , ζ i−1
)]
. (3.26)


















Ij, T (t) ∪ {t+ dt}










+ o (dt) . (3.27)
Substitution of equation (3.27) into equation (3.26) gives
(r + λ) gij
(


















Following the steps of the previous section we first have to solve the last equation for gij .
However, it is impossible to derive a closed form expression for gij from equation (3.28).
The problem is mainly caused by the fact that in the model of this chapter, contrary to
the model of Chapter 2, at time t we can not ignore the technologies with efficiencies in the
interval (ζ (t) , θ (t)). In the previous chapter a technology was either adopted at its arrival
date or not at all. However, in this chapter we have to take into account all technologies,
since it is possible that due to a late arrival of another technology it is optimal to adopt
an already existing technology (cf. Example 3.1). Further in the multiple switch case
the firm’s value under the strategy ”the following technology to adopt is technology θj”
increases not only as a result of the decrease of the investment cost of technology θj,
but also through the decreases in the investment costs of technologies θj+1, . . . , θN(t) and
the arrival of new technologies. Since we need an explicit equation for gij to be able to
compare the multiple and single switch cases, we conclude that the multiple switch case
can, unfortunately, not be explicitly solved. Though, it may be possible that equation
(3.28) can be solved numerically.
3.5 Net Present Value Method
In this section we derive the investment strategy according to the net present value method
and compare the result with the optimal investment strategy derived in the previous
sections.
Consider the case in which the firm adopts technology θi. If at time, say t = t0,
investment in technology θi is delayed in our model, the firm can invest later in this
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technology θi against a lower cost than if it had invested at time t0. Therefore the value
of the option to postpone the adoption of technology θi will be positive. Consequently,
the critical switching level of I determined by the net present value method will be larger
than that determined by equation (3.16).
The following holds for the net present value switching level INPVi for switching from






− INPVi . (3.29)
We can rewrite (3.29) as follows:
INPVi =
π (θi)− π (ζ0)
r
. (3.30)
If we compare (3.30) with (3.16) it is not hard to see that the optimal switching level
is smaller than the one obtained according to the net present value method. This implies
that it is optimal to switch later, i.e. the firm anticipates at the decrease of the investment
cost. As with a financial call option it is optimal to wait with exercising until the option is
sufficiently deep in the money. Note that when the investment cost equals the net present
value switching level, the investment option is at the money.
When the investment cost equals the critical level, the discounted gains from invest-





(π (θi)− π (ζ0)) e−ρtdt =
π (θi)− π (ζ0)
ρ
. (3.31)
From (3.31) we obtain that the net present value prescribes to discount with the interest
rate: ρ = r. According to the optimal investment strategy the discount rate must be
ρ = r + αi + λβi (cf. (3.16)). This implies that the rate at which the investment cost
decreases has to be added to the interest rate.
Theorem 3.2 Consider a time t (≥ 0) . Let k = arg max
i∈{1,... ,N(t)}
(Fi (t, T (t) , ζ0)) . Given
that the firm has not invested before, according to the net present value method, the firm
invests at time t in technology θk if the following condition is fulfilled:
Ik (t) < I
NPV
k . (3.32)
Comparing this with the optimal investment strategy we see that the net present value
method leads to wrong investment decisions, because it ignores (1) the decrease of the
investment costs and (2) the fact that more efficient technologies will become available
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in the future. The first point is reflected in the critical levels (compare equation (3.16)
and (3.30)). The second in the set of technologies over which is maximized (compare
definitions of k in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2).
Example 3.1 (continued) For our parameter set it holds that INPVi > I0, for all i ∈ IN.
This implies that according to the net present value method the firm adopts technology 1
at time T1.
3.6 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to analyze optimal technology adoption of a firm, while
the sunk cost investments of each available technology decrease over time.
In the one switch case it is optimal for a firm to invest in a technology if three conditions
are fulfilled: (1) compared to other technologies, the value of the firm is maximized by
investing in that particular technology, (2) the investment cost of that technology is below
its critical value (the option to invest is sufficiently deep in the money), and (3) that this
particular technology is already invented.
Unfortunately, it turned out that the multiple switch case is too complex to solve.
Appendix
3.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1 For t ∈ [Ti, Ti+1) the investment cost Ii (t) is the solution of
dIi (t) = −αiIi (t) dt, (3.33)
Ii (Ti) = Ii0. (3.34)
The solution of this system of equations is
Ii (t) = Ii0 exp (−αi (t− Ti)) , for t ∈ [Ti, Ti+1) . (3.35)
At time t = Ti+1 the investment cost instantaneously decreases with factor βi, thus
Ii (Ti+1) = Ii0 exp (−αi (Ti+1 − Ti))− βiIi0 exp (−αi (Ti+1 − Ti))
= (1− βi) Ii0 exp (−αi (Ti+1 − Ti)) . (3.36)
Over the interval [Ti+1, Ti+2) the decrease of the investment cost is again given by equation
(3.33), but now the initial investment cost level is given by equation (3.36). Hence, for
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t ∈ [Ti+1, Ti+2) we have
Ii (t) = (1− βi) Ii0 exp (−αi (Ti+1 − Ti)) exp (−αi (t− Ti+1))
= (1− βi) Ii0 exp (−αi (t− Ti)) . (3.37)
The investment cost at time t = Ti+2 equals
Ii (Ti+2) = (1− βi) Ii0 exp (−αi (Ti+2 − Ti))− βi (1− βi) Ii0 exp (−αi (Ti+2 − Ti))
= (1− βi)2 Ii0 exp (−αi (Ti+2 − Ti)) . (3.38)
The number of technology arrivals and decreases in the investment cost Ii (t) on the
interval [Ti, t) is equal to N (t) − i. Repeating the steps above N (t) − i times gives
equation (3.3). 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 This proposition is just an application of Theorem 2.4 in
Appendix 2.A. Note that the threshold works the other way around in this chapter.
When the investment cost is above the threshold, the firm waits with investing and if
the investment cost is below the threshold investing is optimal. Therefore the function












E [dIi (t)| Ii (t)] . (3.39)
Expanding equation (3.39) with Itô’s lemma gives
π (ζ0)− π (θi) + rIi (t) + λβiIi (t) + αiIi (t) , (3.40)
which is clearly increasing in Ii (t) . The second condition is also fulfilled, because the
investment cost is decreasing over time. Given two values of the investment cost, Ii1 and
Ii2 such that Ii1 < Ii2, it holds that Pr (Ii (t) ≤ I| Ii1) > Pr (Ii (t) ≤ I| Ii2) . 
Part II





A feature of the last decade is that firms more and more face competition on their output
markets. One reason is the abolition of monopolistic markets created by government. In
the Netherlands examples are the opening of the markets for telecommunication, railway
and power supply. Another reason is the, still ongoing, process of mergers, which due to
legislation will not end with a market with only one supplier. The result is that markets
with only one supplier and markets with many suppliers seem to disappear. Thus, in its
own investment decision, a firm should take into account the investment behavior by its
competitors, which is dealt with in this paper.
The existing literature on technology adoption models can be divided into two cate-
gories. The models in the first category are decision theoretic models that analyze the
technology investment decision of a single firm. In the most advanced models there
are multiple new technologies that arrive over time according to a stochastic process.
Examples are Balcer and Lippman (1984), Nair (1995), Rajagopalan et al. (1998) and
Farzin et al. (1998) (see also Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis). These models analyze the
investment decision of one firm in isolation, so that the effects of competition are not
incorporated.
The second category models are game theoretic models. Two (or more) firms compete
on an output market and produce goods using a particular technology. Then, a new and
more efficient technology is invented, and the question is at what time the firms should
adopt it. Reinganum (1981) was the first to analyze this kind of model. She considered a
duopoly with identical firms, in which there is no uncertainty in the innovation process,
and one new technology is considered. The investment expenditure required to adopt
the new technology decreases over time and the efficiency improvement is known. If a
firm adopts the new technology before the other one does, it makes substantial profits at
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the expense of the other firm. On the other hand the investment cost being decreasing
over time provides an incentive to wait with investing. Reinganum assumes that the
firms precommit themselves to adoption times, so she automatically obtains open loop
equilibria.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) proved that in the open loop equilibria the leader (the
firm that invests first) earns more than the follower (the firm that invests second). Since
precommitment seems not to be very realistic in the strategic setting of a duopoly, Fu-
denberg and Tirole extended Reinganum’s model by relaxing this assumption and by not
determining beforehand which firm is the leader. They therefore allow firms to preempt
each other. After extending the standard Nash equilibrium concept, closed loop equilibria
are obtained. It turns out that the equilibria exhibit rent equalization.
The Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model has been (and still is) the starting point of
many technology adoption models in a duopoly setting. Hendricks (1992) adds uncertainty
to the model, by assuming that a firm is uncertain about the innovative capabilities of
its rival. A firm is either an innovator or an imitator and only the firm itself knows what
type it is. Hendricks assumes that an imitator can only play the follower role in the game.
The result of adding this uncertainty is that in case there are large preemption gains there
is no longer rent equalization in equilibrium. Firms that are innovators have an incentive
to delay the adoption, since with positive probability they believe that their rival is an
imitator. The advantage of adding the uncertainty is that Hendricks can apply the normal
Nash equilibrium concept. Hendricks also discusses what the result is of extending the
model even further by making the profitability of the technology uncertain. He argues
that two cases can occur. The first is equivalent to the one described above and in the
second case the firms end up in an attrition game. In an attrition game each player wants
the other player to move as first. However, given that a player has to move first, the
best thing for this player is to move as early as possible. We refer to Appendix 4.A.3
for a more formal treatment of attrition games. In that appendix we use the equilibrium
concepts introduced in Hendricks et al. (1988).
Hoppe (2000) formalizes Hendricks’s discussion on uncertain profitability. She starts
with the Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model and assumes that the innovation is either
good or bad. Hoppe shows for what parameter values the model results in a preemption
game or an attrition game. She does not use the equilibrium concepts introduced by
Hendricks et al. (1988), that is Hoppe, does not mention the equilibria with symmetric
strategies for her attrition games.
Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) extended the Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model by
making the time between adoption and successful implementation stochastic. To motivate
this model feature, Yorukoglu (1998) argues that information technology capital may
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require significant experience to operate efficiently. For instance, an econometric study
by Brynjolfsson et al. (1991) finds lags of two or three years before the organizational
impacts of information technology become effective. Due to the lack of mathematical
precision the paper of Stenbacka and Tombak led to two follow up papers, namely by Götz
(2000) and by Huisman and Kort (1998a). Both papers correct mistakes of Stenbacka and
Tombak. Götz studies the original model with asymmetric firms, whereas Huisman and
Kort concentrate on the symmetric firm case.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe and present the results
of the basic technology adoption model, i.e. the model that was introduced in Reinganum
(1981) and extensively studied in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). The extension to the
Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model as presented in Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) and
studied in Götz (2000) and in Huisman and Kort (1998a) is considered in Section 4.3.
The last section concludes.
4.2 Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole Model
In this section we present and analyze the game theoretic technology adoption model that
was introduced by Reinganum (1981). There are two identical firms active on an output
market. The firms are labelled 1 and 2. An infinite planning horizon is considered, on
which the risk-neutral firms maximize their value at discount rate r (> 0). Initially the
firms produce with a technology of which the efficiency is denoted by θ0. At time t = 0
a new technology, with efficiency θ1 (> θ0) becomes available and the firms must decide
when to adopt that technology. We assume that the firms do not have any market power
on the technology market, that is they are one of many firms on the technology market.
When a firm adopts the new technology it incurs an investment cost, I, which is a convex
decreasing function of time t (≥ 0):
I (t) > 0,
∂I (t)
∂t




There can be three reasons for the decrease of the investment cost of a particular technol-
ogy: (1) it becomes old-fashioned, (2) the firms that are most eager to buy the technology
have already bought it so that technology suppliers have to drop their price in order
to find additional buyers, and (3) due to learning by doing the technology supplier can
produce the technology in a cheaper way.
The profit function of a firm i is denoted by π (θi, θj) where θi and θj are the efficiencies
of the technologies in use by firm i and firm j, respectively, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j.
There is a first mover advantage in the sense that the gains for being first to adopt
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the new technology are higher than for being second:
π (θ1, θ0)− π (θ0, θ0) > π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ0, θ1) ≥ 0, (4.2)
The four possible profit flows are assumed to be ranked in the following way:
π (θ1, θ0) > π (θ1, θ1) ≥ π (θ0, θ0) ≥ π (θ0, θ1) ≥ 0. (4.3)
Thus, we assume that a firm can make higher profits when it uses a more efficient tech-
nology itself and when its rival uses a less efficient technology. The following assumption
rules out immediate adoption:




> π (θ1, θ0)− π (θ0, θ0) . (4.4)
Equation (4.4) states that, at time t = 0, the marginal costs of adoption are larger than
the marginal benefits of adopting. The costs of adoption at time t are equal to
−I (t) exp (−rt) , (4.5)
so that the marginal costs equal(
rI (t)− ∂I (t)
∂t
)
exp (−rt) . (4.6)
The firm that invests first is called the leader and the other firm is called the follower.
In Subsection 4.2.1 the open loop equilibrium of the model is presented. The feedback
equilibrium is discussed in Subsection 4.2.2. In these first two subsections the firm roles
(leader or follower) are assigned exogenous to the firms. This assumption is relaxed in
Subsection 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Open loop Equilibrium
In an open loop equilibrium both firms precommit themselves to an adoption time at the
beginning of the game, i.e. the firms do not take into account that they can influence the
other firm’s adoption time. The adoption time of the leader and follower are denoted by
tL and tF , respectively. By definition, the leader adopts at the same time or before the
follower, i.e. 0 ≤ tL ≤ tF . Given the adoption times tL and tF , the value of the leader
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equals
VL (tL, tF ) =
tL∫
t=0
π (θ0, θ0) exp (−rt) dt+
tF∫
t=tL




















In the same way the value of the follower, VF (tL, tF ) , can be derived. The follower’s value
is given by










π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ0, θ1)
r
− I (tF )
)
. (4.8)
The open loop equilibria are equal to the intersection points of the reaction curves of
the follower and the leader. The reaction function for the follower is derived by calculating,
for each fixed adoption time tL of the leader, the adoption time of the follower, RF (tL),
that maximizes the follower’s value, taking into account the fact that by definition the
follower has to adopt after the leader: RF (tL) ≥ tL. In the same way the reaction function
of the leader is derived by taking a fixed adoption time tF of the follower and deriving the
best reply of the leader RL (tF ) , under the condition that the leader has to adopt before
the follower: RL (tF ) ≤ tF .
The procedure described above implies that the reaction curves are built up by the
first order conditions of maximizing the value functions and the 45 degree line. The 45
degree line is the line that resembles joint-adoption of the leader and the follower. Note
that we do not claim that the reaction functions are continuous. In fact, in Section 4.3
we present an example where the reaction functions are not continuous.
The first order condition for maximizing VF (tL, tF ) over tF is





Let TF be the solution of equation (4.9). Equations (4.1), (4.2), and (4.4) ensure the
existence of a unique positive maximum. The reaction function of the follower is given by
RF (tL) =
{
TF if tL ≤ TF ,
tL if tL > TF .
(4.10)
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The value VL (tL, tF ) of the leader is maximized with respect to tL if





The solution of equation (4.11) is denoted by TL. As with TF , equations (4.1), (4.2)
and (4.4) ensure the existence of a unique positive maximum. Further, these equations
imply that 0 < TL < TF . Therefore, we conclude that there is diffusion in the open loop
equilibrium timings. The leader’s reaction function equals
RL (tF ) =
{
tF if tF < TL,
TL if tF ≥ TL.
(4.12)










Figure 4.1: Reaction curves of leader and follower.
above results in the following proposition that summarizes the open loop equilibrium. For
a more formal proof we refer to Reinganum (1981).
Proposition 4.1 The open loop equilibrium with exogenous firm roles is as follows. The
leader adopts the technology at time TL (> 0) and the follower adopts the technology at time
TF (> TL), where TL and TF are found by solving equations (4.11) and (4.9), respectively.
4.2.2 Feedback Equilibrium
In a feedback equilibrium the leader takes into account that its investment decision affects
the decision of the follower. The follower’s reaction is the same as in the open loop case. To
determine the equilibrium we plot the leader’s payoff as function of its own adoption date
and take the adoption date of the follower equal to its optimal reaction. The equilibrium
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is given by the adoption time at which the leader’s payoff is at its maximum and the
optimal reaction of the follower on that adoption date.
Define the following three functions
L (t) = VL (t, RF (t)) , (4.13)
F (t) = VF (t, RF (t)) , (4.14)
M (t) = VL (t, t) . (4.15)
The function L (t) (F (t)) is equal to the expected discounted value at time t = 0 of the
leader (follower) when the leader invests at time t. M (t) resembles the discounted value
at time t = 0 of the firm when there is joint-adoption at time t.
The definition of TF implies that joint-adoption is not optimal before TF , i.e.
M (t) < L (t) , t < TF , (4.16)
M (t) < F (t) , t < TF , (4.17)
and is optimal after time TF :
L (t) = F (t) = M (t) , t ≥ TF . (4.18)
Define TC to be equal to
TC = argmax
t≥0
M (t) . (4.19)
Thus TC is the solution of





Equations (4.1)-(4.3) guarantee that TC is positive, exists, and maximizesM. These equa-
tions imply that TC > TF .
From the definitions of L, F, and M we derive that F and M are increasing on the
interval [0, TF ] and that L is increasing on the interval [0, TL) and decreasing on the
interval (TL, TF ] . Further, M is increasing on the interval (TF , TC) and decreasing for
t > TC . Hence, there exist three cases. In case A it holds that L (TL) > M (TC) . Case B
is characterized by L (TL) < M (TC) and case C by L (TL) = M (TC) . In Figures 4.2 and
4.3 the three functions are plotted for cases A and B, respectively.
The analysis above implies that there are two candidates for the feedback equilibrium:
(1) (TL, TF ) and (2) (TC , TC) . The following proposition summarizes the analysis.
Proposition 4.2 If L (TL) > M (TC) the equilibrium is as follows: the leader adopts
the technology at time TL and the follower adopts the technology at time TF . If L (TL) <
M (TC) the equilibrium is of the joint-adoption type, where the leader and the follower
adopt the technology at time TC. If L (TL) = M (TC) both equilibria exist.
72 4.2. Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole Model














Figure 4.2: Case A: L (TL) > M (TC) .














Figure 4.3: Case B: L (TL) < M (TC) .
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4.2.3 Endogenous Firm Roles
In this subsection the firm roles will no longer be exogenously given. This is more realistic
since generally firm roles will not be assigned beforehand in practice. This implies that a
firm can (only) become leader by investing as first. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) were the
first to analyze the model of Reinganum with endogenous firm roles. The reason of doing
this further analysis is that the payoff to the leader exceeds the payoff to the follower in
case A, i.e. L (TL) > F (TL) . Therefore it is in each firm’s interest to be the leader and
end up with the higher payoff. In order to incorporate this feature of endogenous firm
roles in the equilibrium concept, Fudenberg and Tirole developed the so-called perfect
equilibrium concept for timing games (see also Appendix 4.A).
We analyze this problem by using Figures 4.2 and 4.3. We add case C to case B. Thus,
case B is, from now on, characterized by L (TL) ≤ M (TC). Consider case A. Both firms
want to become leader and adopt at time TL. As a result a firm will try to preempt the
other firm by investing at time TL−ε, but then the other will try to preempt by adopting
at time TL − 2ε and so forth and so on. This process stops at time TP , where time TP is
defined as:
TP = min (t ∈ (0, TL) |L (t) = F (t)) . (4.21)
Thus, the preemption process stops at the time at which the expected values of the leader
and follower are equal. This phenomenon is called rent equalization. In the equilibrium
of case A, one of the firms preempts at time TP and the other firm will react by adopting
at time TF > TP .
To analyze case B, first define time TS:
TS = min (t ∈ (TF , TC ] |M (t) = L (TL)) . (4.22)
In case B there are multiple equilibria, which can be split up in two classes. The first
class consists of the (TP , TF ) diffusion equilibria. The second class is a continuum of
joint-adoption outcomes indexed by the date of adoption t ∈ [TS, TC ].
We summarize the analysis in the following proposition (see also Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985, Proposition 2)).
Proposition 4.3 (A) If L (TL) > M (TC) there exists a unique equilibrium distribution
over outcomes. With probability one-half, firm 1 adopts at time TP and firm 2 adopts at
TF , and with probability one-half the roles of the firms are reversed. Thus the equilibrium
exhibits diffusion; and with probability one the adoption dates are TP and TF .
(B) If L (TL) ≤ M (TC) two classes of equilibria exist. The first class are the (TP , TF )
diffusion equilibria. The second class is a continuum of joint-adoption outcomes indexed
by the date of adoption t ∈ [TS, TC ].
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The proof can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). The equilibrium strategies
that result in the mentioned equilibria are given in Appendix 4.A. Fudenberg and Tirole
prove that the probability of a mistake in the diffusion equilibrium, i.e. that both firms
adopt simultaneously at time TP which leads to very low profits, is zero. They derive the
following properties of the equilibria.
Proposition 4.4 Joint-adoption equilibria are Pareto-ranked by their date of adoption,
later adoption being more efficient from the firm’s point of view.
The implication of Proposition 4.4 is that in case B the most reasonable outcome to
expect is the joint-adoption at time TC , because it Pareto-dominates all other equilibria.
4.3 Stenbacka and Tombak’s Extension
In this section we analyze the extension to the Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model intro-
duced in Stenbacka and Tombak (1994). This extension is also studied in Götz (2000) and
Huisman and Kort (1998a). The time between adoption and successful implementation is
uncertain and assumed to be exponentially distributed with rate λ. Note that, contrary
to Stenbacka and Tombak, we assume that the hazard rates of the firms are the same.
4.3.1 Open loop Equilibrium
The expected value of the leader if the leader adopts at time tL (≥ 0) and the follower
adopts at time tF (≥ tL) equals (see Stenbacka and Tombak (1994))
























−I (tL) exp (−rtL) . (4.23)
The expected value of the follower is given by
























−I (tF ) exp (−rtF ) . (4.24)
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Differentiating equation (4.23) with respect to tL gives
λ
r+λ







× exp (− (r + λ) (tF − tL)) (π (θ0, θ1)− π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ0, θ0) + π (θ1, θ0)) = 0.
When, given tF , there exists a solution of equation (4.25) such that it is smaller or equal
to tF , this solution is denoted by τL (tF ) . Define τ̂L = sup (t ≥ 0| τL (t) = t) . Then
RL (tF ) =
{
tF if tF < τ̂L,
τL (tF ) if tF ≥ τ̂L.
(4.26)











exp (−λ (tF − tL)) (π (θ0, θ1)− π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ0, θ0) + π (θ1, θ0)) = 0.
The solution of the last equation (if it exists) is denoted by τF (tL) . We define TF =
inf (t ≥ 0 |τF (t) = t) , i.e. TF is the first point in time for which the optimal reaction for
the follower to adoption of the leader at time tL is also adopting at time tL. It is obvious
that the reaction function of the follower is equal to the 45 degree line for all tL > TF .
This results in the following expression for the reaction curve of the follower
RF (tL) =
{
τF (tL) if tL ≤ TF ,
tL if tL > TF .
(4.28)
Götz (2000) shows that there always exists a unique date t∗S which satisfies
t∗S = τF (t
∗
S) = τL (t
∗
S) . (4.29)
Götz also proves that (t∗S, t
∗
S) is not an open loop equilibrium for λ larger than a certain




S) is not contained in the set of intersection points
of the reaction curves. The reason is that, for at least one player, the point (t∗S, t
∗
S) is not
on its reaction curve, because the second order condition is not satisfied for that point.
Assume that the point (t∗S, t
∗
S) is not on the reaction curve of the follower. Then the first
order condition of the follower, given that the leader adopts at time t∗S, has two solutions:
t∗S and RF (t
∗





implies that the reaction curve of the follower is discontinuous at time TF ,
lim
ξ↓0
RF (TF − ξ) = τF (TF ) > TF , (4.30)
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while
E [VF (TF , TF )] = E [VF (TF , τF (TF ))] . (4.31)
Thus, if the leader adopts at time TF , the follower is indifferent between adopting at time
τF (TF ) and adopting at time TF . Suppose that the follower chooses TF , then it is in the
leader’s interest to adopt at time τL (TF ) (< TF ) , so that (TF , TF ) is not an equilibrium.
Therefore, the equilibrium is of the diffusion type in this case. Note that this is consistent
with Reinganum (1981) (λ = ∞). The timing of the diffusion equilibrium in this case,
(t∗L, t
∗
F ), is the solution of {
RF (tL) = tF ,
RL (tF ) = tL.
(4.32)
For λ ≤ λ0 the reaction functions are continuous and RF (t∗S) = t∗S = TF , thus (TF , TF )
is a solution of (4.32). Here, there is certainly a joint-adoption equilibrium and there can
also be a diffusion equilibrium.
The result above implies the incorrectness of part (a) of Proposition 1 of Stenbacka and
Tombak (1994, p. 399): In an open loop equilibrium the extent of dispersion between the
adoption timings will be increased if the degree of uncertainty is increased. This part of the
proposition is incorrect if we find a parameter setting for which the equilibrium is of the
diffusion type for large λ and of the joint-adoption type for small λ. The following example
contradicts Stenbacka and Tombak’s Proposition 1 in this way, which is also mentioned
in Götz (2000). In the same example it is also shown that part (b) of Stenbacka and
Tombak’s Proposition 1 is incorrect: In an open loop equilibrium the extent of dispersion
between the adoption timings will be increased if the advantages of being the first to succeed
decrease relative to the gains from being the second to succeed. This is not mentioned in
Götz (2000).
Example 4.1 We complete the example Stenbacka and Tombak use to illustrate case (b)
of their Proposition 1 and which Götz has extended. Stenbacka and Tombak start out with
a Cournot duopoly model with linear inverse demand function p = a − q1 − q2, constant
marginal costs, c, an innovation that reduces the marginal cost to c− ε. It can be derived
that
π (θ1, θ0) =
1
9
(a− c+ 2ε)2 ,
π (θ1, θ1) =
1
9
(a− c+ ε)2 ,




π (θ0, θ1) =
1
9
(a− c− ε)2 .
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As in Götz (2000), we take the investment cost I at time t equal to I (t) = 1000e−0.2t,
a = 9, ε = 1, c = 1 and the discount rate r = 0.05. In Figure 4.4 the reaction curves of
the leader and the follower are plotted for λ = 1 and λ = 3. Figure 4.5 shows the reaction
curves of the leader and the follower for λ = 4. Note that Götz also plots reaction curves,
but for the individual firms. Where we assign the leader and follower role beforehand,
Götz has to do it afterwards. He only plots the reaction functions for λ = 1 and λ = 3.
He argues that there is not a joint-adoption equilibrium for λ = 4, but he does not plot the
reaction curves for this case. Note that for λ = 4 the reaction curves are discontinuous.
Thus in this example the threshold λ0 will be somewhere within the interval (3, 4). In
























Figure 4.4: Reaction curves for λ = 1 (left panel) and λ = 3 (right panel).























Figure 4.5: Reaction curves for λ = 4 and for ε = 1 (left panel) and ε = 0.5 (right panel).
Table 4.1 the equilibria for the three different scenarios are summarized. Comparing the
third and the first plot we see that increasing the uncertainty (lower λ) leads to a decreased
extent of dispersion of the adoption timings, which implies the incorrectness of part (a)
of Proposition 1 of Stenbacka and Tombak (1994).








1 none (21.20, 21.20)
3 (20.83, 21.26) (21.04, 21.04)
4 (20.77, 21.29) none
Table 4.1: Equilibria for different values of λ and ε = 1.
In the next scenario we take λ = 4 and ε = 0.5. The reaction functions are plotted in
the right panel of Figure 4.5 and in Table 4.2 the equilibria are listed. By comparing the
fourth and third scenario we see that an increase of ε (the cost reduction from successful
implementation) results in an increase of the extent of dispersion, which disproves part








(24.59, 24.69) (24.64, 24.64)
Table 4.2: Equilibria for λ = 4 and ε = 0.5.
4.3.2 Feedback Equilibrium
Like in Subsection 4.2.2, to determine the feedback equilibrium we plot the leader’s payoff
as function of its own adoption date and take the adoption date of the follower equal to
its optimal reaction.
Another method to find the feedback equilibrium is used by Götz (2000). He also
starts with the reaction function of the follower and plots isoprofit curves of the leader in
the same figure. The equilibrium is found by the point that is on the follower’s reaction
curve and yields the highest profit for the leader.
The method to derive the feedback equilibrium, used by Stenbacka and Tombak (1994)
will not lead to the right solutions. As in the open loop case they draw reaction curves for
both the leader and follower and consider the intersections as equilibria. However, in the
feedback case the leader affects the follower’s decision, which implies that the leader does
not take a follower’s decision for granted. This makes it impossible to draw a reaction
curve for the leader. This explains the different results between Stenbacka and Tombak
on the one side and Götz and this chapter on the other side. Stenbacka and Tombak
(will) only find dispersed leader-follower adoption times, whereas we will show that joint-
adoption can also be a feedback equilibrium. If we find an equilibrium with dispersed
timings, these timings are a solution of the system of first order conditions of Stenbacka
Chapter 4. One New Technology 79
and Tombak. See Appendix 4.B for a formal proof of the fact that the system of first
order conditions does not have a joint-adoption solution. This contradicts the claim by
Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) that there also exists a joint-adoption solution for that
system of equations. The reasons are: (1) the only feasible pairs of timings are the ones
on the reaction curve of the follower, the timings being dispersed, which implies that the
reaction curve of the follower equals the first order condition of the follower, and (2) the
value of the leader must be maximized, which gives the first order condition of the leader.
Define the following three functions
L (t) = E [VL (t, RF (t))] , (4.33)
F (t) = E [VF (t, RF (t))] , (4.34)
M (t) = E [VL (t, t)] . (4.35)
The function L (t) (F (t)) is equal to the expected discounted value at time zero of the
leader (follower) when the leader invests at time t. M (t) resembles the value of the firm
when there is joint-adoption at time t. Remember that the best reply adoption time of
the follower when the leader invests at time t is denoted by RF (t).
Joint-adoption is by definition not optimal before TF , i.e.
M (t) < L (t) , t < TF , (4.36)
M (t) < F (t) , t < TF , (4.37)
and is optimal after time TF :
L (t) = F (t) = M (t) , t ≥ TF . (4.38)
As long as RF (t) > t, the expected payoff of the follower increases when the leader
adopts later. This is because a later adoption date for the leader implies that the ex-
pected implementation date of the leader will also be later, which makes him a less strong
competitor, so that the follower can reach higher profits. Hence, on the interval [0, TF )
the function F is increasing in t. On that interval, the leader curve is first increasing and
then decreasing in t. This is a result of the following proposition (see also Stenbacka and
Tombak (1994, Proposition 2)).
Proposition 4.5 It holds that
TL < t
∗
L ≤ t∗F < RF (TL) , (4.39)
where TL = arg max
t∈[0,TF )
L (t) and (t∗L, t
∗
F ) is the open loop equilibrium.
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Note that these TL and RF (TL) are the solutions of the system of first order conditions
of Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) in the feedback case. Intuitively the proposition is un-
derstandable since the reaction function of the follower is such that ∂tF
∂tL
< 0 (differentiate
equation (4.27) with respect to tL). Hence, the leader knows that when it adopts earlier
the follower will adopt later. This strategic interaction, which is present in the feedback
setup, thus leads to a larger expected time interval on which the leader collects first im-
plementor profits. Compared to open loop, this gives an extra incentive for the leader
to adopt earlier. This tendency to adopt earlier, however, is tempered by the increase
in investment costs. Since the proof of Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) is not correct, we
give a correct proof in Appendix 4.B. The reasons why their proof is not correct are: (1)
the so-called additional terms in Stenbacka and Tombak’s equation (11) (cf. Stenbacka
and Tombak (1994, p. 401)) are not all negative, and (2) these three terms are dependent
on TL. This implies that a more careful mathematical treatment is needed to prove the
claim.
If the reaction function of the follower is discontinuous at time TF (e.g. see the left
panel of Figure 4.5) the leader curve makes a discontinuous jump downwards at time
TF . The reason is that before TF the follower adopts later than the leader so that the
leader enjoys higher profits than the follower during a time interval with positive length
in expectation, while from TF onwards expected leader and follower value are equal.
Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) define TC to be equal to
TC = argmax
t≥0
M (t) . (4.40)
They call TC the cooperative adoption time, but we will argue below that this can also
be the equilibrium adoption time of the non-cooperative game. Since for all t ∈ [0, TF ):
(1) F (t) > M (t), (2) F (t) is increasing in t, and (3) F (TF ) = M (TF ) , it holds that




(2λπ (θ1, θ1) + r (π (θ1, θ0) + π (θ0, θ1))− 2 (r + λ)π (θ0, θ0)) (4.41)

















which is satisfied due to equation (4.1).
The analysis above implies that there are two candidates for the feedback equilibrium:
(1) (TL, RF (TL)) and (2) (TC , TC) . The following proposition summarizes the analysis.
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Proposition 4.6 If E [VL (TL, RF (TL))] > E [VL (TC , TC)] the equilibrium is as follows:
the leader adopts the technology at time TL and the follower adopts the technology at
time RF (TL) . If E [VL (TL, RF (TL))] < E [VL (TC , TC)] the equilibrium is of the joint
adoption type, where the leader and the follower adopt the technology at time TC. If
E [VL (TL, RF (TL))] = E [VL (TC , TC)] both of the two described equilibria exist.
Example 4.1 (continued) In Figures 4.6-4.7 we have plotted the payoff functions, L (t),
F (t), and M (t) for the first three scenarios of the example of the previous section. In
Table 4.3 we have summarized the equilibrium timings. Note that the feedback equilibrium
(TC , TC) is not an open loop equilibrium. The reason is that if the leader knows for sure
that the follower is going to adopt at time TC he can do better by adopting before TC .
See also Figure 4.8 in which we have plotted the value of the leader as function of its own
adoption time under the assumption that the follower is going to adopt at time TC for sure
(λ = 1). We may conclude that adopting at time TC (= 24.64) is not optimal for the leader.
But still the strategic interaction makes (TC , TC) the feedback equilibrium. This shows the
incorrectness of the construction of the equilibria of Stenbacka and Tombak: (TC , TC) will
not be on their ”leader’s reaction curve”, whereas it is the equilibrium. From the previous
section we know that for λ = 4 the reaction curve of the follower is discontinuous at time
TF , in the right panel of Figure 4.7 we have zoomed at that point to show that the leader
payoff curve is indeed discontinuous at that point in time.










































Figure 4.6: Payoff curves for λ = 1 (left panel) and λ = 3 (right panel).
4.3.3 Endogenous Firm Roles
In this section we make the firm roles endogenous. This means that both firms have equal
chances to become the leader. Of course, the firm that invests first actually becomes
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Figure 4.7: Payoff curves for λ = 4.
λ (TC , TC) M (TC)
1 (24.64, 24.64) 150.7
3 (24.50, 24.50) 151.0
4 (24.48, 24.48) 151.0
Table 4.3: Equilibria for different values of λ.
















Figure 4.8: Expected value of the leader given that the follower adopts at time TC .
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the leader. The analysis of Subsection 4.2.3 can also be applied to the payoff functions
defined by equations (4.33)-(4.35). Since there are no changes we refer to that section for
the formal statement and the properties of the equilibria.
Example 4.1 (continued) In all of the three parameter settings of the example of Sec-
tion 4 we are in case B. In Table 4.4 we have summarized the characteristics of the
equilibria. If we change the parameters π (θ1, θ0) and r into π (θ1, θ0) = 15 and r = 0.08
we are in case A. The equilibrium timings and payoffs are given in Table 4.5 and the
leader, follower and joint-adoption curves are plotted in Figure 4.9. Note that the equi-
librium payoffs L (TP ) are lower than M (∞) = π(θ0,θ0)r = 88.89, which is the payoff to
each firm if both keep on producing with the old technology. This striking result means
that both firms can do better by sticking to producing with their old technology forever,
provided that their competitor does the same. Still, strategic interactions drive them to the
preemption equilibrium just mentioned, so that these interactions have a disastrous effect
on both firms’ performance.
λ (TP , RF (TP )) L (TP ) (TL, RF (TL)) TS M (TS) TC M (TC)
1 (17.29, 21.50) 147.3 (20.63, 21.36) 21.32 150.0 24.64 150.7
3 (17.13, 21.35) 147.5 (20.54, 21.32) 21.34 150.2 24.50 151.0
4 (17.11, 21.33) 147.6 (20.58, 21.31) 21.35 150.3 24.48 151.0
Table 4.4: Characteristics of equilibria for different values of λ.























Figure 4.9: Payoff curves for π (θ1, θ0) = 15, λ = 1, and r = 0.08.
84 4.4. Conclusions
(TP , RF (TP )) L (TP ) (TL, TF ) L (TL) TC M (TC)
(14.18, 22.22) 87.66 (18.10, 22.16) 92.27 24.96 91.20
Table 4.5: Equilibrium for π (θ1, θ0) = 15, λ = 1, and r = 0.08.
4.4 Conclusions
We conclude that the introduction of uncertainty does not change the main results derived
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). In the feedback framework with endogenous firm roles
we end up with the same two cases.
A point for further research is to extend the analysis to a model with unequal hazard
rates. This would lead us back to the original and very interesting setup of Stenbacka
and Tombak (1994). The necessity for the review of their analysis and results should be
clear by now.
Appendices
4.A Timing Games with Two Identical Players
We restrict our attention as much as possible to equilibria with symmetric strategies. The
reason is that in a game with identical players, identical strategies are the most logical
ones. Timing games can be divided in two classes: preemption games and attrition games.
In a timing game there are two players, 1 and 2, that have to decide when to make a
single move at some time t in the interval [0, 1] . This is without loss of generality. For
example, a game with an infinite horizon can be transformed into this framework by a
change of the time variable, take t = u
u+1
, where u ∈ [0,∞) . If we denote one player by i
then the other player is denoted by j.
The player that moves first is called the leader and its payoff equals L (t) , and the
other player is called the follower and earns F (t). If both players move simultaneously at
time t they both get a payoff equal to M (t) .
We assume that the payoff functions L (t) and F (t) are continuous on the time interval
[0, 1] . When one (or both) of the payoff functions is discontinuous (as in Example 4.1 for
λ = 4 and ε = 1) the timing game can be solved by splitting up the original timing game.
The split up times are the times at which one of the payoff functions is discontinuous. In
the first step, the last timing game is solved. The second last timing game is solved in
the second step, where the results of the first step are used.
If no player has moved by time 1, they both receive M (1) . This can be interpreted
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as the equilibrium payoff of another game that is played if both players have not moved
by time 1. Since by joint-moving the follower can at least obtain M (t), it holds that
F (t) ≥ M (t) . (4.43)
If there exist a point in time t ∈ [0, 1] for which there is a so-called first mover
advantage:
L (t) > F (t) , (4.44)
the timing game is called a preemption game. If for all t ∈ [0, 1]:
F (t) > L (t) , (4.45)
the game is called an attrition game.
The equilibrium concepts used are those introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
for preemption games and in Hendricks et al. (1988) for attrition games. The approach
of Simon (1987a,b) for timing games is almost equivalent to Fudenberg and Tirole’s. In
Section 4.A.2 we point out the main difference. In Chapter 8 we have to apply Simon’s
equilibrium concept since it is the only one that can be used for games with asymmetric
players. Hendricks and Wilson (1992) also provide an equilibrium concept for preemption
games in continuous time, but they restrict themselves to strategies of only one function.
However, as argued in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and in Simon and Stinchcombe (1989),
strategies in preemption games must consist of two functions in order to describe mixed
strategies in continuous time that are the limit of discrete time mixed strategies.
We start with describing the strategy spaces, value functions, and the equilibrium
concept in Subsection 4.A.1. After that we analyze a particular class of preemption
games in Subsection 4.A.2, and some attrition games in Subsection 4.A.3.
4.A.1 Strategy Spaces, Payoff Functions, and Equilibrium
We use the strategy spaces that where introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). We
will first restate their definitions. They start out with defining simple continuous time
strategies (such that different ”types” of atoms can be distinguished), payoffs, and the
Nash equilibrium. After that they extend the strategies to closed loop strategies and
define the perfect equilibrium.
Definition 4.1 A simple strategy for player i in the game starting at time t is a pair of
real-valued functions (Gi, αi) : [t, 1]× [t, 1] → [0, 1]× [0, 1] satisfying:
1. Gi is non-decreasing and right-continuous.
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2. αi (s) > 0 =⇒ Gi (s) = 1.
3. αi is right-differentiable.
4. If αi (s) = 0 and s = inf (u ≥ t|αi (u) > 0) , then αi (·) has positive right derivative
at s.
Condition 1 ensures that Gi is a cumulative distribution function. Gi (s) is the cu-
mulative probability that player i has moved by time s given that both players have not
moved before time s. αi (s) measures the intensity of atoms in the interval [s, s+ ds] ,
thus condition 2 requires that if αi (s) is positive then player i is sure to move by time s.
The last two conditions are imposed for technical convenience. The function value α1 (s)
(α2 (s)) should be interpreted as the probability that firm 1 (2) chooses row (column) 1
in the matrix game of which the payoffs are depicted in Figure 4.10. Playing the game
costs no time and if player 1 chooses row 2 and player 2 column 2 the game is repeated.
If necessary the game will be repeated infinitely often.
( F( s) ,L( s) )
( M( s) ,M( s) )
repeat game
( L( s) ,F( s) )α1( s)
1−α1( s)
α2( s) 1−α2( s)
player 1
player 2
Figure 4.10: Payoffs (first entry for player 1 and second entry for player 2) and strategies of matrix game
played at time t.
We need some more notation in order to define the payoffs resulting from a pair of
simple strategies. Define
τ i (t) =
{
1 if αi (s) = 0 ∀s ∈ [t, 1] ,
inf (s ∈ [t, 1]|αi (s) > 0) otherwise.
(4.46)
At τ i (t) the first interval of atoms in player i’s strategy starts. Define
τ (t) = min (τ 1 (t) , τ 2 (t)) .
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Thus in the subgame starting at time t, one of the players has ended the game for sure
by time τ (t). Define
G−i (s) = lim
u↑s
Gi (u) , (4.47)
which is the left-hand limit of Gi (·) at s. The game begins at t ≥ 0; so impose G−i (t) = 0,
i = 1, 2. Define
ai (s) = lim
ξ↓0
(Gi (s)−Gi (s− ξ)) = Gi (s)−G−i (s) , (4.48)
which is the size of the jump in Gi at time s (≥ t).
Define
V i (t, (G1, α1) , (G2, α2)) , (4.49)
to be the payoff of player i in the subgame starting at time t if player j plays the simple
strategy (Gj, αj) , j = 1, 2. Then payoffs are equal to















W i (τ (t) , (G1, α1) , (G2, α2)) ,
where, if τ j (t) > τ i (t) ,













and, if τ i (t) > τ j (t) ,
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while if τ i (t) = τ j (t) ,
W i (τ , (G1, α1) , (G2, α2)) (4.53)
=

M (τ) if αi (τ) = αj (τ) = 1,
αi(τ)(1−αj(τ))L(τ)+αj(τ)(1−αi(τ))F (τ)+αi(τ)αj(τ)M(τ)







if αi (τ) = αj (τ) = 0.
The first two parts of equation (4.50) also appear in the value function of a player if
the usual mixed strategy concept is used. With usual mixed strategy concept is meant
the strategy concept in which a mixed strategy is represented by only one function, i.e.







players has moved by time τ (t) . At least one of the cumulative distributions Gi (·) then
jumps to one. If τ j (t) > τ i (t) = τ then the payoffs are computed as the limits of discrete




at the first instant and with probability zero thereafter. This
corresponds to a situation in which firm j plays an isolated jump, of size aj (τ), at time τ
and firm i adopts continuously with intensity αi (τ) . Firm j does not have an interval of
atoms at τ because τ j (t) > τ . If τ 1 (t) = τ 2 (t) = τ , the probabilities of getting L, F , and
M are computed from discrete-time limits with constant probabilities of moves αi (τ) and
αj (τ). If αi (τ) = αj (τ) = 0 the payoffs are computed by a first-order Taylor expansion.
Using the value functions we can define the Nash equilibrium of a game starting at
time t.
Definition 4.2 A pair of simple strategies {(Gi, αi) , i = 1, 2} is a Nash equilibrium of the
game starting at time t (with neither player having moved yet) if each player i’s strategy
maximizes his payoff V i (t, ·, ·) holding the other player’s strategy fixed.
Next we recall Fudenberg and Tirole’s definition of a closed loop strategy.
Definition 4.3 A closed loop strategy for player i is a collection of simple strategies
{(Gti (·) , αti (·)) , t ∈ [0, 1]} satisfying the intertemporal consistency conditions:
1. Gti (v) = G
t
i (u) + (1−Gti (u))Gui (v) for t ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1.
2. αti (v) = α
u
i (v) = αi (v) for t ≤ u ≤ v ≤ 1.
The reason for the need of a whole family of strategies is that to test for perfectness,
the strategies must be defined even conditional on zero-probability events. Condition
1 ensures that the family of strategies is consistent between non-zero-probability events;
that is, if Gti puts positive weight on times from v on, then G
t
i should be consistent between
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time t and v. Condition 2 is a similar consistency condition. Note that we corrected the
mistakes in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)’s arguments of the functions in the intertemporal
consistency conditions.
Definition 4.4 A pair of closed loop strategies {{(Gti (·) , αti (·)) , t ∈ [0, 1]} , i = 1, 2} is a
perfect equilibrium if for every t, the pair of simple strategies {(Gti (·) , αti (·)) , i = 1, 2} is
a Nash equilibrium.
4.A.2 Preemption Games
In this section a particular class of preemption games is analyzed. We make the following
additional assumptions on the value functions.
A1 M (t) is continuous on [0, 1] .
A2 ∃TF ∈ (0, 1) such that L (t) = F (t) = M (t) ∀t ∈ [TF , 1] and F (t) > M (t) ∀t ∈
[0, TF ).
A3 F (t) is strictly increasing on [0, TF ].
A4 L (t)− F (t) is quasi concave on [0, 1] .
As mentioned before, in a preemption game there is an incentive for the players to
become the leader. Define time TP as the first point in time at which the payoff of the
leader is larger or equal than the payoff of the follower
TP = min (t ∈ [0, 1]|L (t) ≥ F (t)) . (4.54)
Define TL as the point in time at which the leader curve is maximal on the interval [0, TF ]:
TL = arg max
t∈[0,TF ]
L (t) . (4.55)
Lemma 4.1 TP ≤ TL.
Proof of Lemma 4.1 Suppose TP > TL. Then since F is increasing and with the defi-
nition of TP :
L (TP ) = F (TP ) ≥ F (TL) > L (TL) ,
which is a contradiction with the definition of TL. 
Define TC as the point in time at which the joint-moving curve is at its maximum:
TC = arg max
t∈[0,1]
M (t) . (4.56)
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Lemma 4.2 TC ≥ TF .
Proof of Lemma 4.2 Since F is increasing on [0, TF ], M (t) ≤ F (t) for t ∈ [0, 1], and
M (TF ) = F (TF ), it holds that M (s) < M (TF ) for s ∈ [0, TF ], so that TC ≥ TF . 
We distinguish two cases. In the first case it holds that L (TL) > M (TC) and in the
second case L (TL) ≤ M (TC). An example of the first (second) case is depicted in Figure
4.2 (4.3).
Case 1: L (TL) > M (TC)
Both players would like to move at time TL, since that would give them the largest possible
payoff. Joint-movement is not optimal since F (t) > M (t) for t ∈ [0, TL) . Knowing this,
one player, say player 1, will try to preempt player 2 by stopping at time TL− ε, but then
player 2 tries to preempt player 1 by moving at time TL−2ε and so forth and so on. This
preemption process stops at time TP . Either the leader and follower curves are equal at
time TP , which is called rent equalization, or there is no rent equalization and TP = 0.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) prove that if there is rent equalization the probability of a
mistake, that is both players stopping at time TP , is zero. If there is no rent equalization,
the probability of a mistake is positive. The equilibrium strategy for each player is given
by (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)):
Gt (s) =
{
0 s ∈ [t, TP ) ,




0 s ∈ [t, TP ) ,
L(s)−F (s)
L(s)−M(s) s ∈ (TP , TC) ,
1 s ∈ [TC , 1] .
(4.58)
Let us derive α (s) for s ∈ (TP , TC) . Suppress the time arguments and denote the
payoff of a player i by Pi (αi, αj) , with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j. From Figure 4.10 it follows
that
Pi (αi, αj) = αiαjM + αi (1− αj)L+ (1− αi)αjF + (1− αi) (1− αj)Pi (αi, αj) .
(4.59)
Rewriting gives
Pi (αi, αj) =
αiαjM + αi (1− αj)L+ (1− αi)αjF
1− (1− αi) (1− αj) . (4.60)
To find the optimal value for αi we differentiate (4.60) with respect to αi and put this




αj ((1− αj)L− F + αjM)
(1− (1− αi) (1− αj))2
= 0. (4.61)
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It is easily verified that
∂2Pi(αi,αj)
∂α2i
< 0, so that satisfying (4.61) indeed leads to a maximum
value of the player. Since we only consider symmetrical strategies we impose that
αi = αj = α. (4.62)




Consider a subgame that starts at time s for which L (s) ≥ F (s) . The probability
that a player stops the game at time s, Pr (one| s) , equals
Pr (one| s) = α (s) (1− α (s)) + (1− α (s)) (1− α (s)) Pr (one| s) ,
so that
Pr (one| s) = 1− α (s)
2− α (s) , (4.64)
and the probability that both players stop the game at s, Pr (two| s) , equals
Pr (two| s) = α (s)α (s) + (1− α (s)) (1− α (s)) Pr (two| s) ,
so that
Pr (two| s) = α (s)
2− α (s) . (4.65)
Thus each player stops the game itself with probability 1−α(s)
2−α(s) and with probability
α(s)
2−α(s)
both players stop the game. If there is no rent equalization, i.e. L = F , by (4.63) and
(4.65) the probability of a mistake is positive.
If at time t = TP there is rent equalization, i.e. L = F , by (4.63) it holds that
α (TP ) = 0 and the probabilities are equal to
Pr (one| s) = 1
2
, (4.66)
Pr (two| s) = 0. (4.67)
By (4.66) we get that the probability that one player becomes leader at time TP is equal
for both players (one-half). Moreover, from equation (4.67) it follows that when there is
rent equalization, i.e. L = F , the probability of a mistake, that is both players stopping
at time TP and thus gaining the lowest possible payoff M , is zero. Mathematically this
means that αi (TP ) = 0 for both players (i = 1, 2).
The first mover advantage (L (s) > F (s)) results in equilibrium strategies in which
both players take a positive chance of making a mistake in order to get the leader payoff.
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Substitution of equations (4.57) and (4.58) into equation (4.50) shows that a player sets his
intensity α (·) such that his expected value equals the follower value: the expected payoff




V i (t, ·, ·)] = { F (TP ) t ∈ [0, TP ] ,
F (t) t ∈ (TP , 1] .
(4.68)
We summarize in the following proposition. For a formal proof we refer to Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985).
Proposition 4.7 The equilibrium strategies for the preemption game that satisfies as-
sumptions A1-A4 and for which L (TL) > M (TC) are given by equations (4.57) and
(4.58). The expected payoff for each player is given by equation (4.68).
Case 2: L (TL) ≤ M (TC)
In this scenario there are multiple equilibria. The equilibria can be divided into two types.
The first type is the preemption equilibrium defined in the previous subsection and the
second type is a so-called joint-movement equilibrium.
Define
TS = min (t ≥ TF |M (t) = L (TL)) . (4.69)
There are an infinite number of type 2 equilibria. Each equilibrium is characterized by
its movement date u, where u ∈ [TS, TC ]. Equilibrium strategies are given by
Gt (s) =
{
0 s ∈ [t, u) ,
1 s ∈ [u, 1] , (4.70)
α (s) =
{
0 s ∈ [t, u) ,
1 s ∈ [u, 1] . (4.71)
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) argue that the Pareto-superior joint moving equilibrium,
both moving at time TC , is the most reasonable outcome of the game.
Proposition 4.8 The preemption game that satisfies assumptions A1-A4 and for which
it holds that L (TL) ≤ M (TC) has two types of equilibrium strategies. The first type is
given by equations (4.57)-(4.58) and the second type by equations (4.70)-(4.71). The most
reasonable outcome of the game is joint-movement at time TC.
Now we are in a position to point out the main difference with the approach above
and the one developed in Simon (1987a,b). In case 2 the most reasonable outcome is the
only equilibrium if Simon’s equilibrium concept is used.
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4.A.3 Attrition Games
In this section we analyze timing games that satisfy the following assumptions:
A5 F (t) > M (t) for t ∈ [0, 1) .
A6 L (t) is strictly decreasing for t ∈ [0, 1) .
Since, contrary to a preemption game, both players do not want to take any chances of
making a mistake in a war of attrition, the only important joint-movement value is M (1).
In other words, the outcome is not influenced by the shape of the joint-movement curve
before time 1 as long as it is below the follower value. This implies for the equilibrium
strategies that α (s) = 0 for s ∈ [0, 1) .
We distinguish two different cases. In the first case L (t) > M (1) for t ∈ [0, 1] and
in the second case L (t∗) = M (1) for some unique t∗ ∈ [0, 1] . In the left (right) panel of






























Figure 4.11: Payoff curves in case 1 (left panel) and case 2 (right panel).
Case 1: L (t) > M (1) for t ∈ [0, 1]
Hendricks et al. (1988) show that there is no symmetric equilibrium for this game. There
are two asymmetric equilibria. In the first one player 1 stops at time 0 and in the second
one player 2 stops at time 0. Although this result is unsatisfactory it is understandable.
Consider a symmetric strategy. Since L is decreasing and M (1) < L (1) both players will
try not to reach time 1 without one of them having stopped the game before. But, to do
so they have to apply a strategy with Gti (s) = 1 for s < 1. But if a player knows that
the other player stops the game before time 1 with probability 1, his optimal strategy is
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not to stop at all, implying that Gt (s) = 0 for s ∈ [t, 1]. Thus there does not exist an
equilibrium with symmetric strategies.
Proposition 4.9 In an attrition game that satisfies assumptions A5-A6 and for which
M (t) < L (t) for t ∈ [0, 1] there does not exist an equilibrium with symmetric strategies.
Case 2: L (t∗) = M (1) for some unique t∗ ∈ [0, 1]
For this scenario there is an equilibrium with symmetric strategies. Hendricks et al. (1988)


















s ∈ (t∗, 1) ,
1 s = 1,
(4.72)








0 s < 1,
1 s = 1,
(4.74)
and if t ≥ t∗,
Gt (s) =
{
0 s ∈ [t, 1) ,
1 s = 1,
(4.75)
at (1) = 1, (4.76)
α (s) =
{
0 s ∈ [t, 1) ,
1 s = 1.
(4.77)
Equations (4.73) and (4.76) imply that there is a discontinuous jump in Gt at time 1. The
same argument as in the previous subsection applies here. If G would be equal to 1 before
time 1 the other player would be better of by setting his G (t) = 0 for all t less than 1.
Thus the positive probability of reaching time 1 while neither of the players has moved,
(at (1))
2
, enforces each player to stop the game before time t∗ with positive probability.
Since in this scenario the players take chances of getting the terminal payoff, contrary to
the previous subsection, an equilibrium with symmetric strategies exists. Note that the
existence of t∗ is needed for the existence of the symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4.10 In an attrition game that satisfies assumptions A5-A6 and for which
L (t∗) = M (1) for some unique t∗ ∈ [0, 1] there exists an equilibrium with symmetric
strategies, given by equations (4.72)-(4.77).
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4.B Lemma and Proofs
The following lemma disproves a claim by Stenbacka and Tombak (1994).
































− rI (tF ) = 0.
(4.78)




































































Due to equations (4.2) and (4.83), equation (4.81) can not hold. Rewriting equation (4.82)
gives
λ2 (π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ1, θ0)) + λ (r + λ) (π (θ0, θ1)− π (θ0, θ0))
(r + λ) (r + 2λ)
= 0. (4.84)
Due to equation (4.3) this equation can not hold. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.5 The first-order condition for interior solutions for the leader
in the feedback game is










e−(r+λ)(tF−TL) (π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ1, θ0))
(r + 2λ)
−λ
2e−(r+λ)(tF−TL) (π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ1, θ0))




λ− (r + λ) ∂tF
∂tL
)
e−(r+λ)(tF−TL) (π (θ0, θ1)− π (θ0, θ0))
(r + λ) (r + 2λ)





Note that we correct for the (two) sign mistakes in Stenbacka and Tombak’s equation
(11). In the open loop case the first order condition is given by the following equation:





L) (π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ1, θ0))




L) (π (θ0, θ1)− π (θ0, θ0))







Now, define the following function:
f (tL) =
λ (π (θ0, θ0)− π (θ1, θ0))
(r + λ)
− λ
2e−(r+λ)(tF−tL) (π (θ1, θ1)− π (θ1, θ0))
(r + λ) (r + 2λ)
+
λ2e−(r+λ)(tF−tL) (π (θ0, θ1)− π (θ0, θ0))
(r + λ) (r + 2λ)





From (4.86) and (4.87) it follows that
f (t∗L) = 0. (4.88)
Provided that the second order condition holds (cf. Stenbacka and Tombak (1994, p. 409)),


















e−(r+λ)(tF−TL) (π (θ0, θ1)− π (θ0, θ0))
(r + 2λ)
= 0. (4.90)
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Since the sum of the three terms is negative, it follows from (4.90) that
f (TL) > 0. (4.91)







One of the features of the models concerning the investment of new technologies considered
in the previous chapter is that only one new technology was available. The availability of
more consecutive new technologies complicates the technology investment decision con-
siderably, since every time the firm evaluates an investment in a new technology it has to
take into account that at a later point of time a more efficient technology will be invented.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a first step in analyzing the problem of when
a firm could adopt an existing technology knowing that a better technology will become
available later, while it has to fight for a market share with an identical firm on the
output market. Two technologies are considered: an existing one which can be adopted
immediately, and a new one which is more efficient and enters the input market at a
known future date. Learning is incorporated in the sense that it is less costly to adopt
and successfully implement the new technology if it has adopted the current technology
before. As such this framework is taken from Grenadier and Weiss (1997). In that paper
the future date at which the new technology becomes available is uncertain and only
one firm is considered. So, compared to Grenadier and Weiss (1997) we exchange the
uncertainty for competition on the output market. In this way we are able to identify the
strategic aspects of this problem.
Two scenarios are worked out in detail: one where the new technology is cheap, and one
where the new technology is so expensive that it is not optimal for both firms to produce
with the new technology. In the latter case we show that on a particular time interval
it is optimal for one firm to invest right away in the current technology while the other
firm waits with investment in order to adopt the new technology as soon as it becomes
available. Which firm will do better depends on the comparison between the temporary
monopoly profits gained by the first investor before the new technology arrives, versus
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the higher revenue the other firm obtains after the arrival date of the new technology
due to the fact that it produces with a more efficient technology. In case the monopoly
profits are outweighed by the higher revenue associated with the new technology, second
mover advantages arise. To our knowledge, the way second mover advantages are caused
here has not occurred in the literature yet. Different second mover advantages have been
found by Hendricks (1992) and Dutta et al. (1995). In Hendricks (1992) they are caused
by ex ante uncertainty in the profitability of adoption (see also Hoppe (2000)), while in
Dutta et al. (1995) the quality of the product improves over time. These second mover
advantages may lead to a better understanding of the fact that from empirical studies
it could not always be concluded that early entrants perform better than later entrants.
Apart from the numerous studies that found persistent market-share advantages to first
entrants, there are many examples of pioneering firms that did not survive the competition
of later entrants. Dutta et al. (1995) mention the case of EMI, which developed the first
CT scanner but lost its market place because it lacked a technological infrastructure and
marketing base in the medical field.
The contents of this chapter is as follows. The model is introduced in Section 5.2.
In Section 5.3 the solution procedure is explained and optimal investment strategies are
analyzed in detail for two specific scenarios. Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 The Model
The model is based on Grenadier and Weiss (1997), but here a duopoly with two identical
risk-neutral and value maximizing firms is considered, while in Grenadier and Weiss (1997)
the analysis is focussed on a single firm. To produce goods the firms need to acquire a
certain technology. Initially, at time t = 0, they can invest in a current technology, of
which the efficiency is denoted by θ1 (> 0). At time t = T (≥ 0), a new and more efficient
technology becomes available for adoption, with efficiency θ2 (> θ1). In our analysis time
T is assumed to be known beforehand (contrary to Grenadier and Weiss (1997), where
T depends on the realization of a Wiener process that governs the state of technological
knowledge). When a firm does not produce we denote this by θ0 = 0. The firm’s profits
per unit of time, while it produces with technology θi and the other firm with technology
θj, are equal to π(θi, θj), with i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We assume that for j ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
π (θ0, θj) = 0, (5.1)
and for i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
π (θi, θj) > 0. (5.2)
Chapter 5. Two New Technologies 101
If Pij denotes the value of the firm while this firm itself produces with technology θi









where r (> 0) is the constant discount rate.
If the new technology is not available for adoption yet, i.e. t < T , the firm has the
possibility to invest in the current technology, where the investment expenditure equals
Ce (> 0). Then the firm’s payoff is P1j−Ce, where j = 1 when the other firm is producing
with technology θ1 and j = 0 when the other firm refrains from producing.
From time T onwards the firm can choose to adopt the new technology. If the firm
has invested in the current technology before, it may replace this technology for the new
one. Then the payoff of investing in the new technology is P2i−P1j −Cu, where Cu (> 0)
stands for the cost of upgrading. Note that in the formulation of the payoff it is taken
into account that the other firm can change its technology too at time T .
If the firm adopts the new technology without having invested in the current technology
before, the payoff of this investment is P2i − Cl, with Cl > 0. At the moment the new
technology arrives the demand for the current technology will fall so that it makes sense
that the acquisition cost of the current technology will fall too. This makes that if the
firm did not buy the current technology before, it may become profitable to adopt this
technology after time T . The payoff of this transaction is P1i − Cd, with Cd > 0.
Concerning the levels of the different cost parameters we impose that
Cu < Cl < Ce + Cu, (5.4)
Cd < Ce. (5.5)
The first inequality in (5.4) denotes the learning effect in the sense that it is less costly to
adopt and successfully implement the new technology if the firm already produces goods.
The second inequality assures that no arbitrage is possible, i.e. it is always more costly
to immediately start producing with the current technology and replacing it later by the
new one, than to refrain from production initially in order to wait for the new technology
to arrive.
The value of a particular technology falls over time, because (1) it becomes old-
fashioned, (2) the firms that are most eager to buy the technology have already bought
it so that technology suppliers have to drop their price in order to find additional buyers,
and (3) due to learning by doing the technology supplier can produce the technology
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in a cheaper way. For these reasons we assume here that technology investments are
irreversible.
Next, we specify how the profit streams are related to each other. Note that from (5.3)
it can be obtained that profits per unit of time π(θi, θj) are related to each other in the
same way as the discounted profit streams Pij. First, it holds that when the firm produces
with a given technology the highest profit it can obtain is the monopoly profit, which the
firm receives if the other firm does not produce. Second, its profits will be lowest when
the other firm is a strong competitor in the sense that it produces in the most efficient
manner by using the modern technology. This leads to
Pi0 > Pi1 > Pi2 for i ∈ {1, 2} . (5.6)
Furthermore, by upgrading its technology, thus exchanging the current technology for the
new technology, the firm gains more, the less competitive the other firm is. Of course,
since the new technology is more efficient, the profit stream always increases due to this
exchange. Mathematically, this can be expressed as
P20 − P10 > P21 − P11 > P22 − P12 > 0. (5.7)
Finally, in order to limit the number of possible cases, we focus on the scenarios where
for each technology investment the discounted future profit stream exceeds the immediate
expenditure. Due to (5.4), (5.5), and (5.6) it can be concluded that this is assured by
P12 > Ce and P22 > Cl. (5.8)
5.3 Solution Procedure
5.3.1 Candidate Strategies for Optimality
Since for every technology investment the discounted future profit stream exceeds the
immediate cost expenditure (cf. (5.8)), it is optimal for each firm to invest at least once.
This implies that, given that we are at time t = 0, each firm has four candidate strategies
for optimality (cf. Grenadier and Weiss (1997)). Note that due to discounting the firms
will either invest at time t = 0 or at time t = T.
The first strategy is called theCompulsive strategy . Here the firm invests right away
in the current technology, and replaces this current technology by the new one as soon as
the latter becomes available. The payoff of the Compulsive strategy equals
P1j − Ce + exp (−rT )) (P2i − P1j − Cu) . (5.9)
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In (5.9), as well as below in (5.10), (5.11), and (5.12), the other firm produces with
technology θj before time T and with technology θi after time T , with j ≤ i. Of course,
if j or i equals 0 it is meant that the other firm does not produce at all.
The second strategy is the Buy and Hold strategy by which it is meant that the firm
invests right away in the current strategy and keeps on producing with it forever. The
firm’s payoff then equals
P1j − Ce + exp (−rT ) (P1i − P1j) . (5.10)
The third strategy is the Leapfrog strategy . Then the firm waits for the new technology
to arrive and adopts it then. The payoff of this strategy is
exp (−rT ) (P2i − Cl) . (5.11)
The fourth strategy is to wait for the new technology to arrive, and at that moment
invest in the current technology, which then can be bought against a cheaper price. The
payoff of this so-called Laggard strategy then equals
exp (−rT ) (P1i − Cd) . (5.12)
5.3.2 Equilibrium Strategies
The equilibrium strategies of both firms depend on the scenarios in which they have to
operate. It holds that in some scenarios upgrading is optimal, implying that the payoff of
the Compulsive strategy exceeds the payoff of the Buy and Hold strategy, while in other
ones it is not. Another factor that distinguishes the different scenarios are the payoffs
of the Leapfrog and the Laggard strategies: the Leapfrog payoff can exceed the Laggard
payoff but it can be the other way round too. Here it also has to be taken into account
that the ranking of the payoffs depends on what the other firm is doing: producing with
the current technology or with the new one. On the other hand, all scenarios have in
common that when the firm exchanges the current technology for the new technology, it
gains more when the other firm produces with the current technology instead of the new
technology (cf. (5.7)).
In Table 5.1 all possible scenarios are listed. In total there are nine scenarios, each
giving a different solution. It would lead to using up too much space and unnecessary
repetitions if in the sequel we would study all these solutions. Instead we describe two
of these solutions in detail in the next subsections. In order to still cover many different
aspects of optimal technology investments we choose rather opposite scenarios. In the
first case it is relatively cheap to acquire the new technology, while in the second case the
new technology is expensive and the learning effect is negligible.
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Scenario Specifications
1 P22 − P12 < P21 − P11 ≤ Cl − Cd, Cu
2 P22 − P12 ≤ Cl − Cd < P21 − P11 ≤ Cu
3 P22 − P12 ≤ Cu < P21 − P11 ≤ Cl − Cd
4 P22 − P12 ≤ Cl − Cd, Cu < P21 − P11
5 Cl − Cd < P22 − P12 < P21 − P11 ≤ Cu
6 Cl − Cd < P22 − P12 ≤ Cu < P21 − P11
7 Cu < P22 − P12 < P21 − P11 ≤ Cl − Cd
8 Cu < P22 − P12 ≤ Cl − Cd < P21 − P11
9 Cl − Cd, Cu < P22 − P12 < P21 − P11
Table 5.1: Possible scenarios and their specifications.
In both subsections we start out by analyzing the case of exogenous firm roles, i.e.,
despite the fact that both firms are identical one of them is given the leader role before-
hand. This implies that only this firm is allowed to invest first. The other firm is the
follower, which can choose between investing at the same time as the leader resulting in
joint adoption, or investing later. The resulting solution is taken as a starting point to
consider the more realistic case of endogenous firm roles, meaning that beforehand it is
not known which firm will be the leader.
5.3.3 Equilibrium Strategies if the New Technology is Cheap
The scenario we have in mind here is number 9 in Table 5.1, from which it can be obtained
that it must hold that
P21 − P11 > P22 − P12 > max (Cu, Cl − Cd) . (5.13)
Due to (5.9) and (5.10) we can conclude that under (5.11) Compulsive dominates Buy
and Hold, while (5.11) and (5.12) imply that Leapfrog dominates Laggard.
Exogenous Firm Roles
Despite of the fact that both firms are identical one of them gets the leader role beforehand
so that the other firm is the follower. Straightforward calculations lead to the equilibrium
strategies that are presented in Table 5.2. Concerning the notation, Txy,z means that: (i)
if the second technology arrives exactly at this point of time a firm is indifferent between
strategy x and y, given that the other firm performs strategy z, and (ii) if the second
technology arrives before (after) time Txy,z the firm prefers strategy x (y) , given that
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the other firm uses strategy z. Here the names of the strategies are abbreviated (C:
Compulsive, Le: Leapfrog, La: Laggard, and B: Buy and Hold). So, if for instance the
arrival date of the second technology T ∈ [0, TLeC,Le] , according to Table 5.2 both firms



















Equations (5.4) and (5.6) imply that
0 < TLeC,Le < TLeC,C . (5.16)
T interval Leader Follower
[0, TLeC,Le] Leapfrog Leapfrog
(TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ] Compulsive Leapfrog
(TLeC,C ,∞) Compulsive Compulsive
Table 5.2: Equilibrium strategies in scenario 9 as function of T, the arrival time of the second technology,
when the firm roles are assigned exogenously.
Since in scenario 9 the new technology is attractive, only those strategies occur under
which this technology will be bought: Compulsive and Leapfrog. On the first interval
[0, TLeC,Le] the arrival of the new technology is that near that for both firms it is optimal
to wait with investment until the new technology becomes available. This explains the
occurrence of the Leapfrog strategy on this interval.
On the time interval (TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ] T is a bit further away, which implies that, given
that the leader announces a Compulsive strategy, the follower will prefer Leapfrog, i.e.
refrain from immediate investment in order to wait for the new technology to arrive. The
explanation is that the time interval in which the current technology will be used is too
short to make investing in the current technology profitable. Also the learning effect,
i.e. implementing the new technology is cheaper when the firm has already production
experience due to using the current technology, cannot make up for this (cf. (5.4)). But,
given that the follower will not adopt the current technology so that it will not produce
before time T , by investing in the current technology the leader can become a monopolist
until the time that the new technology arrives.
When the point of time at which the new technology appears on the market lies
relatively far in the future, it is optimal for both firms to apply the Compulsive strategy,
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i.e. buy the current technology immediately and upgrade at time T. This explains why
for both firms the Compulsive strategy is optimal when the arrival date of the second
technology lies somewhere in the interval (TLeC,C ,∞).
Endogenous Firm Roles
Since firms are identical there seems to be no reason why one of these firms should be
given the leader role beforehand. This makes the outcome of the exogenous firm roles
case hard to accept. However, here we use this outcome to generate the equilibria of the
case where it is not known beforehand which firm will invest first. The fact that firms are
identical and rational also implies that it is reasonable to impose that firms behave in the
same manner, since no reason of why they should act differently can be given. Therefore
we restrict ourselves to symmetric strategies.
Denote the value of the leader and the follower as function of T, the arrival time of the
second technology, by L (T ) and F (T ) , respectively. When both firms apply the leader’s
strategy, their payoff equals M (T ) . From Table 5.2 and equations (5.9) and (5.11) it
follows that
L (T ) =

exp (−rT ) (P22 − Cl) if T ∈ [0, TLeC,Le] ,
P10 − Ce + exp (−rT ) (P22 − P10 − Cu) if T ∈ (TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ] ,
P11 − Ce + exp (−rT ) (P22 − P11 − Cu) if T ∈ (TLeC,C ,∞) ,
(5.17)
F (T ) =
{
exp (−rT ) (P22 − Cl) if T ∈ [0, TLeC,C ] ,
P11 − Ce + exp (−rT ) (P22 − P11 − Cu) if T ∈ (TLeC,C ,∞) ,
(5.18)
M (T ) =
{
exp (−rT ) (P22 − Cl) if T ∈ [0, TLeC,Le] ,
P11 − Ce + exp (−rT ) (P22 − P11 − Cu) if T ∈ (TLeC,Le,∞) .
(5.19)
In Figure 5.1 the payoffs are plotted. This figure should be read as a feedback diagram.
Note that contrary to the payoff figures in Chapter 4, the figure shows the payoffs of both
firms as function of the arrival time of the second technology T instead of the payoffs as
function of time t.
Looking at Figure 5.1 we see that, apart from the interval (TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ], in the case
of exogenous firm roles the firms choose for the same strategy, meaning that they invest
at the same time in the same technology. Hence, there is no difference in the behavior of
leader and follower so that we end up with the same equilibria as in the case of endogenous
firm roles.
So, what is left to do is to determine the equilibria on the interval (TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ].
From Figure 5.1 we obtain that the firm that invests first gets the highest payoff, since















Figure 5.1: Payoffs in scenario 9 as function of T, the arrival time of the second technology, when the
firm roles are endogenously determined.
L (T ) > F (T ) for T ∈ (TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ] . In case both firms invest at the same time, they
both get M (T ) . This game is a preemption game. In Appendix 4.A.2 it was shown that
the equilibrium strategy for each firm is given by the following pair of functions
G (s) = 1, (5.20)
α (s) =
L (s)− F (s)
L (s)−M (s) , (5.21)
where s ∈ (TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ] . Recall that G (s) is the cumulative probability that a firm
invests at time s given that there was no investment before time s and that α (s) measures
the intensity of that probability of investment (cf. Appendix 4.A.2).
Of course, both firms do not want to invest at the same time, because it leaves them
with the lowest possible payoff M . In Appendix 4.A.2 we derived that the probability of
occurrence of such a mistake is
α (s)
2− α (s) , (5.22)
which naturally increases with α (s). Due to the fact that for s ∈ (TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ] L (s) >
F (s) ≥ M (s) , equation (5.21) learns that α (s) is strictly positive, so that the probability
of making a mistake is strictly greater than zero. In a similar way it can be obtained that
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the probability of a firm being the first investor equals
1− α (s)
2− α (s) . (5.23)
Due to symmetry this is also the probability of ending up being follower. Since the
probability of simultaneous adoption increases with α (s), it follows that the probability
of being the first investor decreases with α (s), which is at first sight a strange result. But
it is not that strange, because if one firm increases its probability to invest, the other firm
does the same. This results in a higher probability of making a mistake, which leaves less
room for the equal probabilities of being the first investor.
Substitution of the Compulsive and the Leapfrog payoffs, which are given by (5.9)
and (5.11), respectively, into (5.21) results in the following expression for α (s) for s ∈
(TLeC,Le, TLeC,C ]:
α (s) =
P10 − Ce + exp (−rs) (−P10 + Cl − Cu)
(P10 − P11) (1− exp (−rs)) . (5.24)





r exp (−rs) (Ce − Cl + Cu)
(P10 − P11) (1− exp (−rs))2
> 0, (5.25)
where the inequality sign follows from (5.4). The implication is that if we consider two
games, one where the second technology arrives at time T1 and the other one where the
second technology arrives at time T2 , where T1 and T2 are related such that TLeC,Le <
T1 < T2 < TLeC,C , then the probability of making the simultaneous adoption mistake in
the game where the second technology arrives at time T1 is smaller than in the game where
the second technology arrives at time T2. To understand this result, consider Figure 5.1:
(1) the difference between the payoff from being the leader and the payoff of the follower
increases, so that the relative profitability of winning the investment race rises, and (2)
the difference between the follower payoff and the payoff that results from simultaneous
investment decreases so that firms more and more prefer to win the investment race rather
than to make the joint adoption mistake.
Furthermore from (5.24) and the fact that the probability of the joint adoption mistake
increases with α (s), the following ceteris paribus results can be derived: the joint adoption
mistake is more likely to occur for lower values of Ce or Cu, or for higher values of P10,
P11, Cl, or r.
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5.3.4 Equilibrium Strategies if Learning is Negligible and the
New Technology is Expensive
In this subsection scenario 2 of Table 5.1 is analyzed. From that table we obtain that in
this scenario it holds that
P21 − Cu − P11 ≤ 0, (5.26)
P21 − Cl > P11 − Cd, (5.27)
P22 − Cl ≤ P12 − Cd. (5.28)
In Table 5.1 we see that the cost of upgrading is large in this scenario. This means that,
even in case the firm is already active on this market by producing with the current tech-
nology, the learning effect is that low that it is still costly to buy and implement the new
technology. From (5.26) it can be concluded that, given that the other firm produces with
the current technology, it is not profitable to upgrade so that the Compulsive strategy will
not be optimal. The same holds when the other firm produces with the new technology,
because then exchanging the current technology for the new one is even less profitable.
Taking into account the payoffs of the Leapfrog and the Laggard strategy (cf. (5.11)
and (5.12)), we can derive from (5.27) and (5.28) that the Leapfrog strategy is more prof-
itable than the Laggard strategy if the other firm produces with the current technology,
while it is the other way round when the other firm produces with the new technology.
Since we already concluded that upgrading is never optimal, it follows that in this sce-
nario demand on the output market is too small for two firms producing with the more
expensive new technology.
Exogenous Firm Roles
Again we first consider the case where one firm is the leader and the other firm the follower.
The equilibrium strategies are presented in Table 5.3. Time TB,Le is defined such that at
that time the payoffs of Buy and Hold and Leapfrog are equal. With equations (5.10),




























From equations (5.5) and (5.27) it follows that
0 < TLaB,Le < TB,Le. (5.32)
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Further, we derive that
TB,Le < TLeB,B, (5.33)
if and only if the following equation holds,
P11 − Ce
P21 − Cl <
P10 − P11
P10 − P12 . (5.34)
T interval Leader Follower
[0, TB,Le] Leapfrog Laggard
(TB,Le, TLeB,B] Buy and Hold Leapfrog
(TLeB,B ,∞) Buy and Hold Buy and Hold
Table 5.3: Equilibrium strategies in scenario 2 as function of T, the arrival time of the second technology,
when the firm roles are assigned exogenously.
Since in this scenario the cost of upgrading is too high for a replacement of the current
technology by the new technology to be profitable, the Compulsive strategy will never be
applied. On the interval [0, TLaB,Le] the arrival time of the new technology is that close
that for both firms it is not optimal to invest immediately. One firm will adopt the new
technology as soon as it arrives. The other firm waits until time T to acquire the current
technology, since from this time onwards the acquisition cost of the current technology
is lower (cf. (5.5)). Note that, given the fact that one firm plays Leapfrog, expression
(5.28) implies that for the other firm the Laggard strategy is most profitable. The reason
is that the demand for output is too low for the two firms to produce both with the new
expensive technology.
On the time interval (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B ] T is a bit further away, which implies that, given
that the leader follows a Buy and Hold strategy, the follower will prefer Leapfrog. The
earnings that arise from producing with the current technology on the time interval before
time T are not large enough for the follower to justify the immediate acquisition of the
current technology. Note that, given that the leader applies a Buy and Hold strategy, for
the follower the Leapfrog payoff is higher than the Laggard payoff (cf. (5.27)). The fact
that the follower plays Leapfrog implies that until the new technology arrives the leader
is the only producer on the market. This monopoly position increases revenue before
time T , compared to the situation where both firms apply Buy and Hold. On the other
hand, after time T the Buy and Hold strategy will generate less revenue, because then
the other firm captures a larger share of the market since it produces more efficiently with
the new technology. Hence, two opposite effects are working on the Buy and Hold payoff
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once the follower switches to Leapfrog. In Table 5.3 and in Figure 5.2 (presented later
on) the monopoly effect is assumed to dominate, which explains the downward jump of
the Buy and Hold (leader) payoff right at TLeB,B. But the reverse can also be true. After
straightforward calculations it can be concluded that the jump is indeed downward in case
(5.34) holds. We see that in any case at the beginning of the interval (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B ]
the Buy and Hold payoff is less than the Leapfrog payoff so that the first investor earns
less than the follower. Recall that TB,Le is the point of time at which the payoffs of
Buy and Hold and Leapfrog are equal (see Figure 5.2, note that TB,Le does not exist in
case (5.34) does not hold). Then, on the interval (TLaB,Le, TB,Le] (or (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B ] if
(5.34) does not hold) the leader refrains from investment and applies a Leapfrog strategy.
The follower is not allowed to invest earlier than the leader, so he has to choose between
Leapfrog and Laggard. The follower’s choice will be Laggard, since this leaves him with
the highest payoff (cf. (5.34)). In case equation (5.34) holds we have to consider the
interval (TB,Le, TLeB,B]. For the leader it is optimal to apply the Buy and Hold strategy
and the follower responds by using the Leapfrog strategy.
When the point of time T at which the new technology appears on the market is rela-
tively far away, it is optimal for both firms to start producing with the current technology.
Therefore, both firms apply the Buy and Hold strategy if the arrival time of the second
technology belongs to the interval (TLeB,B,∞) .
Endogenous Firm Roles
Here it is not specified beforehand which firm will be the first investor, so that both
firms can be leader or follower. As said before this seems the proper way to analyze a
duopoly with identical firms. Since firms are identical, we restrict ourselves to symmetric
strategies. From Table 5.3 and equations (5.10), (5.11), and (5.12) it follows that (with
one modification which will be explained right after (5.37))
L (T ) =

exp (−rT ) (P21 − Cl) if T ∈ [0, TLaB,Le] ,
P10 − Ce + exp (−rT ) (P12 − P10) if T ∈ (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B ] ,
P11 − Ce if T ∈ (TLeB,B,∞) ,
(5.35)
F (T ) =

exp (−rT ) (P12 − Cd) if T ∈ [0, TLaB,Le] ,
exp (−rT ) (P21 − Cl) if T ∈ (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B ] ,
P11 − Ce if T ∈ (TLeB,B,∞) ,
(5.36)
M (T ) =
{
exp (−rT ) (P22 − Cl) if T ∈ [0, TLaB,Le] ,
P11 − Ce if T ∈ (TLaB,Le,∞) .
(5.37)
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Note that now the leader plays the Buy and Hold strategy in the games where the
second technology arrives somewhere in the interval (TLaB,Le, TB,Le] , because a firm can
only become leader by investing as first. The expected value of waiting equals the Laggard
payoff which is less than the payoff resulting from the Buy and Hold strategy. Therefore
one firm will invest in the current technology. In Figure 5.2 the payoffs are plotted.














Figure 5.2: Payoffs in scenario 2 as function of T, the arrival time of the second technology, when the
firm roles are endogenously determined.
From Figure 5.2 it is obtained that only for the interval (TLeB,B,∞) the strategies of
both firms are identical, implying that the equilibrium for games where T ∈ (TLeB,B ,∞)
is the same for the exogenous and the endogenous firm roles case.
To solve the whole problem we divide the remaining time interval into three subin-
tervals and treat the three cases in order of timing. For the games with arrival date of
the second technology in the interval [0, TLaB,Le] the optimal strategies are Leapfrog and
Laggard, i.e. no investment takes place before time T. The firms wait until the arrival
of the new technology after which the following game will be played. Without loss of
generality we set T = 0 for the moment. Since the highest payoff can be obtained by
a Leapfrog strategy (provided that the other firm plays Laggard), it is attractive to be
the first investor in the new technology. However, when both firms apply the strategy
invest right away in the new technology at time T , with probability one they end up with
the payoff M (0), which is less than what could be obtained by investing in the current
technology, F (0) . Hence, it seems that a mixed strategy is called for in this preemption
game. The equilibrium strategy is given by the following pair of functions (see Appendix
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4.A.2 for details)
G (0) = 1, (5.38)
α (0) =
L (0)− F (0)
L (0)−M (0) =
P21 − Cl − (P12 − Cd)
P21 − P22 . (5.39)
The worse thing that can happen is that both firms invest in the new technology at the
same time, leaving them with a low payoff M (0) = P22 − Cl. Analogous to the previous
subsection, the probability that this happens is given by equation (5.22). The expected
value of the firm resulting from the optimal mixed strategy described by equations (5.38)
and (5.39) equals the payoff associated with the Laggard strategy (see Appendix 4.A.2
where it was shown that the expected payoff in a preemption game equals the follower
payoff). Therefore, the value of the firm is also equal to the Laggard payoff if T ∈
(0, TLaB,Le], and from Figure 5.2 it can be concluded that this value decreases in T .
It turns out to be convenient to divide the interval (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B ] into two parts:
(TLaB,Le, TB,Le] and (TB,Le, TLeB,B]. Note that TB,Le ∈ (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B ] only in case (5.34)
holds. If (5.34) does not hold, then during the whole interval (TLaB,Le, TLeB,B] the Buy
and Hold payoff falls below the Leapfrog payoff. Let us first consider (TLaB,Le, TB,Le].
Here the new technology will become available soon, which implies that the Leapfrog
strategy is more profitable than Buy and Hold. Therefore, the payoff of the first investor
is lower than the payoff of the follower, so that a second mover advantage arises. Hence,
each firm prefers to be the follower, but if it has to be the first investor, it prefers to
invest earlier rather than later, because the Buy and Hold payoff falls over time. Thus
the game is an attrition game. A possible strategy would be to refrain from investment
during this interval, waiting for the other firm to invest. Since with identical firms there
is no reason to believe why the other firm would act differently, nothing happens on this
interval. This implies that both firms end up with playing the game at time T , which is
described above. The expected value of the firm obtained from playing this game equals
the Laggard payoff, and this payoff lies below the payoffs of both Buy and Hold and
Leapfrog. In Appendix 4.A.3 the subgame perfect equilibrium is given for an attrition
game with identical players, as it occurs here. The equilibrium strategy is described by
(note that due to the difference in definition of the payoff functions L, F , and M in this
chapter the argument of the functions is T − v instead of v)
G(s) = 1− exp
 s∫
v=0
dL (T − v)
F (T − v)− L(T − v)
 , (5.40)
α (s) = 0, (5.41)
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where s ∈ [0, T ). Equation (5.41) implies that the probability that the two firms move ex-
actly at the same time is zero, which explains whyM does not affect the mixed investment
strategy in (5.40).




Note that, if this were not the case, the symmetric investment strategy is not a Nash




then one of the firms could do better by refraining from investment during the interval
[0, T ), since this firm knows for sure that its competitor will have invested at some time
before T .
Substitution of the relevant formulas for the payoffs into (5.40) leads to
G(s) = 1− exp
 s∫
v=0
r exp (−r (T − v)) (P12 − P10)
Ce − P10 + exp (−r (T − v)) (P21 − Cl − P12 + P10)dv
 . (5.42)
The firm’s willingness to invest increases with the relative performance of Buy and Hold
compared to Leapfrog. In this light the following ceteris paribus results, that are derived
from (5.42), are easy to understand: G goes up with r, T , P10, Cl, and goes down with
Ce and P21.
Finally, we analyze games for which T ∈ (TB,Le, TLeB,B ]. Solving this case leads to
analogous results as in the previous subsection. In the symmetric equilibrium both firms
use the following strategy
G (s) = 1, (5.43)
α (s) =
L (s)− F (s)
L (s)−M (s) , (5.44)
where s ∈ (TB,Le, TLeB,B ]. Right at the start of the game one of the firms will invest in
the current technology. The other firm refrains from investment until time T at which
it will adopt the new technology. The probability that both firms invest in the current
technology exactly at the same time is again given by equation (5.22). It is unclear how
α (s) develops over time, since two opposite effects are working here: (1) the difference in
payoffs between leading and following decreases over time which has a negative effect on
α (s), and (2) the difference in payoffs between leading and joint adoption decreases as
time passes which has a positive effect on α (s).
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5.4 Conclusions
This chapter treats the technology adoption decision of the firm in a duopoly framework.
One of the main difficulties concerning the technology investment decision in practice is
that in the future better technologies than now available will be invented. The model in
this chapter tries to capture this important aspect by considering two technologies: one
which is available immediately, and the other one which is more efficient and becomes
available at a known point of time in the future. By doing so, work of Reinganum (1981),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Hendricks (1992), and Stenbacka and Tombak (1994), who
consider only one technology, is extended. Moreover, learning is incorporated in the way
that adoption of the current technology makes it less costly to adopt and implement the
new technology.
We focussed on the scenario where for every technology investment it holds that the
discounted future profit stream exceeds the immediate expenditure. In case the arrival
date of the new technology lies far in the future, the future presence of a new technology
does not prevent that investing in the current technology is still optimal. When this date
comes nearer it is not optimal anymore for both firms to invest in the current technology
right away. Hence, one of the firms has to refrain from investment, which implies that
by investing in the current technology the other firm obtains monopoly profits until the
arrival date of the new technology. To capture these monopoly profits a firm must try
to invest earlier than its competitor. In this way the preemption equilibria arise that
we already know from, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), but here no rent equalization
occurs as was the case in that paper. A consequence of the absence of rent equalization
is that a positive probability arises that both firms invest at the same time, leaving them
with a very low payoff (in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) the probability of occurrence of
this mistake was zero due to rent equalization).
Another new element in our chapter is the occurrence of second mover advantages in
technology adoption problems. This happens in scenarios where technology upgrading
is not optimal so that firms have to make a choice between investing in the current
technology right away and keep on producing with it, or waiting with investment until
the new technology arrives. The advantage of the immediate investor is that monopoly
profits are gained until the arrival of the new technology, while the investor in the new
technology has the advantage of producing with a better technology once it is available. A
second mover advantage arises when the advantage of producing with the new technology
in the future leads to a higher payoff than the current temporary monopoly profits.
An immediate extension of the model in this chapter is to add uncertainty. A distinc-
tion can be made between uncertainty concerning the arrival date of new technologies or
uncertainty concerning the efficiency of new technologies. For instance, in case of micro-
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chips the technical parameters and specifications of future designs are known beforehand,
but the arrival date is uncertain since the appearance of the technology depends on re-
search and development and the market factors affecting the introduction of the product
(see Chapter 6 and Nair (1995)).
Another interesting topic of future research is to incorporate asymmetric information
in the sense that a firm does not know how profitable a particular innovation is for its
opponent. However, as time passes the firm learns about the other firm’s profit function
from the observed investment behavior of the other firm. Based on this observation it will





In this chapter we extend the models of Chapters 4 and 5 by adding uncertainty to the
innovation process and by considering multiple new technologies. The new technologies
are invented at previously unknown points of time. A comparable framework is considered
in the duopoly model by Gaimon (1989). The difference is that in that paper a continuous
stream of new technologies arrives over time, which is known beforehand by the firms.
The investment decision problem of this chapter is solved by introducing the waiting
curve as a new concept in timing games. The waiting curve is equal to the expected
equilibrium payoff of the firm when both firms wait with making an investment (at least)
until the next technology has arrived. Therefore the waiting curve resembles the option
to invest in some future technology that is not invented yet.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 the investment
decision problem of the firm is described. We reformulate the investment decision problem
as a timing game, and design an algorithm to solve it in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4
we apply the algorithm to an information technology investment problem. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 6.5.
6.2 The Model
In this section we describe the model of this chapter. A duopoly is considered where both
firms maximize their value over an infinite planning horizon. We define T (≥ 0) to be the
time elapsed since the start of the game. The first assumption is that firms are identical.
Each firm has a profit function π (θx, θy), where θx (≥ 0) equals the technology-efficiency
parameter of the technology that the firm uses itself and θy (≥ 0) that of its opponent. The
profit function of each firm is non-negative, increasing and concave in its own technology-
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efficiency parameter and decreasing in its rival technology-efficiency parameter. This for
the reasons that (i) a firm can make more profits when it produces with a more efficient
technology, (ii) the growth of the profits will be limited (due to output market saturation
and the fact that production costs are always positive), and (iii) a firm will make less
profits when its rival uses a more efficient technology. In formulas this means that










We analyze a dynamic model with an infinite planning horizon. Risk-neutral firms
are considered, which discount the stream of future profits at a constant rate r (> 0).
Initially, at time T = 0 each firm produces with a technology of which the efficiency
is designated by θ0 (≥ 0). As time passes new technologies become available at discrete
points of time. Technologies become more and more efficient over time, and the more
efficient a technology the larger the associated parameter θ. The i-th technology has an
efficiency represented by θi (> θi−1), for i ∈ IN. We define Ti (≥ 0) to be equal to the
point in time at which technology i becomes available, i ∈ IN, and T0 = 0. Each firm
has the opportunity to adopt at time T (≥ 0) one of the technologies being available at
time T by investing I (ti) to adopt technology i, where ti (≥ 0) is the length of the time
period passed since the introduction of technology i, i.e. ti = T − Ti. We assume the
second hand market for these capital goods to be negligible (e.g. information technology
products) so that this investment is irreversible. The differences between the technologies
are all captured in the different values for the efficiency parameter θ, so that, without loss
of generality, investment expenditures (= I (·)) can be set equal for all technologies. The
investment cost I (·) is non-negative, decreasing and convex in time:








Such a decrease can be motivated by the fact that better technologies become available as
time passes so that the demand for the current technology decreases over time. Another
factor can be learning by doing in the production process of the technology supplier.
Furthermore, we assume, as anywhere else, that the process of technological evolution
(innovation supply) is exogenous to the firms. The arrival process of the new technologies
is a stochastic process. We assume that the associated increases in θ are known before-
hand. In practice this occurs, for example, in the case of micro-chips where the technical
parameters and specifications of future designs are known beforehand, but the arrival date
is uncertain since the appearance of technology depends on research and development and
market factors affecting the introduction of the product (see also Nair (1995)).
At time T the number N (T ) refers to the technology that became last available. To
incorporate the uncertainty in the innovation process we assume that N (T ) is a Poisson
process with rate λ (> 0). The interarrival time τ i (≥ 0) is the time between the invention
times of the (i− 1)-th and i-th technology: τ i = Ti − Ti−1, i ∈ IN. As a result of the
Poisson arrival process the τ i’s are independently and identically distributed according to
an exponential distribution with parameter λ.
6.3 Timing Game
For simplicity reasons we restrict ourselves to the case where firms can only make one
technology switch. This typically holds for firms whose financial means are limited. We
transform the investment decision problem into a two player timing game. In Appendix
4.A a rigorous treatment of timing games is given. Here we repeat the important features.
In a timing game each player has to decide when to make a single move. The player that
moves first is called the leader and the other is the follower. Since firms are identical there
seems to be no reason why one of these firms should be given the leader role beforehand.
Therefore, we strive at obtaining equilibria where it is not known beforehand which firm
will invest first. In the general setting of a timing game the payoff of a player depends
on its own date of moving and the other player’s date of moving. In case one player has
already moved, the problem for the other player is a one person decision problem. A
player can react instantaneously to its opponent’s action.
Four payoff curves are important in our timing game. Each payoff curve is a function
of time t (≥ 0), which is the time passed since the last technology has become available for
the firms: t (T ) = T − TN(T ). In the remainder of this chapter we write t instead of t (T )
whenever there is no confusion possible. Let the leader move at time t. Then the value
of the follower, which is the outcome of the one person’s decision problem, is denoted by
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F (t) . The value of the leader is given by L (t) , in which the optimal action of the follower
is included. In case of a simultaneous move at time t the value of a player is denoted by
M (t) . Since simultaneous moving is always possible for the follower, it holds that
F (t) ≥ M (t) , for t ≥ 0. (6.8)
The fourth curve is called the waiting curve, which is a new concept within the area of
timing games. Here, the waiting curve is used to transform the investment decision prob-
lem under consideration into a timing game. The waiting curve represents the expected
payoff of a firm if both firms do not move (at least) until the next arrival of a new tech-
nology and act optimally afterwards. This implies that we need to know the equilibrium
outcome of the game that starts after the arrival of a new technology. As a result we have
to consider a finite number of new technologies. Due to discounting this assumption is
not too strict. In order to find the right number of new technologies to take into account
in the model, the following algorithm, which is a weak forecast horizon procedure, can be
used:
Step 0 Solve the model with one technology.
Step 1 Add one extra technology to the model and solve the model.
Step 2 If the results of the last two models are very different go to step 1, otherwise the
right number of technologies has been found.
A model with n new technologies is solved as follows. Start with solving the timing
game that starts after the arrival of the n-th technology. This game is a classical timing
game, since it contains no waiting curve. The equilibrium outcomes of this game are
used to construct the waiting curve for the game that starts at some time during the
interval [Tn−1, Tn) . Solve this game and use the equilibrium outcomes to construct the
waiting curve for the game that starts somewhere at the time interval [Tn−2, Tn−1) . This
procedure goes on until the game that starts at time T1 = 0 is solved.
This section describes the construction of the four payoff curves. In Subsection 6.3.1
we derive the value of a firm given each firm’s strategy. Using this value function, we
determine the leader, follower and joint-moving curves in Subsection 6.3.2. In Subsection
6.3.3 possible equilibria of timing games without waiting curve are considered. The waiting
curve is constructed in Subsection 6.3.4. In Subsection 6.3.5 we explain the implication of
adding the waiting curve for the possible equilibria of timing games. Finally, in Subsection
6.3.6 the algorithm for solving the investment decision problem with a finite number of
new technologies is summarized.
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6.3.1 Value Function
In the investment decision problem firms not only have to decide when to adopt a tech-
nology, but also which technology to adopt. Define V (S, i, T, j) as the expected value
at time T of a firm that adopts technology i at time S ≥ T itself, while its rival adopts
technology j at time T. Of course, it must be true that T ≥ Tj and S ≥ Ti. The expected
value of the firm at time T equals
V (S, i, T, j) = E
 S−T∫
u=0




π (θi, θj) exp (−ru) du− I (S − Ti) exp (−r (S − T ))
 .
The expected value of the firm’s opponent at time T is equal to
V (T, j, S, i) = E
 S−T∫
u=0




π (θj, θi) exp (−ru) du− I (T − Tj)
 .
Rewriting (6.9) gives
V (S, i, T, j) =
π (θ0, θj)
r




E [exp (−r (S − T ))]− I (S − Ti)E [exp (−r (S − T ))] .
Equation (6.10) can be written as follows
V (T, j, S, i) =
π (θj, θ0)
r




E [exp (−r (S − T ))]− I (T − Tj) .
For determining the value functions (6.11) and (6.12) there is one thing left to derive: an
expression for E [exp (−r (S − T ))] . Recall that N (T ) is the index of the most efficient
technology that is available at time T . We distinguish two cases: in the first case the
second investor wants to invest in an already existing technology, while in the second case
this firm plans to invest in a technology that does not exist yet. In the first case, it holds
that N (T ) ≥ i, and therefore the value of S is known for sure at time T :
E [exp (−r (S − T ))|N (T ) ≥ i] = exp (−r (S − T )) . (6.13)
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Now consider the second case where N (T ) < i, then
E [exp (−r (S − T ))|N (T ) < i] = exp (−r (S − Ti))E [exp (−r (Ti − T ))|N (T ) < i] .
(6.14)
Lemma 2.3 states that






With the help of equation (6.15) we derive that
E [exp (−r (S − T ))] =
{
exp (−r (S − T )) if S < TN(T )+1,





if S ≥ TN(T )+1.
(6.16)
6.3.2 Leader, Follower and Joint-Moving Curves
At each point of time T the leader can choose to immediately invest in a technology j
from the finite set {1, 2, . . . , N (T )} . Given an adoption strategy of the leader (T, j) the
optimal reaction of the follower can be calculated in two steps.
In the first step, derive for each technology i the optimal adoption date S∗i for the
follower. Since the follower’s payoff depends on the adoption strategy the other firm uses,
S∗i is a function of T and j. Therefore,
S∗i (T, j) = arg max
u≥max(Ti,T )
V (u, i, T, j) . (6.17)
In order to be more specific about S∗i (T, j) consider the following scenario: the leader has
already adopted technology j and technology i has just been invented. The follower can
either adopt technology i right away or delay adoption. Let wFi (j) denote the optimal
waiting time for the follower, that is the length of the time period between invention and
optimal adoption of technology i. Solving the maximization problem (6.17) yields that
wFi (j) = 0 if





and that wFi (j) is implicitly determined by








otherwise. Equation (6.19) states that the marginal costs (the left-hand side) and the
marginal benefits (the right-hand side) are equal at time wFi (j). The marginal costs are
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equal to the opportunity costs of the investment, rI (t), and the costs resulting from
the fact that the firm invests right away so that it does not take advantage from I
being decreasing over time. If at time Ti the marginal benefits exceed the marginal
costs (cf. equation (6.18)) the firm should adopt immediately so that wFi (j) = 0. Using
the definition of wFi (j) and since π (θi, θj) is increasing in θi, we know that there exists
an î (j) such that wFi (j) = 0 for all i ≥ î (j).
We extend this particular scenario to the general case and conclude that the optimal
adoption time S∗i (T, j) is equal to
S∗i (T, j) =
{
T if T ≥ Ti + wFi (j) ,
Ti + w
F




In the second step, we use (6.20) to determine the technology i∗ that maximizes the
follower’s payoff, given that the leader invests at time T in technology j:
i∗ (T, j) = argmax
k
V (S∗k (T, j) , k, T, j) . (6.21)
The leader, on its turn, takes into account the follower’s investment behavior in choosing
at time T the technology j∗ (T ) that results in the largest payoff:








The process described above results in the following value functions for the timing game
that starts at time Tk ≤ T :
L (t) = L (T − Tk) = (1− exp (−r (T − Tk))) π (θ0, θ0)
r
(6.23)
+ exp (−r (T − Tk))V
(
T, j∗ (T ) , S∗i∗(T,j∗(T )) (T, j
∗ (T )) , i∗ (T, j∗ (T ))
)
,
F (t) = F (T − Tk) = (1− exp (−r (T − Tk))) π (θ0, θ0)
r
(6.24)
+ exp (−r (T − Tk))V
(
S∗i∗(T,j∗(T )) (T, j
∗ (T )) , i∗ (T, j∗ (T )) , T, j∗ (T )
)
,
M (t) = M (T − Tk) = (1− exp (−r (T − Tk))) π (θ0, θ0)
r
(6.25)
+ exp (−r (T − Tk))V (T, j∗ (T ) , T, j∗ (T )) .
6.3.3 Equilibria for Timing Games without Waiting Curve
In this subsection possible equilibria for classical timing games, i.e. timing games without
waiting curves, are presented. In our model with n new technologies, the game that starts
after time Tn is a classical timing game.
Classical timing games can be divided in two classes. The first class consists of the so-
called preemption games and the elements of the second class are called attrition games.
124 6.3. Timing Game
Preemption games are characterized by the fact that there exists a point of time where
there is a first mover advantage:
∃t ∈ [0,∞) such that L (t) > F (t) . (6.26)
In an attrition game the follower’s payoff exceeds the leader’s payoff at all times:
F (t) > L (t) for all t ∈ [0,∞) . (6.27)
In general a (classical) timing game can be split up into countably many subgames,
where each subgame is a preemption game or an attrition game. Due to the definitions of
preemption and attrition games, the split up points will be the points at which the function
L (t)− F (t) changes its sign. The equilibrium of a general timing game is found by first
solving the last subgame, then using the resulting value functions of the equilibrium of
this subgame in the second last subgame and so forth and so on.
Since we analyze identical firms we are especially interested in equilibria with sym-
metric strategies. For identical and rational firms there is no reason why they should act
differently. For a rigorous treatment and a literature overview of classical timing games
we refer to Appendix 4.A.
The equilibrium outcome of the timing game that starts after time Tn depends on
the interarrival time τn. We denote the (expected) equilibrium outcome of the game that
starts after time Tn by Ωn (τn). If the game has more than one equilibrium, we use the
most reasonable equilibrium in the calculations, being the equilibrium under which the
player’s payoffs are maximal (the Pareto optimal equilibrium, cf. Appendix 4.A).
6.3.4 Waiting Curve
In general, the equilibrium outcome of the game that starts in the interval [Tk, Tk+1) is
denoted by Ωk (τ k), with k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} . Using this notation, the waiting curve for a
game that starts in the interval [Tk−1, Tk) equals
W (t) = W (T − Tk−1) = (1− exp (−r (T − Tk−1))) π (θ0, θ0)
r






π (θ0, θ0) exp (−ru) du+ exp (−rτ k) Ωk (τ k)
λ exp (−λτ k) dτ k. (6.28)
The first part represents the profits made by the firm on the time interval [Tk−1, T ] . The
second part resembles the expected payoff of the firm from time T onwards conditioned
on the interarrival time τ k.
The waiting curve represents the option to invest in some future technology that is
not invented yet. As such it is not equal to the option value of waiting since it does not
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take into account the increased profitability over time (due to the decreasing investment
costs) of the already existing technologies.
6.3.5 Equilibria for Timing Games with Waiting Curve
The equilibria of a timing game with waiting curve are found in two steps. In the first
step the timing game is split up into subgames. This is done as is described in Subsection
6.3.3, i.e. the split up points are the points at which the function L (t) − F (t) changes
its sign. In the second step the subgames are solved. The last subgame is solved as first,
then the second last subgame, and so forth and so on.
The first class of subgames with waiting curve are those in which the leader curve
exceeds the waiting curve for all points in time. The implication is that for the leader
investing dominates waiting. Consequently, the equilibria of such a subgame are given by
the equilibria of the corresponding subgame without waiting curve.
In a subgame for which the waiting curve exceeds the leader curve, i.e. W (t) > L (t)
for all t ≥ 0, none of the firms is going to invest as first. This for the reason that waiting
gives them a higher expected value. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome for both firms is
waiting.
If in a subgame the leader curve exceeds the waiting curve for some but not all points
in time, then for at least one firm investing is better than waiting for those points in time.
There are two cases: (i) the subgame without the waiting curve is a preemption game,
and (ii) the subgame without the waiting curve is an attrition game.
In the first case (preemption game) the equilibria of the subgame with waiting curve
are given by the equilibria of the subgame without waiting curve. This is a direct result of
the fact that the equilibria in the subgame without waiting curve are Nash equilibria, i.e.
one firm can not improve his expected value by deviating from the equilibrium strategy.
Contrary, in the second case (attrition game) the firm that is leader can increase its
profit by waiting with investing at the points in time where the waiting curve exceeds
the leader curve. The equilibrium strategies for the part of the subgame where the leader
curve exceeds the waiting curve are given by the equilibrium strategies of the subgame
without waiting curve. At the points in time of the other part of the subgame none of
the firms will invest.
6.3.6 Solution Procedure
In this subsection the solution procedure is summarized. In the first step of the solution
procedure the classical timing game that starts at time Tn is solved. This gives the equi-
librium outcome function Ωn (τn) . Using this equilibrium outcome function we construct
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the waiting curve (6.28) and solve the timing game that starts at a point in time on the
interval [Tn−1, Tn) . The resulting outcomes are incorporated in the function Ωn−1 (τn−1)
which is again used to construct the waiting curve for the timing game that starts some-
where during the time interval [Tn−2, Tn−1). This process is repeated until the game that
starts at T1 is solved.
Combining the equilibrium strategies of each step gives the optimal investment strat-
egy of the firm. The ex-ante probabilities of each equilibrium outcome can be derived
using the calculations of each step. After each realization of an interarrival time these
probabilities must be updated.
6.4 Information Technology Investment Problem
In this section we apply the algorithm of the previous section to a specific information
technology investment problem. Information technology products are heavily dependent
on micro-chips. The memory and arithmetic power of micro-chips develop in an exponen-
tial way over time. This was firstly recognized by Gordon Moore, one of the Intel-founders,
in 1964, who found out that the amount of information on a piece of silicium doubles every
year. This statement is called Moore’s law. Nowadays, Moore’s law still applies although
the doubling time has risen to two to three years. In our calculations it is assumed that on
average every three years a new generation of chips arrives: λ = 1
3
. A new generation of
chips is a generation that is twice as efficient as the preceding generation. After applying
the algorithm stated in the beginning of Section 6.3, it turned out that we need to take
four generations of chips into account. When we normalize the technology parameter of
the current technology to one, this gives rise to the following scheme,
θ0 = 1, (6.29)
θi+1 = 2θi, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} , (6.30)
so that
θi = 2
i, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} . (6.31)
Due to the rapid innovation process, prices of information technology products go down
quickly. We assume that
I (t) = I0 exp (−αt) , (6.32)
where
I0 = 50, (6.33)
α = 1. (6.34)
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The strange thing with micro-electronics is that their fast efficiency improvement does
not impress consumers. As an illustration, consider a telephone in which a certain amount
of telephone numbers can be stored. A new generation of chips doubles this amount, but
most likely this will not be a reason for customers to sell their old telephone and buy a new
one. Another example is that a new generation of personal computers will not double the
research output of a scientist. Therefore, a manager of Philips, Claassen (see Rozendaal
(1998)), has argued that utility is a logarithmic function of technology, in the sense that
utility increases with one unit in case technology power becomes ten times as large. For
this reason we assume that profit increases with the technology-efficiency parameter in a
logarithmic way with base 10 (cf. (6.31)):





















if i < 1
2
(j + 1) (r + α) I0,
0 else.
(6.36)
In Appendix 6.A the expected equilibrium outcomes for the subgames starting right
at the invention times T4, T3, and T2 are derived. The results are summarized in Tables




∣∣V (T4 + t, 4, T4 + wF4 (4) , 4) = V (T4 + wF4 (4) , 4, T4 + t, 4))
= 0.734579,
tL34 (τ 4) = min
(
t
∣∣V (T4 + t, 3, T4 + wF4 (3) , 4) = V (T4 + t, 4, T4 + wF4 (4) , 4)) ,




T4 + t, 3, T4 + w
F
4 (3) , 4
)
,
tP34 (τ 4) = min
(
t




∣∣V (T3 + t, 3, T4 + wF4 (3) , 4) = V (T4 + wF4 (3) , 4, T3 + t, 3))
= 0.727495,
tL23 (τ 3) = min
(
t
∣∣V (T3 + t, 2, T4 + wF4 (2) , 4) = V (T3 + t, 3, T4 + wF4 (3) , 4)) ,




T3 + t, 2, T4 + w
F






∣∣V (T2 + t, 2, T4 + wF4 (2) , 4) = V (T4 + wF4 (2) , 4, T2 + t, 2))
= 1.81706.
In Tables 6.2 and 6.3 the equilibrium outcomes are conditional on the next technology
not arriving too early. That is the next technology does not arrive before the time at which
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τ 4 region Type Equilibrium
Leader Follower
Technology Time Technology Time
[0, 0.800591) P 4 T4 + t
P
4 4 T4 + w
F
4 (4)
[0.800591, 1.17938) A 3 T4 + t
L
34 (τ 4) 4 T4 + w
F
4 (3)
[1.17938, 1.87931] A 3 T4 + S
L
34 (τ 4) 4 T4 + w
F
4 (3)
(1.87931, 1.89322) P 3 T4 + t
P
34 (τ 4) 4 T4 + w
F
4 (3)
[1.89322,∞) P 3 T4 4 T4 + wF4 (3)
Table 6.1: Equilibria and type of subgames starting at time T4 as function of τ4. Type ”P” is preemption
game and type ”A” is attrition game.
τ 3 region Type Equilibrium
Leader Follower
Technology Time Technology Time
[0, 1.24843) P 3 T3 + t
P
34 4 T4 + w
F
4 (3)
[1.24843, 2.94586) A 2 T3 + t
L
23 (τ 3) 4 T4 + w
F
4 (2)
[2.94586, 3.95758) A 2 T3 + S
L
24 (τ 3) 4 T4 + w
F
4 (2)
[3.95758,∞) A 2 T3 4 T4 + wF4 (2)
Table 6.2: Equilibria and type of subgames starting at time T3 as function of τ3. Type ”P” is preemption
game and type ”A” is attrition game.
τ 2 region Type Equilibrium
Leader Follower
Technology Time Technology Time
[0,∞) P 2 T2 + tP24 4 T4 + wF4 (2)
Table 6.3: Equilibria and type of subgames starting at time T2 as function of τ2. Type ”P” is preemption
game.
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the leader changes technologies according to the table. In Appendix 6.A the equilibrium
outcome functions Ωi (τ i) , i = 2, 3, 4, are presented. Let i ∈ {2, 3, 4} . In the game that
starts in the interval [Ti−1, Ti) the equilibrium strategy of a firm depends on τ i. Note
that the higher τ i the more attractive the technologies j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} are, due to the
decrease of the investment costs of these technologies during the interval [Tj , Ti).
If technology 4 arrives shortly after technology 3 (see first line of Table 6.1), technology
4 dominates technology 3 and both firms will adopt technology 4. If it takes a little longer
before technology 4 becomes available, technology 3 is the most attractive technology for
the leader to adopt. In the second and third τ 4 region the follower’s value is higher than
the leader’s value. To explain this second mover advantage, consider the second line of














. A late arrival of technology 4 makes technology
3 attractive enough for direct adoption, see the last line of Table 6.1. Tables 6.2 and 6.3
should be interpreted in the same way.
We now analyze the game at the moment where technologies 2, 3, and 4 have not been
invented yet, in a more elaborate way. Using the outcome function Ω2 (τ 2) we construct
the waiting curve for the game that starts at time T1 (cf. (6.28)), which is the invention










π (θ0, θ0) exp (−ru) du+ exp (−rτ 2) Ω2 (τ 2)
λ exp (−λτ 2) dτ 2.
The leader, follower and joint-moving curves are derived with the equations presented in
Section 6.3. In Figure 6.1 the four curves are plotted.
From Figure 6.1 the following unique ordering of the curves is derived: F (t) > W (t) >
L (t) > M (t) for all t ∈ [T1, T2) . This implies that each firm likes the other to invest as
first and does not want to invest as first itself. Thus waiting is the optimal strategy for
the firms in the game that starts in the interval [T1, T2) .
Then at time T2 the game starts where technologies 1 and 2 are present, but the
remaining technologies 3 and 4 have not been invented yet. From Table 6.3 we derive
that one firm will adopt technology 2 at time T2 + t
P
24 and the other firm technology 4 if





τ 3 ≥ tP24
)
= exp
(−λtP24) = 0.54570, (6.38)
this is the case.
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= 1− exp (−λtP24) = 0.45430, (6.39)
technology 3 arrives before time T2 + t
P
24. Now, there are two cases. In the first case, τ 3
is smaller than the boundary 1.24843 (see Table 6.2), which occurs with probability
Pr (τ 3 < 1.24843) = 1− exp (−1.24843λ) = 0.34041, (6.40)
and in the second case, 1.24843 < τ 3 < t
P
24, which occurs with probability
Pr
(
1.24843 ≤ τ 3 < tP24
)
= exp (−1.24843λ)− exp (−λtP24) = 0.11389. (6.41)
Table 6.2 states that, in the first case, the outcome will be adoption of technology 3
at time T3 + t
P
34 if technology 4 does not arrive before that time. This outcome occurs
with the following probability:
Pr
(
τ 3 < t
P














1− exp (−λtP24)) exp (−λtP34)
= 0.26711. (6.42)
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Technology 4 arrives before time T3 + t
P





τ 3 < t
P


















1− exp (−λtP24)) (1− exp (−λtP34))
= 0.073303. (6.43)
In this case the outcome will be a preemption equilibrium in which one firm adopts
technology 4 at time T4 + t
P
4 and the other firm technology 4 at time T4 +w
F
4 (4) . Here it
is important to note that tP34 = 0.727495 is smaller than the first τ 4 boundary 0.800591.
Hence, with probability one the outcomes listed on the lines 2-5 of Table 6.1 will not
occur here.
The second case is a little more complicated. The outcome exhibits adoption of tech-
nology 3 at time T3 + t
L
23 (τ 3) by one firm, while the other firm adopts technology 4, if
technology 4 arrives after time T3 + t
L
23 (τ 3) , which happens with probability:
Pr
(







τ 4 ≥ tL23 (τ 3)
)





(−λtL23 (τ 3))λ exp (−λτ 3) dτ 3
= 0.086802. (6.44)
Otherwise the outcome is of the preemption type (first line of Table 6.1) if τ 4 < 0.800591
or of the attrition type (second line of Table 6.1) if τ 4 ≥ 0.800591. The probability that
the preemption equilibrium occurs is equal to
Pr
(







τ 4 < min
(
tL23 (τ 3) , 0.800591
))
λ exp (−λτ 3) dτ 3
= 0.026273. (6.45)











0.800591 ≤ τ 4 < tL23 (τ 3)
)





exp (−0.800591λ)− exp (−λtL23 (τ 3))) 1{0.800591≤tL34(τ3)}λ exp (−λτ 3) dτ 3
= 0.00081337, (6.46)
the attrition game will happen. Here the leader adopts technology 3 and the follower
invests in technology 4. So, on the longer term the follower produces with the more
efficient technology which here leads to a higher expected payoff.
The analysis above implies that only the first two lines of Tables 6.1 and 6.2 matter.
This for the reason that one of the firms adopts an existing technology, if a new technology
arrives too late.
In Table 6.4 all possible outcomes and the probabilities are summarized. We conclude
that the ex-ante probability of a preemption equilibrium with rent equalization (see Ap-
pendix 6.A) equals 0.91238. The most likely outcome (probability 0.54570) is that one
firm adopts technology 2 and the other firm technology 4. With probability 0.087615 there
is a second mover advantage in the equilibrium, i.e. the firm that invests as first earns
less than the firm that invests as second. The market share gain by the second mover
offsets the temporary market share gain of the first mover. With probability 0.90042 the
leader adopts another technology than the follower. The follower is expected to adopt
technology 4 in all equilibria. Joint adoption does not occur as an equilibrium outcome.
Probability Type Equilibrium
Leader Follower
Technology Time Technology Time
0.54570 P 2 T2 + t
P
24 4 T4 + w
F
4 (2)
0.26711 P 3 T3 + t
P
34 4 T4 + w
F
4 (3)
0.086802 A 2 T3 + t
L
23 (τ 3) 4 T4 + w
F
4 (2)
0.099576 P 4 T4 + t
P
4 4 T4 + w
F
4 (4)
0.00081337 A 3 T4 + t
L
34 (τ 4) 4 T4 + w
F
4 (3)
Table 6.4: Equilibria and ex-ante probabilities at time T1 = 0. Type ”P” is preemption game and type
”A” is attrition game.
We did not add an extra new technology to the model, because the probability that
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both firms adopt technology 4 is less than 0.10. Hence, with a probability of more than
0.90 at least one firm invests in another technology than the last one. For this reason we
choose not to analyze the game with one technology more.
6.5 Conclusions
We analyzed a framework in which consecutive generations of new technologies arrive over
time, and a firm has to make its optimal technology investment decision. Competition on
the output market is taken into account. As time passes more efficient technologies arrive
according to a stochastic arrival process. The investment cost of a particular technology
drops over time.
Introducing the waiting curve as a new concept, the investment decision problem was
converted into a timing game. The timing game changes every time a new technology
enters the market. We designed an algorithm that can be used to solve this game.
The algorithm is applied to an information technology investment problem with four
new technologies. The most likely outcome exhibits diffusion, one firm adopts technology
2 early and the other technology 4 later on, while the expected payoffs of the first and
second investor are the same. With a probability of more than 90 percent the expected
payoffs of the firms are equal. In the other cases the firm that invests as second performs
better than the firm that invests as first. Thus the temporary gain of market share by
the leader does not make up for the market share gain of the follower.
One possible extension of this model is to relax the assumption that firms are allowed
to make only one technology switch. We believe that this model can be solved in the
same fashion: use the waiting curve concept to convert the game to a timing game with
multiple actions and solve that game following the work by Simon (1987b).
Another interesting extension is to make the number of active firms on the output
market endogenous. If the active firms make positive profits it may be interesting for
a new firm to enter the market. How does the threat of entering change the technology
adoption behavior of the existing firms? Will they try to prevent firms to enter the market
by adopting new technologies sooner?
Appendix
6.A Construction of the Waiting Curve
In this part the waiting curve for the application in Section 6.3 is constructed. To do so,
starting out from each realization the subgames have to be solved. Appendix 4.A provides
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some relevant mathematical prerequisites for the analysis in this appendix.
6.A.1 Games Starting in Fifth Period
The outcome of the subgame that starts at a time after the arrival of the fourth technology
depends on the realization of T4 and thus on the realization of τ 4. It turns out that there
are five different intervals for τ 4 to consider. This implies that there are four critical values
for τ 4, denoted by τ
∗
4 (i) , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} . On each of these intervals the configuration of
the figure in which L, F , and M are depicted is the same.
1. τ 4 ∈ [0, τ ∗4 (1)) = [0, 0.800591) .
In Figure 6.2 the three graphs of L (t) , F (t) , and M (t) are plotted for τ 4 = 0.5.
0 t34





















Figure 6.2: Leader, follower and joint moving curves for the subgame that starts at time T4 if τ4 = 0.5.
Here technology 4 is invented just after the invention of technology 3. Therefore,
technology 4 dominates technology 3 very quickly. At time tL34 (τ 4) the leader is indifferent





34 (τ 4) , 3, T4 + w
F






34 (τ 4) , 4, T4 + w
F
4 (4) , 4
)
,
where wF4 (3) = 3.26767 and w
F
4 (4) = 3.49080. Note that the follower is not indifferent,
because the follower curve jumps down at time tL34 (τ 4) . There are two equilibria with
symmetric strategies. Define the preemption time tP4 as
tP4 = min (t|L (t) = F (t)) = 0.734579.
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For t ∈ (tP4 , wF4 (4)) it holds that L (t) > F (t) > M (t). Therefore, the game that starts
at time tP4 is a preemption game.
At t > tP4 it is in the interest of each firm to adopt technology 4 right away (since
L (t) > F (t)). But if a firm knows that the other will adopt at this particular time, it
wants to preempt at t − ε. Reasoning backwards, at any time beyond tP4 , firms want to
preempt to avoid being preempted later on. As shown in Appendix 4.A this leads to
the following equilibrium: with probability one-half a firm becomes leader and adopts
technology 4 at time T4 + t
P
4 . The other firm is follower and adopts technology 4 at time
T4 +w
F
4 (4). With probability one-half the roles are reversed. We conclude that the game
ends for sure at time T4 + t
P
4 . The probability of a mistake, i.e. both firms adopting
technology 4 at time T4 + t
P









to zero (see Appendix 4.A). Both firms’ values are equal, i.e. there is rent-equalization.














At t < tP4 , it holds that F (t) > L (t) and the leader curve is increasing. Therefore,
both firms wait until tP4 where the above described preemption game starts.




4 (1)) = t
P
4 . Thus if
τ 4 = τ
∗
4 (1) the leader is indifferent between the two strategies exactly at the preemption
time tP4 .
2. τ 4 ∈ [τ ∗4 (1) , τ ∗4 (2)) = [0.800591, 1.17938) .
The leader, follower and joint-moving curves are plotted in Figure 6.3 for τ 4 = 1.
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Figure 6.3: Leader, follower and joint moving curves for the subgame that starts at time T4 if τ4 = 1.
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In this τ 4-region there is no equilibrium with symmetric strategies. Here, there are
four equilibria for the subgame. At time tL34 (τ 4) the leader is indifferent between adopting





34 (τ 4) , 3, T4 + w
F






34 (τ 4) , 4, T4 + w
F
4 (4) , 4
)
.
The subgame that starts at time t > tL34 (τ 4) is a preemption game and in equilibrium




4 (4) , 4, T4 + t, 4
)
, i.e. the follower value
if the leader adopts technology 4 at time T4 + t and the follower adopts technology 4 at
time T4 + w
F
4 (4) . This subgame ends at time T4 + t with probability one.
Adopting before time T4 + t
L
34 (τ 4) is not optimal for a firm, because the follower value
is larger than the leader value and the leader value is increasing.
The story above implies that the game will end at time T4 + t
L
34 (τ 4) with probability
one. The leader has two possible strategies: adopt technology 3 and adopt technology 4.
The follower’s optimal reply is always to adopt technology 4. Thus there are two types
of equilibria. In the first type the leader adopts technology 3 and the follower technology
4 and in the second type the leader and the follower both adopt technology 4. Right at
T4 + t
L
34 (τ 4) the leader’s value is equal in both equilibria, but the follower’s value is larger
in the equilibrium where the leader adopts technology 3. In other words, the equilibrium
in which the leader adopts technology 3 Pareto dominates the other equilibrium and that
is why we use this equilibrium in further calculations. We assume that nature assigns
to a firm the role of leader and that both firms have equal probability of being assigned
leader.








34 (τ 4) , 3, T4 + w
F






4 (3) , 4, T4 + t
L
34 (τ 4) , 3
))
.
3. τ 4 ∈ [τ ∗4 (2) , τ ∗4 (3)] = [1.17938, 1.87931] .
On this interval the leader curve is decreasing on the interval
(









T4 + t, 3, T4 + w
F
4 (3) , 4
)
.








4 (2)) . In Figure
6.4 the three curves are plotted for τ 4 = 1.5.
Since the follower curve lies above the leader curve, we have an attrition game on this
interval, because for all t ∈ [0, tL34 (τ 4)]:
V
(
T4 + t, 3, T4 + w
F






4 (4) , 4, T4 + t
L
34 (τ 4) , 4
)
,
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Figure 6.4: Leader, follower and joint moving curves for the subgame that starts at time T4 if τ4 = 1.5.
there does not exist an equilibrium with symmetric strategies for the game (cf. Appendix
4.A.3). There are two equilibria for this game. In each equilibrium, the leader adopts
technology 3 at time T4+S
L
34 (τ 4) and the follower adopts technology 4 at time T4+w
F
4 (3) .
As before we assume that nature assigns a firm to be leader or follower. Both firms have








34 (τ 4) , 3, T4 + w
F






4 (3) , 4, T4 + S
L
34 (τ 4) , 3
))
.
The subgames that start at time t > tL34 (τ 4) have not changed.
4. τ 4 ∈ (τ ∗4 (3) , τ ∗4 (4)) = (1.87931, 1.89322) .
In these subgames the value of the leader exceeds the value of the follower during a part
of the interval
(
0, tL34 (τ 4)
)
, see Figure 6.5.
These subgames are preemption games. There are two equilibria with symmetric
strategies. With probability one-half a firm becomes leader and adopts technology 3 at
time T4 + t
P
34 (τ 4) , where t
P
34 (τ 4) is defined by
tP34 (τ 4) = min
(
t
∣∣V (T4 + t, 3, T4 + wF4 (3) , 4) = V (T4 + wF4 (3) , 4, T4 + t, 3)) .
The other firm is follower and adopts technology 4 at time T4 + w
F
4 (3) , and with prob-
ability one-half the roles are reversed. According to Appendix 4.A, due to rent equaliza-
tion, there is zero probability of mistake, i.e. both firms adopting technology 3 at time
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Figure 6.5: Leader, follower and joint moving curves for the subgame that starts at time T4 if τ4 = 1.88.
T4 + t
P
34 (τ 4) . Both firm’s values are equal so that there is rent-equalization. The firm’s





34 (τ 4) , 3, T4 + w
F
4 (3) , 4
)
.
The boundary τ ∗4 (3) is defined as the smallest τ 4 for which there exists an t
P
34 (τ 4) .
5. τ 4 ∈ [τ ∗4 (4) ,∞) = [1.89322,∞) .
The boundary τ ∗4 (4) is defined as the smallest τ 4 for which the preemption time t
P
34 (τ 4)
equals 0. Thus, in this region the games end at time T4 with probability one. The leader’s
value at time T4 exceeds the follower’s value at time T4 and that is why there is a positive
probability of a mistake, see Figure 6.6.
Define (see Appendix 4.A)
α (t |τ 4 ) =
V
(
T4 + t, 3, T4 + w
F
4 (3) , 4
)− V (T4 + wF4 (3) , 4, T4 + t, 3)
V (T4 + t, 3, T4 + wF4 (3) , 4)− V (T4 + t, 3, T4 + t, 3)
.
The probability of a firm to become leader (adopt technology 3 at time T4) or to become
follower (adopt technology 4 at time T4 + w
F
4 (3)) equals
1− α (0 |τ 4 )
2− α (0 |τ 4 ) ,
and the probability of a mistake (both firms adopting technology 3 at time T4) equals
α (0 |τ 4 )
2− α (0 |τ 4 ) .
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Figure 6.6: Leader, follower and joint moving curves for the subgame that starts at time T4 if τ4 = 2.
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34 (τ 4) , 3
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, (6.48)
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, (6.50)





4 (3) , 4, T4, 3
)
, (6.51)
if τ 4 ∈ [τ ∗4 (4) ,∞) .
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6.A.2 Game Starting in Fourth Period
Using the expressions (6.47)-(6.51) for Ω4 (τ 4) we derive the waiting curve for the subgames










π (θ0, θ0) exp (−rv3) dv3 + exp (−ru3) Ω4 (u3)
λ exp (−λu3) du3.
The equilibria in this subgame depend on τ 3. There are four different τ 3 intervals to
consider. Thus there are three critical values for τ 3: τ
∗
3 (i) , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} . For the moment
we derive the equilibria in the case that technology 4 has not arrived yet.
1. τ 3 ∈ [0, τ ∗3 (1)) = [0, 1.24843) .
In Figure 6.7 the leader, follower, joint moving and waiting curves are plotted for τ 3 = 1.
tF34 (= 3.24608) is defined as the point in time at which the follower is indifferent between
adopting technology 4 at time T4 +w
F
4 (3) and adopting technology 3 at time T3 +w
F
3 (3)
given that the leader adopted technology 3 and that technology 4 has not arrived yet.
0 t23























Figure 6.7: Leader, follower, joint moving and waiting curve for the subgame that starts at time T3 if
τ3 = 1.
It turns out that waiting is not an option, because the leader curve exceeds the waiting
curve for some points in time and the corresponding timing game without waiting curve
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is a preemption game. As usual there are two equilibria with symmetric strategies. With
probability one-half a firm becomes leader and adopts technology 3 at time T3+t
P
34, where
tP34 = 0.727495. The other firm is follower and is expected to adopt technology 4 at time
T4+w
F
4 (3) , and with probability one-half the roles are reversed. There is zero probability
of mistake, i.e. both firms adopting technology 3 at time T3 + t
P
34. Both firm’s values are
equal so that there is rent-equalization. The firm’s value (discounted to time T3) equals
32.6639.
If τ 3 = τ
∗
3 (1) = 1.24843 it holds that t
L
23 (τ 3) = t
P
34.
2. τ 3 ∈ [τ ∗3 (1) , τ ∗3 (2)) = [1.24843, 2.94586) .
In this region there are two types of equilibria, but none of them is supported by symmetric
strategies. In Figure 6.8 the four curves are plotted for τ 3 = 2.
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Figure 6.8: Leader, follower, joint moving and waiting curve for the subgame that starts at time T3 if
τ3 = 2.
We use the following type in further calculations. The leader adopts technology 2 at
time T3 + t
L
23 (τ 3) and the follower is expected to wait for technology 4 and adopt it at
time T4 + w
F
4 (2) , where w
F
4 (2) = 2.97998. Nature assigns the roles to the firms. The








23 (τ 3) , 2, T4 + w
F






4 (2) , 4, T3 + t
L
23 (τ 3) , 2
))
.
The second boundary, τ ∗3 (2) = 2.94586, is derived by solving the following equation
tL23 (τ 3) = S
L
24 (τ 3) ,
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where




T3 + t, 2, T4 + w
F
4 (2) , 4
)
.
3. τ 3 ∈ [τ ∗3 (2) , τ ∗3 (3)) = [2.94586, 3.95758) .
Again no equilibrium with symmetric strategies in this region exists, see Figure 6.9 for a
plot of the curves in this region.
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Figure 6.9: Leader, follower, joint moving and waiting curve for the subgame that starts at time T3 if
τ3 = 3.5.
In equilibrium the leader adopts technology 2 at time T3 +S
L
24 (τ 3) and the follower is
expected to adopt technology 4 at time T4 + w
F
4 (2) . As before the roles are assigned by








24 (τ 3) , 2, T4 + w
F






4 (2) , 4, T3 + S
L
24 (τ 3) , 2
))
.
The critical value τ ∗3 (3) (= 3.95758) is defined by
τ ∗3 (3) = min
(
τ 3|SL24 (τ 3) = 0
)
.
4. τ 3 ∈ [τ ∗3 (3) ,∞) = [3.95758,∞) .
In Figure 6.10 the leader, follower, joint moving and waiting curves are plotted for τ 3 = 4.
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Figure 6.10: Leader, follower, joint moving and waiting curve for the subgame that starts at time T3 if
τ3 = 4.
The leader adopts technology 2 at time T3 and the follower is expected to adopt
technology 4 at time T4 +w
F
4 (2) in equilibrium. Roles are assigned by nature. Expected
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λ exp (−λτ 4) dτ 4, (6.52)
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λ exp (−λτ 4) dτ 4. (6.53)
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λ exp (−λτ 4) dτ 4, (6.54)
and
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, (6.55)
if τ 3 ∈ [τ ∗3 (3) ,∞) .
6.A.3 Games Starting in Third Period
Using the expressions (6.52)-(6.55) for Ω3 (τ 3) we derive the waiting curve for the subgames










π (θ0, θ0) exp (−rv2) dv2 + exp (−ru2) Ω3 (u2)
λ exp (−λu2) du2.
It turns out that the equilibria in this subgames do not depend on τ 2. This can be
explained by the fact that tL12 (τ 2) < t
P
24 for all τ 2 ∈ [0,∞) . In Figure 6.11 the four
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curves are plotted for τ 2 = 2. t
L
12 (τ 2) is the point in time from T2 on at which the
leader is indifferent between adopting technology 1 and adopting technology 2 given that
technology 3 has not arrived yet and the follower adopts technology 4 at time T4 +w
F
4 (1)
and T4 + w
F
4 (2) , respectively.
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Figure 6.11: Leader, follower, joint moving and waiting curve for the subgame that starts at time T2 if
τ2 = 2.
There are two equilibria, where each occurs with a probability one-half. One firm is




24 = 1.81706, and the other
one is the follower and is expected to adopt technology 4 at time T4 +w
F
4 (2) . The firm’s
expected value equals 38.0414.
Summary


















λ exp (−λu2) du2.

Part III






This chapter considers a framework with two identical firms which both have the pos-
sibility to make an investment that increases their payoff. By how much this payoff is
raised is not known beforehand, since the future market conditions for the firm’s products
are uncertain. Both firms operate on the same output market which implies that the
investment decision of one firm affects the payoff of the other firm. By analyzing this
model uncertainty is combined with strategic aspects.
We identify three scenarios. In the first scenario a preemption equilibrium occurs,
where the moments of investment of both firms are dispersed. The first scenario partic-
ularly holds when first mover advantages are large. In the second scenario the outcome
is that the firms simultaneously invest at the moment that demand is relatively large. In
the third scenario it turns out that in economic environments with low uncertainty the
preemption equilibrium is applied, while with large uncertainty both firms invest together
at the moment that demand is large. This is understandable since the option value of
waiting rises with uncertainty. Then opportunity costs of investment are large so that the
output market conditions must compensate for this when the firm invests.
Furthermore we find that, compared to the monopoly situation, the demand trigger
value is lower for the first investor in the preemption equilibrium. Hence, in order to
be able to preempt its rival, the firm is satisfied with a lower revenue at the moment it
invests. Therefore, the discounted cash flow stream of the investment, which equals the
strategic option value of waiting, is lower than the option value of waiting that prevails in a
monopoly situation. On the other hand, the demand trigger value in the joint investment
case is higher than in the monopoly case. The reason is that the market has to be shared
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by two firms. It turns out that in the joint investment case the strategic option value of
waiting exactly equals the option value of waiting for the monopoly case.
Finally we compare our analysis with the few contributions that include the real option
framework in multiple firm models. Doing this we are able to make a methodological
point. In the preemption equilibrium, situations occur where it is optimal for one firm
to invest, but at the same time investment is not beneficial if both firms decide to do
so. Nevertheless, since the firms are identical there is a possibility that still both firms
invest at the same time, which leads to a low payoff for both of them. Following the
approach described in Appendix 4.A we obtain that such a coordination failure can occur
with positive probability at moments of time where the leader’s payoff is strictly larger
than the follower’s payoff. Most contributions in this area, such as Grenadier (1996),
Dutta et al. (1995), and Weeds (1999), make unsatisfactory assumptions with the aim to
be able to ignore the possibility of simultaneous investment at points of time that this is
not optimal. Grenadier assumes that ”if each (firm) tries to build first, one will randomly
(i.e., through the toss of a coin) win the race”, see Grenadier (1996, pp. 1656-1657), while
in Dutta et al. (1995, p. 568), it is assumed that ”if both (firms) i and j attempt to enter
at any period t, then only one of them succeeds in doing so”.
The model is presented in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3 we solve the investment problem
if there is only one firm active. This will give the benchmark result. The duopoly model
is solved in Section 7.4. In Section 7.5 comparisons are made with related contributions.
Section 7.6 concludes.
7.2 The Model
Two identical firms are active on a market and have the possibility to make an irreversible
investment which results in a higher profit flow. A possible interpretation is that both
firms have the possibility to adopt a new technology which after adoption increases the
firm’s profit. We assume that the firms are risk neutral, value maximizing and discount
with constant factor r (> 0) . The sunk cost to adopt the new technology is constant and
equals I (> 0). Future profits are of a yet unknown size. When we denote one firm by i,
the other firm is denoted by j, with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j.
At time t (≥ 0) the profit flow of firm i equals
Y (t)DNiNj , (7.1)
where, for k ∈ {i, j} :
Nk =
{
0 if firm k has not invested,
1 if firm k has invested.
(7.2)
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In order to incorporate uncertainty, Y (t) follows a geometric Brownian motion process:
dY (t) = µY (t) dt+ σY (t) dω (t) , (7.3)
Y (0) = y, (7.4)
where y > 0, 0 < µ < r, σ > 0, and the dω (t)’s are independently and identically
distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt. Keeping
in mind that (i) the irreversible investment increases the profit flow and (ii) the firm
obtains higher profits if the competitor is weak (thus not having invested (yet)), the
following restrictions on DNiNj are implied:
D10 > D11 > D00 > D01. (7.5)
Further we assume that there is a first mover advantage to investment:
D10 −D00 > D11 −D01. (7.6)
Note that, contrary to Nielsen (1999), we only consider the case in which there are nega-
tive externalities to investment. That is, it is better for the firm that the other firm has
not invested (D10 > D11). When D11 > D10 there are positive externalities to investment,
which can be caused by, e.g., network externalities or the fact that firms produce comple-
mentary products. The aim of this chapter is to study effects of strategic interactions on
the option value of waiting, and thus on the speed of investment.
7.3 Monopoly
In this section we assume that there is only one firm active on the output market. We
use the solution of this model as a benchmark for the results of the duopoly model.
From here on we omit the time dependence of Y, whenever confusion is not possible.
The problem facing the firm is an optimal stopping problem (see also Appendix 2.A).
Hence, intuition suggests that there exists a threshold YM such that investing is optimal
if Y ≥ YM and waiting is optimal when Y < YM . Denote the value of the firm at Y before
the investment by V (Y ) . In Appendix 7.A.1 we derive that
V (Y ) =
{
A1Y
β1 + Y D00
r−µ if Y < YM ,
Y D10
r−µ − I if Y ≥ YM ,
(7.7)









β − r = 0. (7.8)
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Expressions for the investment threshold YM and the constant A1 are found by exploiting





r − µ =
YMD10





r − µ =
D10
r − µ. (7.10)
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r − µ . (7.12)
The optimal investment strategy of the firm is to invest at time TM , where
TM = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YM) . (7.13)
The following proposition states that the threshold YM is unique. The proof is given
in Appendix 7.B.
Proposition 7.1 The threshold YM defined by equation (7.11) is unique.
When Y is below the threshold value YM the value of the firm consists of two parts
(see expression (7.7)). The first part resembles the value of the option to invest and the
second part is the expected value of the firm if the firm never invests. The option value
rises with uncertainty ( β1 is decreasing in σ and note (7.7) and (7.12 )), thus uncertainty
creates value for the firm. The implication is that the investment threshold also rises with
uncertainty, so that the firm’s willingness to invest decreases with uncertainty. Intuitively
this can be understood by noting that under large uncertainty it is more valuable to
wait for new information about the profitability of an investment before undertaking
it. As stressed in Dixit and Pindyck (1996) the difference between the traditional net
present value method and the real options approach to investment problems is completely
captured in the factor β1
β1−1 (> 1) , that occurs in the threshold value (see (7.11)). The net
present value would be equal to zero if the firm would invest when Y = (r−µ)I
D10−D00 . Investing
when Y = YM thus gives a positive net present value:
YMD10
r − µ − I −
YMD00




From the theory of financial options we know that it is only optimal to exercise an option
if it is sufficiently deep in the money, whereas the net present value method prescribes to
exercise the investment option when it is at the money.
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7.4 Duopoly
In this section we extend the model of Section 7.3 by adding another identical firm.
We solve the model in which both firms are initially active on the output market. This
distinguishes our model from Smets (1991) (see also Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9)),
where the firms do not produce initially. Then a firm enters a new market at the moment
that it invests. Note that this new market model is retrieved by setting
D00 = D01 = 0. (7.15)
We compare our results to those of the new market model in Section 7.5.
We call the firm that invests first the leader, and the other firm is the follower. The
model is solved backwards. First we derive the optimal investment decision for the fol-
lower, and using that we derive the optimal investment strategy for the leader. In Subsec-
tion 7.4.3 the optimal joint investment outcome is derived. The analysis of the first three
subsections is used in Subsection 7.4.4, where we characterize the possible equilibria. In
Subsection 7.4.5 we describe the properties of the equilibria and compare them with the
outcome of the monopoly model.
7.4.1 Follower
For the moment let us assume that the leader has invested. In the same way as V (Y ) is
derived in (7.7), the value of the follower is derived and is given by
F (Y ) =
{
B1Y
β1 + Y D01
r−µ if Y < YF ,
Y D11
r−µ − I if Y ≥ YF .
(7.16)
The threshold YF is defined in the same fashion as YM : it is the point at which the
follower is indifferent between investing and not investing. In the same way as the proof
of Proposition 7.1 one can prove that the threshold YF is unique.
When Y is smaller than YF the value of the follower equals the value of the option to
invest, B1Y
β1 , plus the value of never investing, Y D01
r−µ . Solving the value matching and











(r − µ) I
D11 −D01 . (7.18)
Due to equation (7.5) the last two expressions are strictly positive. It is optimal for the
follower to invest at time TF , where
TF = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YF ) . (7.19)
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7.4.2 Leader
The expected value of the leader at time t when he invests at time t (< TF ) equals
L (Y (t)) = E
 TF∫
τ=t




Y (τ)D11 exp (−r (τ − t)) dτ
 . (7.20)
Working out the expectation (see Appendix 7.A.2 for details) gives
L (Y ) =
Y D10




)β1 YF (D11 −D10)
r − µ . (7.21)
If the leader invests when Y ≥ YF , the follower will invest too, so that the leader’s
expected value equals the value of joint investment, denoted by M (Y ) :
M (Y ) =
Y D11
r − µ − I. (7.22)
7.4.3 Joint Investment
We assume that the firms invest simultaneously at time Tθ, where
Tθ = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ θ) , (7.23)
for some θ > 0. The expected value of each firm at time t (< Tθ) equals
J (Y (t) , θ) = E
 Tθ∫
τ=t




Y (τ)D11 exp (−r (τ − t)) dτ
 . (7.24)
Thus










if Y < θ,
Y D11
r−µ − I if Y ≥ θ.
(7.25)
Note that M (Y ) = J (Y, Y ) . The optimal joint investment time TJ equals
TJ = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YJ) , (7.26)




(r − µ) I
D11 −D00 . (7.27)
Analogous to the YM it can be proved that YJ is unique.
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7.4.4 Equilibria
It turns out to be convenient to distinguish between the following two cases. In the first
case there exists a Y such that there are incentives to become the leader. With other
words, for such a Y the leader’s payoff, L (Y ), which can be obtained after investing
right away, exceeds the joint investment payoff which the firm obtains when it waits with
investment until Y reaches YJ , at which both firms invest simultaneously. This implies
that
∃Y ∈ (0, YF ) such that L (Y ) > J (Y, YJ) . (7.28)
In the second case there does not exist such a Y , so that
L (Y ) ≤ J (Y, YJ) for all Y ∈ (0, YF ) . (7.29)
Since the firms are identical, no reason can be found why they should behave differ-
ently. Therefore, we concentrate on equilibria that are supported by symmetric strategies.
We use the perfect equilibrium concept for timing games that is described in Appendix
4.A. There it is argued that in this kind of games a strategy can not be represented by
a single distribution function. It is necessary to be able to distinguish between types of
atoms. Therefore the closed loop strategy of firm i consists of a collection of simple strate-
gies: (Gti (·) , αti (·))t≥0 . The time index t denotes the starting time of the game. Gti (s) is
the probability that firm i has invested by some time s given that the other firm has not
invested. The function αti (s) measures the intensity of atoms on the interval [s, s+ ds] .
By definition αti (s) > 0 implies that a firm is sure to invest by time s, i.e. G
t
i (s) = 1.
Next we give an interpretation of the function αti (s). Forget for a moment the de-
pendence on t. Let τ i be the smallest point in time at which αi (s) is positive: τ i =
inf {s|αi (s) > 0} and define τ to be equal to τ = min (τ 1, τ 2) . From the definition we
know for sure that at least one firm has invested by time τ .
The function value α1 (τ) (α2 (τ)) should be interpreted as the probability that firm 1
(2) chooses row (column) 1 in the matrix game of which the payoffs are depicted in Figure
7.1. Playing the game costs no time and if player 1 chooses row 2 and player 2 column 2
the game is repeated. If necessary the game will be repeated infinitely often.
In our model the firms will use the same strategy, so that αt (s) = αti (s) = α
t
j (s) .
Then the probability that firm i is the only firm that invests at time τ , Pr (one| τ) , equals
Pr (one| τ) = αt (τ) (1− αt (τ))+ (1− αt (τ)) (1− αt (τ))Pr (one| τ) ,
which gives
Pr (one| τ) = 1− α
t (τ)





(L(Y(τ )),F(Y(τ )))α1(τ )
1−α1(τ )
α2(τ ) 1−α2(τ )
firm 1
firm 2
Figure 7.1: Payoffs and strategies for firm 1 and firm 2 of the matrix game played at time τ .
For the probability that both firms invest at τ , Pr (two| τ) , we get
Pr (two| τ) = αt (τ)αt (τ) + (1− αt (τ)) (1− αt (τ))Pr (two| τ) ,
so that
Pr (two| τ) = α
t (τ)
2− αt (τ) . (7.31)
Thus firm i invests while firm j does not invest with probability 1−α
t(t)
2−αt(t) , with the same
probability firm j invests while firm i does not invest, and with probability α
t(t)
2−αt(t) both
firms invest at the same time. Consequently, if αt (τ) = 0 we have
Pr (one| τ) = 1
2
, (7.32)
Pr (two| τ) = 0. (7.33)
First Case: Preemption
For the moment assume that one firm, say firm i, has been given the leader role be-
forehand, thus firm j can only decide to invest after firm i has done so. The optimal
investment time for the leader in the first case, thus where expression (7.28) holds, is
denoted by
TL = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YL) , (7.34)





(r − µ) I
D10 −D00 . (7.35)
The threshold YL is derived by solving the value matching and smooth pasting conditions
that result from the leader’s optimal stopping problem (see Appendix 7.A.2). The unique-
ness of the threshold can be proved using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition
7.1. Note that YL is equal to YM . The reason is that for Y ∈ (0, YF ) the leader’s decision
has no effect on the optimal reply of the follower. Therefore the leader acts as if there is
no follower, and thus behaves like a monopolist. As D10 increases it is more attractive to
be the first investor so that YL, and thus the expected value of TL, decreases. In Appendix
7.B we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 7.2 It holds that
L (YL) > F (YL) . (7.36)
Now let us drop the assumption that one firm is given the leader role beforehand.
Then the implication of Proposition 7.2 is that each firm wants to be the only one to
invest at time TL. A firm will try to preempt its competitor by investing at time TL − ε,
since it knows that the other firm would like to be the first to invest at time TL. But
then the other firm will try to invest at time TL − 2ε. This process of preemption stops
at time TP , where
TP = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YP ) , (7.37)
in which YP is the solution of the following equation
L (YP ) = F (YP ) .
Before time TP there are no incentives to become leader, since for t < TP the follower
payoff exceeds the leader payoff. This is because t < TP implies that Y < YP , which
in turn implies that F (Y ) > L (Y ) due to the fact that YP is unique as stated in the
following proposition. The proof can be found in Appendix 7.A.
Proposition 7.3 There exists a unique value for Y, YP , such that
L (YP ) = F (YP ) and 0 < YP < YF . (7.38)
For this first case the payoff curves are depicted in Figure 7.2. The investment op-
portunity is worthless for Y equal to 0. Therefore at Y = 0 the leader (L) and joint
investment (M) value equal minus the investment cost and the follower (F ) and optimal
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joint investment value (J) equal zero. M is a linear increasing function of Y (see equation
(7.22)). The follower has the choice between investing at the same time as the leader or
to wait. Since the optimal follower action on the interval (0, YF ) is to wait, the follower
curve is situated above the joint investment curve on that interval. From Subsection 7.4.2
we know that the leader, follower and joint investment curves coincide with each other
for Y larger than or equal to YF . Due to the existence and uniqueness of YP (see Proposi-
tion 7.3), the leader curve crosses the follower curve once on the interval (0, YF ) (at YP ).
Since (7.28) holds here, the leader curve also crosses the optimal joint investment curve
somewhere on the interval (0, YF ) . For Y larger or equal than YJ the joint investment
curve coincides with the other three curves.























Figure 7.2: First Case: Preemption
The equilibrium strategy of firm i ∈ {1, 2} equals (cf. Appendix 4.A.2)
Gti (s) = G (s) =
{
0 if s < TP ,
1 if s ≥ TP ,
(7.39)
αti (s) = α (s) =

0 if s < TP ,
L(Y (s))−F (Y (s))
L(Y (s))−M(Y (s)) if TP ≤ s < TF ,
1 if s ≥ TF .
(7.40)
The equilibrium outcome depends on the value y (= Y (0)) . Three regions have to be
distinguished.
The first region is defined by y ≤ YP . There are two possible equilibrium outcomes.
In the first outcome firm 1 is the leader and invests at time TP and firm 2 is the follower
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and invests at time TF . The second outcome is the symmetric counterpart: firm 2 is the
leader and invests at time TP and firm 1 is the follower and invests at time TF . Since at
time TP it holds that Y = YP , it can be obtained from (7.38) and (7.40) that α (TP ) = 0.
Due to (7.32) it can be concluded that each outcome occurs with probability one-half.
Furthermore, from (7.33) we get that the probability that both firms invest simultaneously
is zero. Due to (7.38), it follows that the expected value of each firm equals F (YP ) .
In the second region it holds that YP < y < YF . There are three possible outcomes.
Since L exceeds F in case Y ∈ (YP , YF ) , it can be obtained from (7.40) that α (0) >
0. Due to (7.30) we know that with probability 1−α(0)
2−α(0) anyone of the firms invests at
time 0 and the other firm invests at time TF . Expression (7.31) implies that the firms
invest simultaneously at time 0 with probability α(0)
2−α(0) , leaving them with a low value of
M (y) (< F (y)) . The expected payoff of each firm thus equals
1− α (0)
2− α (0) (L (y) + F (y)) +
α (0)
2− α (0)M (y) = F (y) ,
where the equality sign follows from (7.40). Since there are first mover advantages in
this region, each firm is willing to invest with positive probability. However, this implies
that the probability of simultaneous investment, leading to a low payoff M (y) , is also
positive. Since the firms are both assumed to be risk neutral, they will fix the probability
of investment such that their expected value equals F (y), which is also their payoff if
they let the other firm invest first.
When y is in the third region [YF ,∞) , the outcome exhibits joint investment at time
0. The expected value of each firm is equal to M (y) = L (y) = F (y).
Second Case: Joint Investment
In the case of joint investment expression (7.29) holds, which leads to Figure 7.3. There
turn out to be an infinite number of symmetric equilibrium strategies, which can be
divided into two classes. The first class consists of the strategy described above (see
equations (7.39)-(7.40)). The second class consists of strategies where firms invest simul-
taneously. They have the following form (i ∈ {1, 2}):
Gti (s) = G (s) =
{
0 if s < T ∗,
1 if s ≥ T ∗, (7.41)
αti (s) = α (s) =
{
0 if s < T ∗,
1 if s ≥ T ∗, (7.42)
for any T ∗ ∈ [TS, TJ ] where
TS = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YS) ,
YS = min (θ| J (Y, θ) ≥ L (Y ) for all Y ≥ 0) .
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In Figure 7.4 the construction of YS is shown graphically. In that figure the functions
J (Y, YJ) − L (Y ) and J (Y, YS) − L (Y ) are plotted. To find YS one starts out with
the function J (Y, θ) − L (Y ) with θ = YJ . Then θ is lowered. The lowest θ for which
the function is still non-negative is YS. Note that the function J (Y, YS) − L (Y ) has
exactly one point of tangency on the interval (0, YF ). Thus the curves J (Y, YS) and L (Y )
meet tangent at that point, which is YL. This result can be shown mathematically by




































Figure 7.3: Second Case: Collusion
From (7.26) it can be concluded that the equilibrium that is supported by the strategies
(7.41)-(7.42) with T ∗ = TJ is the Pareto dominant equilibrium and therefore the most
reasonable outcome in this case. In what follows we assume that the Pareto dominant
equilibrium is indeed the outcome in the second case. This would have been the only
equilibrium if we apply the setup described in Simon (1987a). For this equilibrium it
holds that there is simultaneous investment at time TJ . The expected value of each firm
equals J (y, Y (TJ)).
7.4.5 Properties
The following proposition states when which case applies. See Appendix 7.B for a proof.
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J( Y,YJ) −L( Y)
J( Y,YS) −L( Y)
Figure 7.4: Construction of J (Y, YS) curve.
Proposition 7.4 Define

















Whenever the following inequality holds the equilibrium is of the preemption type and
otherwise of the joint investment type:
f (β1) < g (β1) . (7.45)
Proposition 7.4 implies that the equilibrium is always of the preemption type, no
matter the value of β1 and thus the degree of uncertainty, if D10 is large enough, i.e. if
the incentives to become leader are large enough. If D10 is relatively small, the incentives
to become leader almost vanish and the joint investment equilibrium turns up.
Note that condition (7.45) is independent of the value of the investment cost I (as
long as it is strictly positive). This for the reason that changing the investment cost only
changes the absolute values of the investment triggers, and therefore the value functions,
but not the relative values.
The following proposition, that is proved in Appendix 7.B, states the effect of β1 on
the type of the equilibrium.
Proposition 7.5 There are three different scenarios:
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the equilibrium is always of the joint investment
type.










the equilibrium is of the joint investment type
for relatively low values of β1 and of the preemption type for relatively high values
of β1.
(iii) If g′ (1) ≥ f ′ (1) the equilibrium is always of the preemption type.
Propositions 7.4 and 7.5 are visualized in Figure 7.5. In that figure we have plotted
the function g (β1) , the boundary between the preemption case and joint investment













f( β1) in scenario ( i)
f( β1) in scenario ( ii)










Figure 7.5: Possible scenarios.
In scenario (i) the first mover advantage is that large that the preemption equilibrium
will always turn up. The opposite is going on in scenario (ii), where the first mover
advantage is that low that the equilibrium where both firms invest jointly at a later point
in time is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Hence, only in scenario (iii) the type of equilibrium depends on β1. The economic
implications are stated in the following corollary to Proposition 7.5. The proof can be
found in Appendix 7.B.
Corollary 7.1 In scenario (iii) the equilibrium is of the joint investment (preemption)
type for high (low) values of σ and µ and low (high) values of r.
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Here, it is natural that the preemption equilibrium arises if there is not much uncer-
tainty (low σ), the µ is low, or the interest rate is high, since then the value of waiting
is low. The contrary holds in very uncertain (high σ) economic environments, or envi-
ronments where the µ is high, or the interest rate is low. Then the value of waiting is
large, which implies that investing faces high opportunity costs. This makes a preemption
strategy unattractive.
Proposition 7.6 compares the investment thresholds of the duopoly model with the
investment threshold of the monopoly model. The proof is given in Appendix 7.B.
Proposition 7.6 For every parameter configuration it holds that
YP ≤ YM < YJ . (7.46)
Proposition 7.6 implies that the speed of investment increases (decreases) if strategic
interactions result in a preemption (joint investment) equilibrium. The following propo-
sition states that the investment thresholds are decreasing functions of β1 (for a proof see
Appendix 7.B).
Proposition 7.7 The investment thresholds YP , YL, YM , YF , and YJ are decreasing in
β1.
We can conclude that uncertainty delays investment. In scenarios (i) and (ii) invest-
ment is delayed because the investment thresholds rise with uncertainty. Increasing the
uncertainty in scenario (iii) not only rises the investment thresholds, but may also lead
to a change of a preemption equilibrium (with relative low investment thresholds) into a
joint investment equilibrium (with relative high investment thresholds).
In the real options literature it is argued that an investment should be undertaken
when the net present value exceeds the option value of waiting. For models with strategic
interactions this investment rule should be changed: investing is optimal when the net
present value exceeds the strategic option value of waiting. The strategic option value of
waiting incorporates the money value of the strategic interactions in the option value of
waiting. The following proposition compares the strategic option value of waiting in the
duopoly case with the option value of waiting in the monopoly case. The proof is given
in Appendix 7.B.





the strategic option value of waiting is
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1. smaller in the preemption case (at YP );
2. the same in the joint investment case (at YJ).
When strategic interactions lead to a preemption equilibrium, it is even possible that
the firms make an investment with a negative net present value. Then the strategic option
value of waiting is negative. For example, take the following parameter values D10 = 10,
D11 = 4, D00 = 2, D01 = 1, r = 0.10, µ = 0.05, and I = 10. For these parameters
equation (7.45) is always satisfied so that the equilibrium is always of the preemption
type. The net present value of investment at YP equals L (YP ) − YPD00r−µ . In the left part
of Figure 7.6 this net present value is plotted as function of σ. For sake of comparison,
in the right part the corresponding net present value of investment for the monopolist is
presented.















































Figure 7.6: Net present value of investment of duopolist at YP and monopolist at YM as function of σ.
As in the monopoly case, the option value of waiting still increases with uncertainty
in the duopoly model. From Figure 7.6 we conclude that for low (but realistic) values of
σ (σ < 0.308) strategic interactions lead to a negative strategic option value of waiting.
Thus the strategic interactions force the firms to make an investment with a negative net
present value. Becoming inactive is even worse for the firms, since then the net present
value would equal −YPD00
r−µ .
7.5 Existing Literature
In this section we confront our results with the existing literature. Our model is an
extension of the Smets (1991) model described in Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9).
Contrary to that model we also allow that before the moment of investment the firms
are already active on the output market on which they compete. Nielsen (1999) showed
that in the Smets (1991) model competition on the output market decreases the option
value of waiting and therefore duopolistic firms will invest earlier than monopolistic firms.
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Remember that for D00 = D01 = 0 our model is the Smets (1991) model. Since for
x = D10
D11
> 1 we have that β1x− (β1 − 1) < xβ1, equation (7.46) is always satisfied, which
implies that the equilibrium is always of the preemption type in the Smets (1991) model.
Thus Nielsen (1999)’s result is a consequence of the initial conditions on the output market
in the sense that if both firms are initially active on the output market, Nielsen (1999)’s
result does not hold anymore in general. From Proposition 7.6 we conclude that there are
two possibilities. In the case where a joint investment equilibrium is the most reasonable
outcome, strategic interactions result in delayment of investment by the firms. In the case
where the only equilibrium is of the preemption type, competition accelerates investment
if we compare the moment of investment of the leader in the duopoly to the monopolist.
In the new market model the optimal investment threshold for the follower and the
optimal joint investment threshold coincide (cf. (7.18) and (7.27)). Therefore, due to
(7.16) and (7.25) it follows that the follower and the joint investment curve coincide,
which implies that there can not be a second case in the new market model. The economic
reason for these two thresholds to coincide is the fact that the investment timing of the
leader does not affect the follower’s profit flow in a new market model, whereas in our
model the follower’s profit flow decreases from Y D00 to Y D01 at the moment the leader
invests. Thus, in our model the follower will invest earlier to recapture market share from
the leader. That is why we have YF < YJ .
At present, only a few contributions deal with the effect of strategic interactions on
the option value of waiting associated with investments under uncertainty. However, in
these papers the coordination problem is avoided, and thus not treated in the way we did
in Section 7.4. For instance, Weeds (1999) implicitly makes the unsatisfactory assumption
that only one firm will succeed in investing in case there is an incentive to be the first
firm to invest and it is only optimal for one firm to invest. There are two reasons for that
assumption to be unsatisfactory: (1) the firms are imposed to be equal and (2) the firms
can invest simultaneously if it is optimal for both. Note that this assumption, although
explicitly, is also made in Nielsen (1999), Grenadier (1996), and Dutta et al. (1995).
The reason for our outcomes to be more realistic is as follows. When there is an
incentive to be the first to invest (L > F > M) both firms are willing to take a risk and
since they are both assumed to be risk neutral they will risk so much that their expected
value equals F, which equals their payoff if they allow the other firm to invest first.
Employing the results of Section 7.4 learns that in this case both firms set α = L−F
L−M , and
that there is a positive probability α
2−α that both firms invest exactly at the same time,
leaving them with the low payoff M.
Dixit and Pindyck (1996, p. 313) claim that in the Smets (1991) model, the probability
that both firms invest simultaneously, while it is only optimal for one firm to invest, is
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always zero. From the above argumentation it should be clear by now that this claim is
not correct. To correct another point, consider page 314 of Dixit and Pindyck (1996).
First, note that their threshold Y2 is equal to our threshold YF and their threshold Y3
equals our threshold YJ . Now, we know that in the new market model we have that
YJ = YF , so that Y3 is equal to Y2 in their model and not, as they claim, greater than Y2.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter brings together two streams of literature: investment under competition
(Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), and Chapter 4) and investment un-
der uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck (1996)). In this concluding section we focus on the
question how introduction of uncertainty changes the results derived for the determin-
istic duopoly framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). In Fudenberg and Tirole it
was obtained that under large first mover advantages a preemption equilibrium with
dispersed adoption timings results, while otherwise a joint adoption equilibrium is the
Pareto-dominant outcome.
After introduction of uncertainty the firm’s investment timing problem has to deal with
the option value of waiting: when a firm makes an irreversible investment expenditure,
it exercises its option to invest. It gives up the possibility of waiting for new information
to arrive that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure. It is clear that
a huge option value of waiting, which arises in highly uncertain economic environments,
results in a considerable delayment of investment. On the other hand, in the preemption
equilibrium of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) it is imperative for a firm to invest quickly
and thereby preempt investment by potential competitors.
Our chapter brings these contrary forces together and it turns out that our results
relate to those of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) in the following way. Whenever Fudenberg
and Tirole conclude that joint adoption is the Pareto-dominant outcome, this also holds
for our model. Also, if first mover advantages are sufficiently large, for both models the
preemption equilibrium results, but in the stochastic case for both firms the investment
timing is delayed by the option value of waiting. Finally, if first mover advantages are
a bit lower, but still high enough for the preemption equilibrium to prevail in the de-
terministic framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), introduction of sufficiently large
uncertainty results in a joint adoption equilibrium that Pareto-dominates all other equilib-
ria. This brings us to the conclusion that introduction of uncertainty reduces the number
of scenarios under which the preemption equilibrium is the optimal outcome.
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Appendices
7.A Derivation of Value Functions
7.A.1 Monopoly
Let Y (t) behave according to equations (7.3) and (7.4). Then Itô’s lemma (see Appendix
2.A) implies that






dt+ σdω (t) .
Therefore












Thus for t ≥ 0 it holds that









where ω (t) is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
t.
In the stopping region the value of the firm equals
V (Y (t)) = E
 ∞∫
τ=t











τ + σω (τ)
)




































































r − µ − I.
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The value function must satisfy the following Bellman equation in the continuation region




E [dV (Y )] . (7.48)
Applying Itô’s Lemma (see Appendix 2.A) to the expectation in the right-hand side of
equation (7.48) gives











dt+ o (dt) . (7.49)
Substitution of equation (7.49) into equation (7.48) and rewriting leads to the following
differential equation







+ Y D00 = 0. (7.50)
The general solution of (7.50) is given by




r − µ , (7.51)









β − r = 0. (7.52)
When Y = 0 the value of the firm is equal to zero so that the boundary condition V (0) = 0
leads to A2 = 0.
7.A.2 Leader
Given that Y < YF the value of the leader must satisfy the following Bellman equation




E [dL (Y )] . (7.53)
Itô’s Lemma gives









The general solution of (7.54) is equal to




r − µ − I. (7.55)
The following two boundary conditions should be satisfied
L (0) = 0, (7.56)
L (YF ) =
YFD11
r − µ − I. (7.57)
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r − µ , (7.58)
E2 = 0. (7.59)




r − µ . (7.60)
Next let us derive an expression for YL. The following value matching and smooth pasting


















r − µ. (7.62)




(r − µ) I
D10 −D00 , (7.63)






r − µ . (7.64)
7.B Lemmas and Proofs
Proof of Proposition 7.1 Theorem 2.4 gives sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of
the threshold. Here, the functions π and Ω are given by
π (Y ) = Y D00,
Ω (Y ) =
Y D10
r − µ − I.
The function




E [dΩ (Y )|Y ]








= Y D00 − r
(
Y D10





= Y (D00 −D10) + rI,
is indeed decreasing in Y since D00 < D10.
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The positive persistence of uncertainty property is also satisfied. It holds that
Φ (y| x) = Pr (Y (t+ dt) ≤ y|Y (t) = x)
= Pr (Y (t) + dY (t) ≤ y|Y (t) = x)
= Pr (dY (t) ≤ y − x|Y (t) = x)
= Pr (µxdt+ σxdω (t) ≤ y − x)
= Pr
(























Proof of Proposition 7.2 Define the function φ as follows
φ (Y ) = L (Y )− F (Y ) . (7.65)
Then we have to prove that
φ (YL) > 0. (7.66)
For Y ∈ [0, YF ] the value of the follower, in case the leader has already invested, can be
expressed by
F (Y ) =
Y D01




)β1 (YF (D11 −D01)
r − µ − I
)
.
For Y ∈ [0, YF ] the function φ (Y ) equals
φ (Y ) = L (Y )− F (Y )
= Y D10




)β1 YF (D11 −D10)
r − µ
−Y D01
















Substitution of equation (7.35) into (7.67) gives



















D10 −D00 > 1, (7.69)
b =
D11 −D01
D10 −D00 < 1. (7.70)
The inequalities hold due to equations (7.5) and (7.6). After substitution of (7.69) and
(7.70) into (7.68) it is obtained that
h (a, b) =
(β1 − 1)φ (YL)
I
= β1a− (β1 − 1)− β1abβ1−1 + (β1 − 1) bβ1 . (7.71)




= β1 − β1bβ1−1 > 0, (7.72)
∂h (a, b)
∂b
= − (β1 − 1)β1abβ1−2 + β1 (β1 − 1) bβ1 < 0, (7.73)
h (1, 1) = 0. (7.74)

Lemma 7.1 Define the function φ as follows
φ (Y ) = L (Y )− F (Y ) . (7.75)
Then it holds that
φ (0) < 0, (7.76)








≤ 0 for all Y ≥ 0. (7.79)
Proof of Lemma 7.1 For Y ∈ [0, YF ] the function φ (Y ) equals (see (7.67)):
φ (Y ) =
Y (D10 −D01)




)β1 (YF (D10 −D01)
r − µ − I
)
. (7.80)
Expressions (7.76) and (7.77) follow directly after setting Y = 0 and Y = YF , respectively,
in equation (7.80).












r − µ − I
)
. (7.81)
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r − µ − I
)
. (7.82)











which confirms (7.78). The second derivative of φ (Y ) is given by
∂2φ (Y )
∂Y 2







r − µ − I
)















Expression (7.79) follows from equation (7.84) since β1 > 1 and D10 > D11. 
Proof of Proposition 7.3 Proposition 7.3 is a direct result of Lemma 7.1. 
Lemma 7.2 For 0 < Y ≤ YF it holds that
J (Y, YJ) > F (Y ) . (7.85)
Proof of Lemma 7.2 It is obvious that J (Y, YF ) > F (Y ) for Y ∈ (0, YF ) , since D00 >
D01. And by definition it holds that J (Y, YJ) ≥ J (Y, YF ) . 
Lemma 7.3 Define the function γ (Y ) as follows
γ (Y ) = J (Y, YJ)− L (Y ) . (7.86)
Then the following properties hold:
γ (YP ) > 0, (7.87)




Proof of Lemma 7.3 Substitution of equations (7.21) and (7.25) into equation (7.86)
gives
γ (Y ) =
Y (D00 −D10)
r − µ + I + (H1 − E1) Y
β1 ,
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Properties (7.87) and (7.88) follow from Lemma 7.2 together with
L (YP ) = F (YP ) , (7.91)
L (YF ) = F (YF ) . (7.92)
The second derivative of γ (Y ) is equal to
∂2γ (Y )
∂Y 2
= (β1 − 1)β1 (H1 − E1)Y β1−2. (7.93)
Remembering that E1 < 0 and H1 > 0 gives equation (7.89). 
Lemma 7.4 It holds that
min
Y≥0
γ (Y ) < 0, (7.94)
if and only if
f (β1) < g (β1) . (7.95)

















β1−1 > 0. (7.98)
The minimum (expression (7.88) implies that γ (Y ∗) is a unique minimum) of γ equals
γ (Y ∗) = I + (D10 −D00)
β1
β1−1 (H1 − E1)
1











































Substitution of (7.43) and (7.44) in (7.100) gives (7.95). 
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Lemma 7.5 It holds that
0 < argmin
Y≥0
γ (Y ) ≤ YF , (7.101)
where the equality sign only holds for β1 = 1.
Proof of Lemma 7.5 From (7.98) we have that Y ∗ > 0. Substitution of equations (7.58)
and (7.90) in (7.98) gives







Y ∗ ≤ YF


















Combining (7.43) with (7.102) gives






Using these two definitions we have for β1 ≥ 1 :
f (β1) = β1 (x− y) + yβ1 ,
f ′ (β1) = x− y + yβ1 log (y) ,
f ′′ (β1) = y
β1 (log (y))2 > 0.
It turns out that f is strictly increasing, because for 0 < y < 1 we have
x > 1 > y − y log (y) ≥ y − yβ1 log (y) .
Thus equation (7.103) holds, the equality sign only holds for β1 = 1, and thereby the
lemma. 
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Proof of Proposition 7.4 Let γ be defined by equation (7.86). Whenever there exists a
Y ∈ (YP , YF ) such that γ (Y ) < 0, the first case applies. If γ (Y ) ≥ 0 for all Y ∈ (YP , YF )
we are in the second case. Lemma 7.2 implies that there exists a Y ∈ (YP , YF ) such that
γ (Y ) < 0 if and only if the minimum of the function γ is negative and reached somewhere
between YP and YF . Lemma 7.4 derives a condition for the minimum of γ to be negative
and Lemma 7.5 proves that the minimum is reached in the interval (0, YF ) . Combining
Lemmas 7.4 and 7.5 gives Proposition 7.4. 
Lemma 7.6 If
f ′ (β1) ≤ g′ (β1) , (7.104)















Then it holds that 0 < y < 1 < x and
f ′ (β1) = x− y + yβ1 log (y) > 0, (7.108)
g′ (β1) = x
β1 log (x) > 0. (7.109)
The proof of f ′ (β1) being positive is given in the proof of Lemma 7.5. The second and
third derivative of f and g are given by
f ′′ (β1) = y
β1 (log (y))2 > 0, (7.110)
f ′′′ (β1) = y
β1 (log (y))3 < 0, (7.111)
g′′ (β1) = x
β1 (log (x))2 > 0, (7.112)
g′′′ (β1) = x
β1 (log (x))3 > 0. (7.113)
First consider the case where f ′ (1) > g′ (1) . Due to equations (7.110)-(7.113) we know
that f ′′ is positive and decreasing and g′′ is positive and increasing so that there exists a
unique β∗1 for which f
′ (β∗1) = g
′ (β∗1) and f
′ (β1) < g
′ (β1) for all β1 > β
∗
1.
When f ′ (1) ≤ g′ (1) we have to prove that for all β1 > 1 it holds that g′ (β1) > f ′ (β1) .
This is certainly true when f ′′ (β1) < g
′′ (β1) for all β1 ≥ 1. Due to equations (7.111) and
(7.113) it is sufficient to prove that f ′′ (1) < g′′ (1) . Thus we have to prove that for
0 < y < 1 < x,
x− y + y log (y) ≤ x log (x) , (7.114)
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implies
y (log (y))2 < x (log (x))2 . (7.115)
Using the transformation u = log (x) and v = log (y) gives that for u > 0 and v < 0,
exp (u) (u− 1)− exp (v) (v − 1) ≥ 0, (7.116)
has to imply that
exp (u)u2 − exp (v) v2 > 0. (7.117)
Consider the (u, v)-plane. Now equation (7.116) holds for a combination of values of u
and v on and above the curve exp (u) (1− u) = exp (v) (1− v) and equation (7.117) holds
for u and v values above the curve exp (v) v2 = exp (u)u2. The lemma holds because the
curve exp (u) (1− u) = exp (v) (1− v) is situated above the curve exp (v) v2 = exp (u)u2.
This is the case because the curves intersect at (0, 0) , and the differential du
dv
of the first




(v2 + 2v) exp (v)
(u2 + 2u) exp (u)
.











exp( u) ( u−1) <exp( v) ( v−1) and exp( u) u2<exp( v) v2
exp( u) ( u−1) <exp( v) ( v−1) and exp( u) u2>exp( v) v2
exp( u) ( u−1) >exp( v) ( v−1) and exp( u) u2>exp( v) v2
exp( u) ( u−1) =exp( v) ( v−1)
exp( u) u2=exp( v) v2
Figure 7.7: The curves exp (u)u2 = exp (v) v2 and exp (u) (u − 1) = exp (v) (v − 1) for u > 0 and v < 0.
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f (1) = g (1) = x. (7.120)
From (7.108)-(7.110) and (7.112) we know that f and g are convex and increasing in β1.
Further, Lemma 7.6 implies that only the following cases can occur (see also Figure 7.5):





, so that the equilib-
rium is always of the preemption type.














, thus the equilibrium is always of the joint investment type.










equation (7.45) is satisfied for high values of β1
and not satisfied for low values of β1. 
















> 0 and ∂Q
∂σ
> 0 we have that ∂β1
∂σ
< 0. In the same way we can show that
∂β1
∂µ
< 0 and ∂β1
∂r
> 0 (see also Dixit and Pindyck (1996, p. 144)). 
Proof of Proposition 7.6 Since D10> D11 we know that YM < YJ . Substitution of
equation (7.11) in equation (7.75) yields



















Substitution of the following definitions
ξ = D10−D01
D10−D00 > 1, (7.122)
χ = D11−D01
D10−D00 < 1, (7.123)
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gives







1− χβ1−1)− 1 + χβ1] . (7.124)





= −Iβ1χβ1−2 (ξ − χ) < 0. (7.125)
This implies that φ (YM) is decreasing in χ. Since
lim
χ↓1
φ (YM) = 0,
we have φ (YM) ≥ 0. Therefore YP ≤ YM . 







Hence, the only thing that is left to prove is that YP decreases with β1. To do so define
for Y ∈ [0, YF ] and β1 ∈ [0,∞) (cf. (7.65)):
φ (Y, β1) = L (Y )− F (Y )
= Y (D10−D01)








From the definition of YP (β1) we know that
φ (YP (β1) , β1) = 0. (7.128)













Hence, to say something about the sign of ∂YP (β1)
∂β1
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. To do so, first substitute equation (7.18) in
(7.127), which gives
φ (Y, β1) =
Y (D10−D01)










(β1−1)(D11−D01) ((β1 − 1)D11 − β1D10 +D01) .



























(r − µ) I
D10 −D01 . (7.133)
Substitution of (7.133) into (7.131) gives
φ
(



























where x = D11−D01
D10−D01 and x ∈ (0, 1) . Lemma 7.1 and equation (7.134) imply that
YP (β1) < Y (β1) . (7.135)
From (7.132) we conclude that ∂φ(Y,β1)
∂β1







if and only if






((β1 − 1)D11 − β1D10 +D01) > 0. (7.137)








(D11 −D10) > 0.
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D10 −D01 − 1,












Proof of Proposition 7.8 The option value of waiting in the monopoly case is given
by equation (7.14). At the moment of investment in the preemption case, the strategic
option value of waiting equals
L (YP )− YPD00
r − µ <
YPD10










In the joint investment case we have
J (YJ , YJ)− YJD00
r − µ =
YJD11












In Nielsen (1999) and in Chapter 7 it is shown that, in a strategic investment new market
model, competition by an identical firm precipitates investment. The purpose of this
chapter is to examine the same issue, namely the effect of introducing another firm on the
original firm’s investment decision, in an asymmetric setting. We introduce asymmetry
by letting the firms have different investment costs, but the methods and results should
be extendable to other types of asymmetry as well.
We find that competition precipitates investment in an asymmetric setting as well,
but in a weaker sense. More precisely, if the investment cost of the new firm is sufficiently
low, competition strictly precipitates investment, but if the investment cost is high, the
introduction of the new firm does not have an effect on the investment strategy of the
old firm. This result holds both when there are negative or positive externalities to
investment. Though, the type of externality influences the critical investment cost level.
In Torvund (1999, Chapters I.4 and II.3) almost the same model is considered. He only
analyzes the negative externalities case and makes explicit assumptions on the demand
and supply functions of the market. Torvund does not explicitly state the strategies that
result in the equilibria. His conclusions coincide with ours for the negative externalities
case.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2 we present the
model. The value functions and investment thresholds are derived in Section 8.3. The
negative externalities case is analyzed in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 deals with the positive
externalities case and Section 8.6 concludes.
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8.2 The Model
We consider two risk-neutral firms that can make an irreversible investment in order to
become active on a new market. The firms maximize their value over an infinite planning
horizon and discount at rate r (> 0) . We denote the firms by i and j, with i, j ∈ {1, 2}
and i = j. The profit flow of firm i at time t (≥ 0) equals
Y (t)DNiNj , (8.1)
where, for k ∈ {i, j} :
Nk =
{
0 if firm k has not invested,
1 if firm k has invested.
(8.2)
Y (t) behaves according to the following geometric Brownian motion process:
dY (t) = µY (t) dt+ σY (t) dω (t) , (8.3)
Y (0) = y, (8.4)
where y > 0, 0 < µ < r, σ > 0, and the dω (t)’s are independently and identically
distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt. Since we
consider a new market, we set D00 = D01 = 0. The investment cost for firm i equals Ii,
with i ∈ {1, 2} . We assume without loss of generality that I2 > I1 > 0.
8.3 Value Functions and Investment Thresholds
We solve the model described in Section 8.2 using the game theoretic concept of timing
games. The approach applied has been introduced in Appendix 4.A. In a timing game
the players must decide when to make a single move. The player that moves first is called
leader, and the other is the follower. Players can also decide to move simultaneously.
First we introduce some more notation. We denote by Lj (Y (t)) the payoff at time t
to player j if none of the players has moved before time t and player j moves alone at
time t. The payoff of the follower then is denoted by Fi (Y (t)) . When both players move
simultaneously at time t their payoffs equal M1 (Y (t)) for firm 1 and M2 (Y (t)) for firm
2. In the remainder of this chapter we omit the time dependence of Y when there is no
confusion possible.
Dynamic games are usually solved backwards and this one is no exception. We start
with deriving the leader, follower and joint investment curves for the model. Subsection
8.3.1 is devoted to the value of being follower, Subsection 8.3.2 to the value of being
leader, and the value of joint investment is treated in Subsection 8.3.3.
Chapter 8. One New Technology and Asymmetric Firms 183
8.3.1 Follower
Without loss of generality assume that firm j has and firm i has not invested. The problem
facing the follower is an optimal stopping problem (see Appendix 2.A), which conjectures
the existence of a threshold YFi such that investing is optimal for firm i whenever Y ≥ YFi
and waiting is optimal otherwise. Solving this optimal stopping problem, which is a
simplification of the one presented and solved in Appendix 7.A, gives rise to the following
value function for firm i
Fi (Y ) =
{
Ai1Y
β1 if Y < YFi ,
Y D11
r−µ − Ii if Y ≥ YFi ,
(8.5)









β − r = 0. (8.6)
Solving the value matching and smooth pasting conditions (see Appendix 2.A) simulta-













r − µ. (8.8)
Using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 7.1 one can prove that YFi is unique.
The optimal investment time TFi of firm i as follower is equal to
TFi = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YFi) . (8.9)
8.3.2 Leader
Firm j, being the leader, knows the optimal response of firm i on its investment at time
t. The value of firm j at Y (t) = Y if it invests at time t equals








Y (τ)D11 exp (−r (τ − t)) dτ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Y (t) = Y
 . (8.10)
Rewriting gives (see Appendix 7.A.2 for details)
Lj (Y ) =





r−µ if Y < YFi ,
Y D11
r−µ − Ij if Y ≥ YFi .
(8.11)
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8.3.3 Joint Investment
The value of firm i ∈ {1, 2} if both firms invest simultaneously is given by
Mi (Y ) =
Y D11
r − µ − Ii. (8.12)
The optimal joint investment time for firm i equals TFi , which thus equals the follower’s
threshold. The new market assumption is the reason for this. Assume for a moment that
both firms are already active on the output market before the first investment is made.
Then the investment of the first firm decreases the profit flow of the second firm. This
decrease in its profit flow gives the second firm an incentive to make its investment earlier.
The reason is that the gain of the investment is larger. For a more formal treatment and
proof of this phenomenon see Chapter 7.
8.4 Negative Externalities
In the negative externalities case the firms compete in the traditional sense. While we
do not model the product market explicitly, the assumption that profit flow falls upon
investment by a second firm is compatible with both a fall in market share and a fall in
price due to increase in supply. In the model the negative externalities case is characterized
by the following equation
D10 > D11. (8.13)
As in the previous chapter the equilibria of the investment game depend on the relative
positions of the leader, follower and joint investment curves of each firm. The following
proposition gives the three different cases for the curves of firm 2 that can occur. The













Then it holds that I∗2 > I1 and moreover,
1. if I2 ∈ (I∗2 ,∞) it holds that L2 (Y ) < F2 (Y ) for all Y ∈ (0, YF2) (case 1, see Figure
8.1);
2. if I2 = I
∗
2 it holds that L2 (YP2) = F2 (YP2) for some unique YP2 ∈ (0, YF2) (case 2,
see Figure 8.2);
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3. if I2 ∈ (I1, I∗2 ) it holds that L2 (Y ) > F2 (Y ) for all Y ∈ (YP21 , YP22) and L2 (Y ) <




















Figure 8.1: Leader, follower and joint investment curves of firm 2 in case 1.
In cases 1 and 2 the investment cost of firm 2 is relatively to the investment cost of firm
1 that high that firm 2’s leader curve never exceeds its follower curve. For Y values larger
than or equal to YF1 the leader value of the second firm equals its joint investment curve.
From YF2 on the three payoff functions coincide. Consequently, firm 2 never becomes
leader in any of these two cases and always invests at time TF2 .
In case 3 the investment costs of both firms are almost similar. It turns out that there
exists a Y for which the firm 2’s leader curve exceeds its follower curve. For Y = 0 as well
as for Y = YF2 the follower value of firm 2 exceeds the leader value. These observations
imply the existence of the preemption interval (YP21 , YP22) , which on its turn results in
the following corollary.
Corollary 8.1 Firm 2 has only incentives to preempt in case 3.
It turns out that firm 1 has always an incentive to preempt. This is formally stated
in Proposition 8.2, which is proved in Appendix 8.A.
Proposition 8.2 It holds that L1 (Y ) > F1 (Y ) for Y ∈ (YP1 , YF2) with YP1 ∈ (0, YF1)
(see Figure 8.4).



















Figure 8.2: Leader, follower and joint investment curves of firm 2 in case 2.


















Figure 8.3: Leader, follower and joint investment curves of firm 2 in case 3.
Chapter 8. One New Technology and Asymmetric Firms 187



















Figure 8.4: Leader, follower and joint investment curves of firm 1.
As stated above, in cases 1 and 2 of Proposition 8.1 firm 2 will never try to preempt
firm 1 with its investment. Therefore firm 1 can optimize its investment time without
needing to take into account the investment strategy of firm 2. Therefore this equilibrium
is similar to the open loop equilibrium of the game (see Chapter 4). Solving the optimal





(r − µ) I1
D10
. (8.15)
This threshold leads to the following optimal investment time for firm 1
TL1 = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ YL1) . (8.16)
Note that equations (8.7), (8.13), and (8.15) imply that YL1 < YF1 < YF2 , so that (indeed)
it holds that TL1 ≤ TF2 .
Firm 2 will try to preempt firm 1 in case 3, whenever firm 1 has not invested before
time
TP21 = inf (t|Y (t) ∈ [YP21 , YP22 ]) , (8.17)
since for firm 2 the leader curve exceeds its follower curve on the interval (YP21 , YP22) .
Proposition 8.3 There exists a unique I∗∗2 ∈ (I1, I∗2 ) such that
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1. YL1 > YP21 if and only if I2 ∈ (I1, I∗∗2 ) (case 3.1);
2. YL1 ≤ YP21 if and only if I2 ∈ [I∗∗2 , I∗2 ) (case 3.2).
Proposition 8.3 (the proof is given in Appendix 8.A) implies that the equilibrium of
case 3.2 is equal to the equilibrium of the cases 1 and 2. The equilibrium of case 3.1
depends on the initial value of the geometric Brownian motion process.
If the initial value y is below or equal to YP21 firm 1 will invest at time TP21 and firm 2
at time TF2 . Firm 1 is willing to invest first at any level larger than or equal to YP1 , since
its leader payoff exceeds its follower payoff for these Y ’s. Since firm 1 knows that firm 2
does not invest before time TP21 firm 1 will not invest before that time TP21 either. For
firm 1 it is optimal to invest with probability one at time TP21 and consequently firm 2
does not invest at that time but at time TF2 .
For an initial value y ∈ (YP21 , YP22) both firms want to become leader and therefore
both firms invest with positive probability at time t = 0. The result is that the probability
that both firms invest simultaneously is strictly positive. The exact probability that a
firm becomes leader or follower and the probability that there is joint investment are given
below.
Firm 2’s follower payoff exceeds its leader payoff for y ∈ [YP22 , YF2) and therefore firm
2 invests at time TF2 and since YL1 ≤ YP22 (see equations (8.15) and (8.36)) firm 1 invests
at time t = 0.
It is optimal for both firms to invest at time t = 0 if the initial value y is larger than
or equal to YF2 .
All the equilibria are summarized in the following theorem. The equilibrium strategies
that lead to the equilibria are given in Appendix 8.B.1.
Theorem 8.1 For y ≥ 0, let
α1 (y) =
L2 (y)− F2 (y)
L2 (y)−M2 (y) , (8.18)
α2 (y) =
L1 (y)− F1 (y)
L1 (y)−M1 (y) . (8.19)
The equilibrium outcome in the negative externalities case is as follows:
1. if I2 ∈ [I∗∗2 ,∞) (with probability one) firm 1 invests at time TL1 and firm 2 invests
at time TF2 ;
2. if I2 ∈ (I1, I∗∗2 ) the equilibrium outcome depends on the initial value of the geometric
Brownian motion process:
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(a) if y ≤ YP21 (with probability one) firm 1 invests at time TP21 and firm 2 invests
at time TF2 ;
(b) if YP21 < y < YP22 there are three possible outcomes:
i. with probability α1(y)(1−α2(y))
α1(y)+α2(y)−α1(y)α2(y) , firm 1 invests at time 0 and firm 2
invests at time TF2 ;
ii. with probability α2(y)(1−α1(y))
α1(y)+α2(y)−α1(y)α2(y) , firm 1 invests at time TF1 and firm 2
invests at time 0;
iii. with probability α1(y)α2(y)
α1(y)+α2(y)−α1(y)α2(y) , both firm 1 and firm 2 invest at time
0;
(c) if YP22 ≤ y < YF2 (with probability one) firm 1 invests at time 0 and firm 2
invests at time TF2 ;
(d) if y ≥ YF2 (with probability one) both firm 1 and firm 2 invest at time 0.
8.5 Positive Externalities
In some situations an investment is more profitable when more firms have invested. This
situation could arise if the firms produce complementary products or if there are network
externalities. The positive externalities case is characterized by
D11 ≥ D10. (8.20)
Compared to the negative externalities case, the thresholds YLi and YFi switch places
(i ∈ {1, 2}). The reason is that joint investment is more attractive than single investment
in this section. To derive the equilibria we need to know whether the leader threshold of
firm i is smaller than the follower threshold of firm j. The following proposition states the






Then it holds that I∗1 ≤ I2 and moreover,
1. if I1 ∈ (0, I∗1 ) it holds that YL1 < YF2 (case 4, see Figure 8.5), where YL1 and YF2
are given by equations (8.15) and (8.7), respectively;
2. if I1 ∈ [I∗1 , I2) it holds that YL1 ≥ YF2 (case 5, see Figure 8.6).








































Figure 8.6: Leader, follower and joint investment curves of firm 1 in case 5.
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Due to equation (8.20) firm i’s leader curve is situated below its follower curve for all
Y ∈ [0, YFj) . In case 4 the investment cost of firm 1 is low enough to trigger investment
by firm 1 before time TF2 . This contrary to case 5 where firm 1’s leader trigger is larger
than firm 2’s follower trigger.
The following proposition states that the follower threshold of firm 1 is always smaller
than firm 2’s leader threshold.
Proposition 8.5 It holds that YL2 > YF1 (see Figure 8.7), where YF1 is defined by equa-


























Figure 8.7: Leader, follower and joint investment curves of firm 2.
From the propositions it follows that in case 4 firm 1 invests at time TL1 , although
firm 1 prefers to become follower there: L1 (YL1) < F1 (YF1) . The reason is that firm 1
knows for sure that firm 2 is not going to invest before time TF2 . Therefore firm 1 can
choose between delaying its investment and investing at TL1 . Due to the definition of YL1
it turns out that investing at time TL1 is the optimal action for firm 1. Notice that the
game is an attrition game for which there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium (see
Appendix 4.A.3). Firm 2 invests at time TF2 .
In case 5 the firms invest simultaneously at time TF2 , one firm initiates the investment
and the other will make it joint investment. The following theorem formally states the
equilibria outcomes (in Appendix 8.B.2 the equilibrium strategies are presented).
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Theorem 8.2 The equilibrium outcome in the positive externalities case is as follows:
1. if I1 ∈ (0, I∗1 ) (with probability one) firm 1 invests at time TL1 and firm 2 invests at
time TF2 ;
2. if I1 ∈ [I∗1 , I2) (with probability one) both firm 1 and firm 2 invest at time TF2 .
Note that it is not clear which of the firms has the highest payoff in case 4. There are
two opposite effects. On the one hand firm 1 invests first and therefore gets a payoff equal
to its leader value, which is lower than its follower payoff, and firm 2 gets its follower
payoff, which is higher than its leader payoff. On the other hand the investment costs of
firm 1 are lower than those of firm 2 which implies that all the payoff curves of firm 1 are
situated above those of firm 2. It is not clear which effect dominates.
8.6 Conclusions
We are now in a position to state our main result. Let us say, that competition precipitates
investment if the first investment in a two firm model is never made later than in the
corresponding one firm model. Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8.3 For any D10, D11 and any I1, I2 competition precipitates investment.
At this point, it may be useful to briefly review the arguments leading to the conclu-
sion that competition weakly precipitates investment even when firms are allowed to be
asymmetric.
We found that, when firm 2’s investment costs are very high, its presence has no
strategic effect on the investment behavior of firm 1. Firm 1 simply proceeds and invests
at its most preferred investment threshold. Crucially, this most preferred investment
threshold turns out to be the same as in the model in which firm 1 is the only firm in
both the case of negative and positive externalities.
We proceeded to analyze the cases in which firm 2 has low enough investment costs
for its presence to have a strategic effect. In both the case of negative and positive
externalities, this effect turns out to precipitate investment, but for very different reasons.
When there are negative externalities, the threat of preemption pushes firm 1 to invest
earlier than it would otherwise have done. When there are positive externalities, both
firms invest early in anticipation that the other firm will invest early as well.
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Appendices
8.A Lemma and Proofs
Lemma 8.1 For u > v > 0 and a > 1 it holds that
ua − va − auva−1 + ava > 0. (8.23)







+ a > 0.
Define w = u
v
and for w ≥ 1 the function g (w) = wa− 1− aw+ a. It is easy to check that
for w > 1
∂g (w)
∂w
= awa−1 − a > 0,
and g (1) = 0. Thus equation (8.23) and thereby the lemma holds. 
Proof of Proposition 8.1 Define the function φ2 : [0, YF1 ] → IR as follows
φ2 (Y ) = L2 (Y )− F2 (Y ) . (8.24)
Substitution of equations (8.5) and (8.11) into the last equation gives
φ2 (Y ) =
Y D10




)β1 YF1 (D11 −D10)





β1 (r − µ)
. (8.25)
Then it follows that
φ2 (0) = −I2 < 0, (8.26)
φ2 (YF1) =
YF1D11





β1 (r − µ)
< 0, (8.27)
where the last inequality sign is a direct result of the definition of YF2 . The first and

































β1 (r − µ)
)
< 0. (8.29)




(r − µ) I2
D10
. (8.30)
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From equations (8.7), (8.13), and (8.30) it follows that YP2 ∈ (0, YF1) . Substituting the






























Therefore the three cases of Proposition 8.1 apply. The last step is to prove that I∗2 > I1.








Rewriting equation (8.33) leads to
D
β1
10 −Dβ111 − β1D10Dβ1−111 + β1Dβ111 > 0. (8.34)
Due to Lemma 8.1 with u = D10, v = D11, and a = β1, equation (8.34) always holds. 
Proof of Proposition 8.2 Define the function φ1 : [0, YF2 ] → IR as follows
φ1 (Y ) = L1 (Y )− F1 (Y ) . (8.35)
Substitution of equations (8.5) and (8.11) into equation (8.35) gives
φ1 (Y ) =

Y D10

















r−µ if Y ∈ [YF1 , YF2 ] .
(8.36)














































if Y ∈ (0, YF1) ,





r−µ if Y ∈ (YF1 , YF2 ] .
(8.38)
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The last equation implies that φ1 is strictly concave on the interval [0, YF2] . Due to the
derivation of YF1 we know that
lim
Y ↑YF1
φ1 (Y ) = lim
Y ↓YF1










Further, it holds that
φ1 (0) = −I1 < 0, (8.41)





= (β1 − 1)
D11 −D10
r − µ < 0. (8.43)
Equations (8.41), (8.42), and (8.43) imply the existence of YP1 . The uniqueness follows
from the strict concavity of φ1. 
Proof of Proposition 8.3 It holds that YL1 ≤ YP21 if and only if F2 (YL1) ≥ L2 (YL1) .





































Define z = I1
I2
and the function f : [0, 1] → IR as
f (z) = zβ1D
β1
10 − (β1 − 1)Dβ110 + zβ1 (D10 −D11)Dβ1−111 − zβ1Dβ111 . (8.46)





10 + β1 (D10 −D11)Dβ1−111 − β1zβ1−1Dβ111 , (8.47)
∂2f (z)
∂z2
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we know that f is strictly concave and increasing on the interval [0, 1] . Further, it holds
that
f (0) = − (β1 − 1)Dβ110 < 0, (8.50)
f (1) = D
β1
10 − β1 (D10 −D11)Dβ1−111 −Dβ111 > 0. (8.51)
The last inequality follows from Lemma 8.1 with u = D10, v = D11, and a = β1. The
derived properties of f guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a z∗ such that f (z∗) = 0.
The threshold I∗∗2 equals
I1
z∗ . 
Proof of Proposition 8.4 From equations (8.7) and (8.15) we derive that YF2 = YL1 if







Thus the two cases of Proposition 8.4 apply. From equation (8.20) it follows that I∗1 ≤ I2.





(r − µ) I2
D10
. (8.53)
Equations (8.7), (8.20), and (8.53) imply that YL2 > YF1 . 
8.B Equilibrium Strategies
The equilibrium strategies for an asymmetric timing game are derived in the same way as
in a symmetric timing game. For details we refer to Appendix 4.A and Simon (1987a,b).
8.B.1 Negative Externalities
For the case of negative externalities the equilibrium strategies are stated below. To derive
these strategies the steps presented in Appendix 4.A can be used.
1. If I2 ∈ [I∗∗2 ,∞) the equilibrium strategies of firms 1 and 2 in the negative external-
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ities case for t ≥ 0 are given by
G1 (t) =
{
0 if t < TL1 ,
1 if t ≥ TL1 ,
α1 (t) =
{
0 if t < TL1 ,
1 if t ≥ TL1 ,
G2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 ,
α2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 .
2. If I2 ∈ (I1, I∗∗2 ) four different cases should be analyzed.
(a) If y ∈ (0, YP21 ] the equilibrium strategies for t ≥ 0 are given by
G1 (t) =
{
0 if t < TP21 ,
1 if t ≥ TP21 ,
α1 (t) =
{
0 if t < TP21 ,
1 if t ≥ TP21 ,
G2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 ,
α2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 .
(b) If y ∈ (YP21 , YP22) the equilibrium strategies are for t ≥ 0 given by
G1 (t) = 1,
α1 (t) =
L2 (t)− F2 (t)
L2 (t)−M2 (t) ,
G2 (t) = 1,
α2 (t) =
L1 (t)− F1 (t)
L1 (t)−M1 (t) .
(c) If y ∈ [YP22 , YF2) the equilibrium strategies for t ≥ 0 are given by
G1 (t) = 1,
α1 (t) = 1,
G2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 ,
α2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 .
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(d) If y ∈ [YF2 ,∞) the equilibrium strategies for t ≥ 0 are equal to
G1 (t) = 1,
α1 (t) = 1,
G2 (t) = 1,
α2 (t) = 1.
8.B.2 Positive Externalities
For the case of positive externalities the equilibrium strategies are stated below. To derive
these strategies the steps presented in Appendix 4.A can be used.
1. If I1 ∈ (0, I∗1 ) the equilibrium strategies for t ≥ 0 are equal to
G1 (t) =
{
0 if t < TL1 ,
1 if t ≥ TL1 ,
α1 (t) =
{
0 if t < TL1 ,
1 if t ≥ TL1 ,
G2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 ,
α2 (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 .
2. If I1 ∈ [I∗1 , I2) the equilibrium strategies for t ≥ 0 are equal to
Gi (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 ,
αi (t) =
{
0 if t < TF2 ,
1 if t ≥ TF2 ,




A firm that buys a new technology today faces the risk that a much better technology
becomes available tomorrow. The fact that this can happen provides an incentive to delay
the investment. To include this kind of mechanism, the chapter extends the models of
Chapters 7 and 8 by incorporating an additional technology that becomes available at an
unknown point of time in the future. This means that our model contains two different
technologies that can be adopted, which are the currently available technology and a more
efficient technology that becomes available at a future point of time. At the moment a
firm invests, it enters the market, so, like in Chapter 8 we are considering a new market
model. The reason is that we want to keep the model as simple as possible such that we
are still able to point out the effects of adding an extra new technology. In this framework
the possible invention of a more efficient technology raises the option value of waiting to
invest in the current technology, but on the other hand the presence of a competitor may
induce the firm to invest quickly, and thus forget about future technological progress.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The model is presented in Section
9.2. After some preliminary analysis in Sections 9.3 and 9.4, the outcome of the game for
different probabilities concerning the future appearance of the new technology is presented
in Section 9.5. Section 9.6 collects the economic implications and Section 9.7 concludes.
9.2 The Model
We consider two identical, risk neutral and value maximizing firms that can make an
investment expenditure I (> 0) to become active on a market. We denote the firms by i
and j, with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j. The firms discount future profits at rate r (> 0) . At the
beginning of the game, entering the market means producing with the existing technology
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1. However, the decision to invest in technology 1 will be influenced by technological
progress. Adopting technology 1 would have been a bad decision if a little later a much
better technology becomes available. In our model technological progress is included as
follows. At the stochastic time T (> 0) a new and better technology 2 becomes available
for the firms. Time T is distributed according to an exponential distribution with mean
1
λ
(> 0), so that the arrival of technology 2 follows a Poisson process with parameter λ.
To be able to get analytical economic results we assume that firms can invest only
once and that the investment costs of both technologies are equal. Concerning the profit
flow it is assumed that it is stochastically evolving over time according to a geometric
Brownian motion process. The profit flow of firm i at time t (≥ 0) equals
πi (t) = Y (t)DNiNj , (9.1)
where Nk denotes the technology that firm k (∈ {i, j}) is using. Hence, Nk ∈ {0, 1, 2},
where 0 means that the firm is not active. Y (t) follows a geometric Brownian motion
process
dY (t) = µY (t) dt+ σY (t) dω (t) , (9.2)
Y (0) = y, (9.3)
where µ (∈ (0, r)) is the drift parameter, σ (> 0) is the volatility parameter, y (> 0) is the
starting value, and dω (t) is an increment of a Wiener process. Thus dω (t) is distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt. In the remainder of
the chapter we omit the time dependence of Y (t) whenever there is no confusion possible.
We make the following assumptions on the D’s. First, a firm makes the highest
amount of profits with a given technology if the other firm is not active (monopoly).
It also holds that, given its own technology, profits are lowest when the other firm is
a strong competitor, thus producing with the efficient technology 2. Second, given the
technology of the competitor, the firm’s profits are higher when it produces with the
modern technology 2. In this way the following inequalities are obtained:
D20 > D21 > D22
∨ ∨ ∨
D10 > D11 > D12
(9.4)
Finally, since it is a new market model, firms do not earn anything as long as they have
not adopted a technology. This implies that, for Nk ∈ {0, 1, 2} :
D0Nk = 0. (9.5)
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9.3 Second Technology Being Available
Three cases are possible when the second technology is already available. First, we con-
sider the case where no firm has invested before time T , followed by the case where only
the leader has invested before T . Finally, we give the payoff for the case that both firms
have already invested before T .
9.3.1 No Investment before Time T
Since t ≥ T, technology 2 is already available for adoption. This technology is more
efficient than technology 1, and therefore the firms will never invest in technology 1.
Hence, a game arises in which both firms consider entering a market by investing in one
available technology, where the profit flow evolves stochastically over time. In fact, such
a game is considered in Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9), see also Chapter 7. In
Chapter 7 it is shown that the expected value for each firm equals the follower value:
Φ22 (Y ) =
{
A22Y
β1 if Y < Y F22 ,
Y D22
































9.3.2 One Investment before Time T
Here the leader has already invested in technology 1. Now the problem of the follower is
in fact equal to that of a monopolist that considers entering a market where the profit
flow equals Y D21. From the analysis of this standard investment problem (see, e.g., Dixit
and Pindyck (1996)) it is obtained that the value of the follower equals
Φ12 (Y ) =
{
A12Y
β1 if Y < Y F12 ,
Y D21













r − µ − I
)
. (9.12)
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The value of the leader follows automatically:




β1 if Y < Y F12 ,
Y D12
r−µ if Y ≥ Y F12 .
(9.13)
When Y < Y F12 the profit flow is too low for the follower to invest. Therefore the leader
enjoys monopoly profits. If the leader receives these forever, the leader’s total profits
would equal Y D10
r−µ . But it has to be taken into account that in the future Y could reach
Y F12 at a certain point of time. Then the follower will enter the market so that the
leader’s monopoly profits will be reduced. The term B12Y
β1 is the correction factor that
incorporates this reduction into the firm’s payoff for Y < Y F12 . Therefore, the constant
B12 is negative and, due to the fact that the leader’s value function is continuous at Y
F
12 ,





r − µ . (9.14)
9.3.3 Two Investments before Time T
The implication is that both firms have already invested in technology 1. Therefore, the
value of each firm equals
Y D11
r − µ . (9.15)
9.4 Second Technology Not Being Available
First, the follower’s problem is analyzed, followed by the problem of the leader. Then we
consider the joint mover payoff, and finally we determine the expected payoff in case both
firms wait for technology 2.
9.4.1 Follower
First, we determine the follower’s value if the follower waits for technology 2, while the
leader has already invested in technology 1. Then we consider the case where the follower
can also invest in technology 1, and determine the scenario under which investing in
technology 1 can be optimal for the follower.
Follower Waiting for Technology 2
The value of the follower is denoted by F12 (Y ) , and must satisfy the following Bellman
equation




E [dF12 (Y )] . (9.16)
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Itô’s lemma (see Appendix 2.A) tells us that (for the definition of Φ12 (Y ) see (9.10)):











+λdt (Φ12 (Y )− F12 (Y )) + o (dt) . (9.17)








σ2Y 2 − (r + λ)F12 (Y ) + λΦ12 (Y ) = 0. (9.18)
Using the two possible expressions for Φ12 (Y ) (see (9.10)), the solution of (9.18) equals













2) is the positive (negative) solution of
1
2
σ2β∗ (β∗ − 1) + µβ∗ − (r + λ) = 0. (9.20)
Expressions for γ1 and γ2 are found by solving the continuity and the differentiability
conditions for F12 at Y = Y
F
12 . This is done in Appendix 9.A.1. It turns out that γ1 < 0
and γ2 > 0. In equation (9.19) we see that for Y < Y
F
12 the expected value of the follower
consists of two parts. The second part equals the value of the option to adopt technology
2 (cf. equation (9.10)). The first part is a (negative) correction term, due to the fact that
technology 2 is not available yet. Whenever Y is above the threshold Y F12 the follower is
going to adopt technology 2 at the moment that it becomes available. This last observation
explains the last two terms of equation (9.19). The second term equals the expected
present value of the profit flows generated from time T onwards:
E
[
exp (−rT ) Y (T )D21
r − µ
∣∣∣∣Y (0) = Y ]
=
D21












λ exp (−λt) exp (−rt)Y exp (µt) dt
=
λ
r + λ− µ
Y D21
r − µ . (9.21)
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The third term is the expected present value of the investment cost that firm has to pay
at time T in order to adopt technology 2:













. In equation (9.21) the µ is subtracted from the denominator, in order to take into
account the expected increase of Y .
If currently it holds that Y (t) ≥ Y F12 , it can still be the case that Y lies below the
threshold Y F12 at the time that the second technology arrives. Therefore, the correction
term γ2Y
β∗2 , is added to the follower’s value. This correction term is positive, since it
reflects the fact that the firm is not committed to make an investment. Undertaking the
investment would be suboptimal when Y is below Y F12 at the moment the new technology
is invented. Thus γ2Y
β∗2 values flexibility. Notice that this correction factor vanishes when
Y goes to infinity. This for the reason that the probability that Y (T ) is below Y F12 goes
to zero when Y goes to infinity.
Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
When Y increases, the opportunity costs of waiting rise. This could imply that, given that
the probability that a more efficient technology is invented soon is sufficiently low, the
follower is going to adopt technology 1 for large values of Y . Therefore, intuition suggests
that, in case of λ sufficiently low, there exists a threshold Y F11 such that the follower will
wait with investing if Y < Y F11 and for Y ≥ Y F11 the follower will adopt technology 1. Then
the value of the follower is denoted by F11 (Y ) and equal to










r−µ − λIr+λ if Y ∈
[












Equation (9.23) is derived by solving the follower’s optimal stopping problem (see Ap-
pendix 9.A.1). Solving the continuity and differentiability conditions for F11 at Y = Y
F
12
and the value matching and smoothpasting conditions for F11 at Y = Y
F
11 gives expressions
for the constants δ1, δ2 and δ3 (which can be found in Appendix 9.A.1).
The term δ1Y
β∗1 consists of two parts. The first part, (δ1 − δ2)Y β∗1 , is a correction
term in the same fashion as γ1Y
β∗1 and the second part, δ2Y
β∗1 , is the value of the option
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to adopt technology 1. It turns out that the correction factor always dominates the option
value and therefore δ1 < 0. The interpretation of A12Y
β1 is equal to the interpretation of
the same factor in equation (9.19). The term δ2Y
β∗1 equals the option value of adopting
technology 1, which implies that δ2 > 0. The correction factor δ3Y
β∗2 is exactly equal to
γ2Y
β∗2 , thus δ3 > 0. Lemma 9.2 in Appendix 9.B states the signs of the constants.
The following equation implicitly determines Y F11 (cf. Appendix 9.A.1):
(β∗1 − β∗2) δ3
(
Y F11
)β∗2 + (β∗1 − 1)λY F11D21
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) −
(β∗1 − 1)Y F11D11




Proposition 9.1 The threshold Y F11 has the following properties:





D21 −D11 . (9.25)
2. Y F11 approaches the follower’s threshold for adopting technology 1 in a model without
technology 2 (see Chapter 7) if λ approaches zero, i.e.
lim
λ↓0
Y F11 (λ) =
β1
β1 − 1
(r − µ) I
D11
. (9.26)
3. Y F11 approaches infinity if λ approaches λ
∗
1.
A proof of Proposition 9.1 can be found in Appendix 9.B. It is intuitively clear
that the threshold Y F11 is rising with λ, but due to the complexity of expression (9.24)
it was impossible to find an analytical proof for this statement. A larger λ implies that
technology 2 is expected to arrive sooner and therefore it is in the follower’s interest to
postpone the adoption of technology 1. Hence, the threshold for adopting technology 1
will be set higher.
The follower postpones the adoption of technology 1 forever when Y F11 approaches
infinity. It is easy to verify that lim
Y F11→∞
δ1 = γ1, lim
Y F11→∞
δ2 = 0 and δ3 = γ2. This implies
that equation (9.23) turns into equation (9.19) when Y F11 goes to infinity.
9.4.2 Leader
Here we consider the case where the leader invests in technology 1 (for the case where
the leader invests in technology 2, see Subsection 9.3.1). Two scenarios are analyzed. In
the first scenario the follower only considers investing in technology 2, while in the second
scenario investing in technology 1 is an alternative for the follower.
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Follower Waiting for Technology 2
When the follower waits for technology 2, the value of the leader equals
L12 (Y ) = E
−I + T∫
t=0
Y (t)D10 exp (−rt) dt+ exp (−rT ) Λ12 (Y (T ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣Y (0) = Y
 .
(9.27)
This leads to the following expression for the leader curve (see (9.13), (9.14), and Appendix
9.A.2)




β1 + Y D10
r−µ − I if Y < Y F12 ,
ε2Y





r−µ − I if Y ≥ Y F12 .
(9.28)
Expressions for ε1 and ε2 are derived by solving the continuity and differentiability con-
ditions for L12 at Y = Y
F
12 , this is done in Appendix 9.A.2. Lemma 9.4 in Appendix 9.B
states that ε1 and ε2 are both positive. The terms ε1Y
β∗1 and ε2Y
β∗2 correct for the fact
that technology 2 has to arrive before the follower can adopt that technology and the
leader’s value becomes Λ12. The longer it takes before technology 2 arrives, the longer
the leader makes monopoly profits, i.e. the better for the leader. As in (9.13), B12Y
β1
stands for the option that Y exceeds Y F12 , so that the follower will adopt technology 2,
which ends the leader’s monopoly profits. Consequently, as can be seen in (9.14), B12 is
negative. The value ε2Y
β∗2 equals the option that Y falls below Y F12 . This is good for the
leader because if Y < Y F12 the follower will not invest so that the leader keeps on having
monopoly profits. This explains why ε2 is positive.
Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
In this case the value of the leader is given by




β1 + Y D10












r−µ − I if Y ∈
[












The derivation of equation (9.29) and expressions for φ1, φ2 and φ3 can be found in
Appendix 9.A.2. The signs of φ1 and φ3 are equal to the signs of ε1 and ε2 in (9.28),
respectively (see Lemma 9.5 in Appendix 9.B).
The constant φ2 values the possibility that Y rises above Y
F
11 before technology 2
arrives. On the one hand that event is good for the leader, since the follower adopts
technology 1 and not technology 2. On the other hand it is bad for the leader, because
it no longer has a monopoly position. The following proposition states under which
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conditions φ2 is negative or positive, i.e. which argument dominates the other. The proof
is given in appendix 9.B.




D11 −D10 . (9.30)
If equation (9.30) does not hold, the sign of φ2 can go both ways.
Equation (9.30) states that the relative profit gain the follower can make by adopting
technology 2 is larger than the relative profit loss that the leader faces when the follower
adopts technology 2. Inequality (9.30) is most likely to hold when the leader is almost
indifferent concerning the technology the follower switches to. In that case it is not
good for the leader if the follower switches to 1 immediately rather than waiting for 2.
Consequently φ2 is negative which is confirmed by Proposition 9.2.
9.4.3 Joint Investment
The expected value of each firm if both firms adopt technology 1 together is given by
M11 (Y ) =
Y D11
r − µ − I. (9.31)
9.4.4 Waiting Curve
The waiting curve (see also Chapter 6) gives the expected value if both firms wait with
investing until technology 2 arrives. The waiting curve equals





β1 if Y < Y F22 ,
η2Y
β∗2 + λY D22
(r+λ−µ)(r−µ) − λIr+λ if Y ≥ Y F22 .
(9.32)
For a derivation we refer to Appendix 9.A.3, there we also present expressions for η1 and
η2. The constant η1 is negative and the constant η2 is positive. These constants have the
same economic interpretations as γ1 and γ2, respectively.
Proposition 9.3 It always holds that F12 (Y ) > W (Y ) .
This proposition is proved in Appendix 9.B and is a direct result of the new market
assumption. The follower starts making profits after its investment and from the follower’s
point of view it is best that the leader adopts technology 1.
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9.5 Equilibria
In this section firm roles are endogenous which means that it is not determined before-
hand which firm will be the first investor. We describe the possible equilibria of the
technology adoption game before the arrival of technology 2. It turns out that the type
of the equilibria is completely determined by λ. In the following theorem we describe this
relationship.
Theorem 9.1 There are three regions for λ.
1. If λ ∈ [0, λ∗2) the equilibrium is of the preemption type.
2. If λ ∈ [λ∗2, λ∗3) the equilibrium is of the attrition type.
3. If λ ∈ [λ∗3,∞) both firms wait with investing until technology 2 arrives.
The critical λ levels are equal to
λ∗2 =
(r − µ)D10
D21 −D12 , (9.33)
λ∗3 =
(r − µ)D10
D22 −D12 . (9.34)







by (9.25). Note that equation (9.30) ensures that λ∗1 ≤ λ∗2. In case equation (9.30) does
not hold, the second region for λ does not exist. In each of the following four subsections
one of the regions for λ is analyzed and the equilibria are characterized. In the remainder
of this section Theorem 9.1 is implicitly proved. The propositions in this section are
proved in Appendix 9.B. We do not prove the theorems. Interested readers are referred
to Appendix 4.A and Chapter 6 where the equilibrium concepts are presented.
9.5.1 Case 1
In the first case we have λ ∈ [0, λ∗1). From the analysis of the previous section we know
that in this region the follower is going to adopt technology 1 for Y large enough. This
implies that in the equilibrium analysis the leader curve is given by equation (9.29), the
follower curve by (9.23), the joint investment curve by (9.31), and the waiting curve by
(9.32). The following proposition states that there exists a preemption threshold in this
region.














Chapter 9. Two New Technologies 209
Define TP11 and T
F




t|Y (t) ≥ Y P11
)
and TF11 = inf
(
t|Y (t) ≥ Y F11
)
.
Propositions 9.3 and 9.4 imply that the leader curve exceeds the waiting curve for some Y .
From Chapter 6 it follows that the equilibria of this game with waiting curve are equal to
equilibria of the game without waiting curve. This means that in analyzing the game the
future arrival of technology 2 can be ignored for the moment (of course, if, despite the low
probability, technology 2 arrives before one of the firms has invested in technology 1, the
outcome must be reconsidered). Hence, a game must be considered where two firms have
to determine their optimal timing concerning the investment in a given technology. This
is in fact the game described in Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chapter 9), see also Chapter 7.
Here we repeat the most important aspects.
Theorem 9.2 Consider the game with y ≤ Y P11 . It holds that in equilibrium the leader
adopts technology 1 at time TP11 and the follower adopts technology 1 at time T
F
11.
Of course, Theorem 9.2 is conditional on the fact that technology 2 does not arrive
before time TF11. Further we should remark that if Y
P
11 < y < Y
F
11 there exists a positive
probability that the firms invest simultaneously at time 0 (cf. Appendix 4.A.2 and Chapter
7). In equilibrium the expected value of each firm equals the follower value. Figure 9.1
graphically shows the curves in this case.
The investment opportunity is worthless for Y equal to zero. Therefore, at Y = 0
the leader (L) and joint investment (M) value equal minus the investment cost and the
follower (F ) value equals zero. The further shape of the curves L, F , M , and W can be
derived from (9.23), (9.29), (9.31), (9.32), and (9.35).
With Figure 9.1 the preemption mechanism can be clearly explained. Consider the
game with Y (0) ≤ Y P11 . Assume that both firms pass Y P11 without investing and the current
value of Y , say Y (t), exceeds Y P11 . Then for one of the firms it is optimal to invest at
time t, since the L-curve lies above the F -curve, implying that investing first gives a
higher payoff than investing second. The other firm knows this and will try to preempt
its competitor by investing at time t− ε, since it knows that the other firm would like to
be the first to invest at time t. But then the other firm will try to preempt at time t− 2ε.
It is clear that this process of preemption stops at Y P11 , since for Y < Y
P
11 it holds that
F (Y ) > L(Y ) so that there are no incentives to invest first.
The following proposition gives an expression for the probability that technology 2
arrives after a certain threshold is hit. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix
9.B.
Proposition 9.5 Let TS = inf (t|Y (t) ≥ S) . At time t = 0 the probability that the





























Figure 9.1: Case 1: λ ∈ [0, λ∗1) .
Pr (TS < T ) , is given by




)β̂1 if y < S,



















From Proposition 9.5 we derive that the probability that technology 1 is adopted by
the leader (follower) decreases with λ. An increase of λ leads to both a higher threshold
and a higher β̂1.
9.5.2 Case 2
In the second case it holds that λ ∈ [λ∗1, λ∗2) . Here the probability that technology 2 arrives
soon is that high that the follower is going to wait for technology 2. As in the previous
case there exists a preemption threshold.
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t|Y (t) ≥ Y P12
)
. Furthermore we
define TF12 = inf
(
t ≥ T |Y (t) ≥ Y F12
)
.
Theorem 9.3 In equilibrium the leader adopts technology 1 at time TP12 and the follower
adopts technology 2 at time TF12.
As above the leader’s adoption of technology 1 is conditional on technology 2 not
arriving before time TP12. If initially Y is above Y
P
12 then with positive probability both
firms adopt technology 1 at time 0. The expected value of each firm equals the follower




























Figure 9.2: Case 2: λ ∈ [λ∗1, λ∗2) .
From the fact that Y P12 is rising in λ and Proposition 9.5 it can be concluded that the
probability that the leader adopts technology 1 decreases with λ.
9.5.3 Case 3
The third case is characterized by the fact that λ ∈ [λ∗2, λ∗3) . Here the probability that
technology 2 arrives is even higher than in case 2, where it was already high enough for
the follower to wait for technology 2. This implies that also in this case the follower is
going to wait for technology 2. In this region there does not exist a preemption threshold,
i.e. the follower curve is situated above the leader curve for each Y . This implies that
the game without waiting curve is an attrition game.
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The following theorem describes the equilibrium conditional on technology 2 not ar-
riving before time TL12 = inf
(
t|Y (t) ≥ Y L12
)
.
Theorem 9.4 In equilibrium the leader adopts technology 1 at time TL12 and the follower
adopts technology 2 at time TF12.
The curves for the different payoffs in this game are depicted in Figure 9.3. The leader
curve shows the expected payoff as function of Y for a firm that invests in technology 1
immediately. This firm knows that its competitor will invest in technology 2 as soon as it
becomes available and Y > Y F12 . The leader has the advantage of monopoly profits until
the time that the follower invests in technology 2, but the disadvantage of producing with
a less efficient technology after this date. On the other hand the waiting curve shows
the expected payoff if both firms wait for technology 2 to arrive. As long as the waiting
curve lies above the leader curve, investing now in technology 1 is not a sensible option.




























Figure 9.3: Case 3: λ ∈ [λ∗2, λ∗3) .
In the attrition game the follower curve is situated above the leader curve and the
leader curve above the joint investment curve for all positive Y. This implies that there
does not exist a symmetric equilibrium for this attrition game (cf. Appendix 4.A.3).
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There are two asymmetric equilibria, which are summarized in Theorem 9.4 (each firm
can either be leader or follower). For simplicity reasons we assume that each equilibrium
occurs with probability one half.
Proposition 9.5 together with the fact that Y L12 is increasing with λ imply that the
probability that the leader adopts technology 1 is decreasing with λ.
9.5.4 Case 4
In the fourth case (λ ∈ [λ∗3,∞) ) the probability that technology 2 will be invented soon is
that high that both firms wait with investing until technology 2 arrives. This is reflected
by the fact that the waiting curve exceeds the leader curve for all Y in this region. Figure



























Figure 9.4: Case 4: λ ∈ [λ∗3,∞) .
At the moment that technology 2 arrives, a game starts where both firms consider
entering a market by investing in one available technology (the presence of technology 1
can be ignored since it is less efficient), while the profit flow follows a geometric Brownian
motion process. Hence, like in case 1, the framework of Dixit and Pindyck (1996, Chap-
ter 9) again applies. The difference is that in case 1 the Dixit and Pindyck game has to
deal with investment in technology 1, while here the investment in technology 2 must be
considered.
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9.6 Economic Analysis
The Poisson parameter λ is the key parameter for the results. Waiting for the new
technology is better when the probability that this new technology becomes available
soon, is high enough. If this probability is low enough both firms only consider when
to invest in the current technology, while ignoring the new one. In this case the usual
preemption game arises (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Dixit and Pindyck (1996,
Chapter 9) for its stochastic counterpart).
If the probability that technology 2 becomes available soon is not too small, i.e. the
Poisson parameter exceeds λ∗1 (cf. (9.25)), then the game is still a preemption game, so
that each firm tries to be the first investor. However, the firm that will invest second is
better off by waiting for the new technology rather than investing in the current one.
If λ is again a bit larger such that it exceeds λ∗2 (see (9.33)), the preemption game turns
into an attrition game. Like in the previous case, the first investor chooses the current
technology and the second investor will wait for the new technology, but the difference is
that the payoff of the second investor is higher here. Hence, neither firm would like to be
the first investor, but if they both keep on waiting, their payoff will be even less than the
payoff of the one that decides immediately to invest first. According to Appendix 4.A.3
a unique asymmetric equilibrium exists where the adoption timings are dispersed.
If λ exceeds λ∗3, given by (9.34), then the probability that technology 2 arrives soon is
that large that both firms will wait for this new technology. The possibility to invest in
the current technology will be ignored.
It is clear that for λ = 0 the model exactly equals the one treated in Dixit and Pindyck
(1996, Chapter 9). Here there is no technological progress in the sense that the probability
that a new technology will be invented is zero. Hence both firms only need to consider
investing in the current technology, so that the problem boils down to the determination
of the optimal point in time that a firm must enter a market with stochastic profit flow,
while taking into account the behavior of an identical competitor. The resulting game
is a preemption game, like the one where λ is positive but below λ∗1. It holds that Y
P
11
increases with λ so that the possible occurrence of a new technology will delay investment
in the current technology, which is intuitively plausible.
Comparing the case for λ = 0 (model with one technology) with λ ∈ (λ∗2, λ∗3) shows that
taking into account the possible occurrence of a new technology could turn a preemption
game into an attrition game.
To learn more about the effects of the future availability of a more efficient technology
on the optimal timing of investment, we also carry out comparative statics analysis on
the other parameter values. Let us first consider the effect of revenue volatility which
is measured by σ. The general prediction of the real options literature is that a higher
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level of uncertainty increases the threshold level and therefore will have a negative effect
on investment. In our model an increased threshold level implies that the investment in
technology 1 will be delayed. Therefore, the probability that technology 2 arrives before
the investment is undertaken, increases. Hence, the conclusion is that increased revenue
uncertainty induces a higher probability that the new technology will be adopted instead
of the current technology.
Next, consider the expected growth of the market reflected by the parameter µ. An
increase of µ reduces the values of λ∗i , with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In general this means that the
probability increases that the firm will delay or totally refrain from investing in the current
technology. The reason is that in case of a fast growing market the firm will exploit this
growth as much as possible by using the more efficient new technology. The firm is more
willing to wait for this technology to be invented.
The effect of the discount rate is completely opposite to the effect of the expected
market growth rate. A higher discount rate implies that immediate profits are more
important to the firm. Therefore the firm prefers investing in the current technology
rather than waiting for the new one.
Finally, consider the effects of the several profit flows. First, notice that λ∗1 increases
with D11 and decreases with D21. This can be explained by the fact that the second
investor is more willing to produce with the first technology if D11 is large, while it likes
to wait for the new technology to arrive if D21 is large.
Second, λ∗2 increases with D10 and D12, while it decreases with D21. This implies
that λ∗2 is larger if the payoff of the strategy ”adopt technology 1 immediately” is higher
relative to the payoff of the strategy ”wait for technology 2 to arrive and adopt it then”.
Note that if the latter strategy gives the highest payoff, the game is an attrition game,
which occurs for λ ∈ (λ∗2, λ∗3).
Third, λ∗3 increases with D10 and D12, while it decreases with D22. Hence, if a high
profit is reached when both firms produce with the new technology, compared to the
strategy ”invest in technology 1 immediately and have some monopoly profits before
technology 2 arrives”, both firms will wait for the second technology to arrive. This in
fact happens for λ > λ∗3.
9.7 Conclusions
The optimal investment timing is governed to a large extent by the magnitude of the
probability that the new technology becomes available within a given period of time. We
found that, indeed, the possible occurrence of a new technology will delay investment
in the current technology. Compared to the case where technological progress is not
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included (for example Chapters 7 and 8), taking into account the possible occurrence of
a new technology could turn a preemption game into an attrition game, which is a game
where the second mover gets the highest payoff. This could happen when the first mover
invests in the current technology, while the second mover waits for the new technology to
arrive and invests then in it, and can be explained as follows. Compared to the strategy
of its competitor, the benefits of the first investor are the monopoly profits gained during
the period that starts at the moment of investment by the first investor and lasts until
the moment that the second mover invests. However, these monopoly profits can be more
than offset by the efficiency gain the second investor enjoys due to producing with a more
efficient technology, which takes place after both firms have invested.
From the theory of real options it is known that the option value of waiting with
investment increases with revenue uncertainty. For our model this implies that increased
uncertainty delays adoption of the current technology, so that the probability that the new
technology is invented before the investment in the current technology has taken place
increases. This leads to the conclusion that increased revenue uncertainty induces a higher
probability that the new technology will be adopted instead of the current technology.
Hence, uncertainty raises the technological level within firms. Another result that is worth
mentioning here is, that in a faster growing market a firm is more inclined to wait for a
more efficient technology to arrive.
Appendices
9.A Derivation of Value Functions
9.A.1 Follower
Follower Waiting for Technology 2






)−β∗1 I (r (r − µ) β∗2 + (r − µβ1)λβ∗2 − (r − µ) (r + λ) β1)





)−β∗2 I (r (r − µ) β∗1 + (r − µβ1)λβ∗1 − (r − µ) (r + λ) β1)
(r + λ) (r + λ− µ) (β1 − 1) (β∗1 − β∗2)
. (9.41)
A direct result of Lemma 9.1 (see Appendix 9.B) is that γ1 < 0 and γ2 > 0.
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Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
The follower solves the optimal stopping problem, in which stopping means adopting
technology 1. Therefore the expected value of the follower for Y ≥ Y F11 equals
F11 (Y ) =
Y D11
r − µ − I. (9.42)
In the continuation region waiting is the optimal strategy and the following Bellman
equation must be satisfied




E [dF11 (Y )] . (9.43)








σ2Y 2 − (r + λ)F11 (Y ) + λΦ12 (Y ) = 0. (9.44)
Using (9.10) and the boundary condition F11 (0) = 0 gives




β1 if Y < Y F12 ,
δ2Y
β∗1 + δ3Y
β∗2 + λY D21
(r+λ−µ)(r−µ) − λIr+λ if Y ≥ Y F12 .
(9.45)
Combining (9.42) and (9.43) gives equation (9.23).
Expressions for δ1, δ2, δ3 and Y
F
11 are found by simultaneously solving the continuity
and differentiability conditions for F11 at Y
F
12 and the value matching and smooth pasting
conditions for F11 at Y
F
11 . It turns out that it is not possible to get a closed form solution
for Y F11 . The threshold Y
F
11 is implicitly determined by equation (9.24). The constants are
equal to















(β∗1 − 1) (r + λ)
, (9.47)
δ3 = γ2. (9.48)
Lemma 9.2 in Appendix 9.B states that δ1 < 0, δ2 > 0, and δ3 > 0.
9.A.2 Leader
Follower Waiting for Technology 2
In order to derive an expression for equation (9.27), define
h (Y ) = E
 T∫
t=0
Y (t)D10 exp (−rt) dt+ exp (−rT ) Λ12 (Y (T ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣Y (0) = Y
 . (9.49)
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Then h (Y ) must satisfy the following Bellman equation




E [dh (Y )] . (9.50)
Applying Itô’s lemma gives











+λdt (Λ12 (Y )− h (Y )) + o (dt) . (9.51)








σ2Y 2 − (r + λ)h (Y ) + λΛ12 (Y ) + Y D10 = 0. (9.52)
Substitution of (9.13) in (9.52) and solving that differential equation gives
h (Y ) =
{
ε1Y
β∗1 + τ 1Y
β∗2 +B12Y
β1 + Y D10










r−µ if Y ≥ Y F12 .
(9.53)
The boundary condition at Y = 0 and the condition that rules out speculative bubbles
(see Dixit and Pindyck (1996, p. 181)),







r + λ− µ +
λ
r + λ− µ
D12
r − µ, (9.55)
imply that τ 1 = 0 and τ 2 = 0.






)1−β∗1 ((r − µ) (β1 − β∗2) + λ (β1 − 1)) (D10 −D12)





)1−β∗2 ((r − µ) (β1 − β∗1) + λ (β1 − 1)) (D10 −D12)
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) (β∗1 − β∗2)
. (9.57)
According to Lemma 9.4 ε1 and ε2 are both positive (see Appendix 9.B).
Follower Considering Technology 1 to be Interesting
If Y ≥ Y F11 the value function of the leader is given by
L11 (Y ) =
Y D11
r − µ − I. (9.58)
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Next we derive the value function of the leader for Y < Y F11 . The value of the leader equals




Y (t)D10 exp (−rt) dt+ 1{T≤TF11} exp (−rT ) Λ12 (Y (T ))
∞∫
t=min(T,TF11)
1{TF11<T}Y (t)D11 exp (−rt) dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Y (0) = Y
 . (9.59)
Define




Y (t)D10 exp (−rt) dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Y (0) = Y
 . (9.60)
The function f must satisfy the following Bellman equation for Y < Y F11 :




E [df (Y )] . (9.61)
Itô’s lemma gives























− (r + λ) f (Y ) + Y D10 = 0. (9.63)
The solution of this differential equation is given by




r + λ− µ. (9.64)










r + λ− µ, (9.65)
υ2 = 0. (9.66)
Next define
g (Y ) = E
[




1{TF11<T}Y (t)D11 exp (−rt) dt
∣∣∣∣Y (0) = Y ]. (9.67)
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The function g must satisfy the following Bellman equation





























− (r + λ) g (Y ) + λΛ12 (Y ) = 0. (9.69)
The solution of (9.69) is given by
















r−µ if Y ≥ Y F12 .
(9.70)
Due to the boundary condition g (0) = 0 we know that κ2 = 0. The constants κ1, κ3, and
κ4 are found by simultaneously solving the continuity and differentiability condition at












r − µ −
λY F11D12
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ)
)
− (Y F11)β∗2−β∗1 ε2, (9.72)
κ4 = ε2. (9.73)
Combining equations (9.58), (9.59), (9.64), and (9.70) gives equation (9.29), in which
φ1 = υ1 + κ3 + ε1, (9.74)
φ2 = υ1 + κ3, (9.75)
φ3 = κ4 = ε2. (9.76)
Lemma 9.5 in Appendix 9.B states that φ1 > 0 and φ3 > 0.
9.A.3 Waiting Curve
The following Bellman equation must hold for the waiting curve




E [dW (Y )] . (9.77)
Itô’s lemma gives











+λdt (Φ22 (Y )−W (Y )) + o (dt) . (9.78)
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Substitution of (9.78) in (9.77) gives


















− (r + λ)W (Y ) + λΦ22 (Y ) = 0. (9.80)
Using equation (9.6) and the boundary condition for Y = 0 and ruling out speculative
bubbles,







(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) , (9.82)
gives




β1 if Y < Y F22 ,
η2Y
β∗2 + λY D22
(r+λ−µ)(r−µ) − λIr+λ if Y ≥ Y F22 .
(9.83)
The constants η1 and η2 are found by solving the continuity and differentiability conditions




)−β∗1 I (r (r − µ) β∗2 + (r − µβ1)λβ∗2 − (r − µ) (r + λ) β1)





)−β∗2 I (r (r − µ) β∗1 + (r − µβ1)λβ∗1 − (r − µ) (r + λ) β1)
(r + λ) (r + λ− µ) (β1 − 1) (β∗1 − β∗2)
. (9.85)
A direct result of Lemma 9.1 is that η1 < 0 and η2 > 0.
9.B Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 9.1 The following two inequalities hold:
r (r − µ) β∗2 + (r − µβ1)λβ∗2 − (r − µ) (r + λ) β1 < 0, (9.86)
r (r − µ) β∗1 + (r − µβ1)λβ∗1 − (r − µ) (r + λ) β1 > 0. (9.87)
Proof of Lemma 9.1 The assumption µ ∈ (0, r) implies that (cf. Proof of Proposition
7.5):




Equation (9.86) holds due to equation (9.88) and the fact that β∗2 < 0.
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We know that β∗1 ≥ β1, where the equality sign only holds for σ → ∞ for which we
have β∗1 = β1 = 1. Write β
∗
1 = ξβ1 and substitute in (9.87):
r (r − µ) ξβ1 + (r − µβ1)λξβ1 − (r + λ) (r − µ) β1
= r (r + λ− µ) β1 (ξ − 1)− µλβ1 (ξβ1 − 1)
= Ξ (ξ) . (9.89)
Then Ξ (1) = 0 (ξ = 1 implies that β1 = β
∗
1 and therefore β1 = 1) and
dΞ (ξ)
dξ
= β1 (r (r + λ)− µ (r + λβ1)) > 0, (9.90)
if and only if
r (r + λ)− µ (r + λβ1) > 0. (9.91)





r (r − µ)
µλ
. (9.92)
Therefore equation (9.87) holds. 
Lemma 9.2 The constants δ1, δ2, and δ3 have the following signs: δ1 < 0, δ2 > 0, and
δ3 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 9.2 The signs of δ2 and δ3 follow immediately from equations (9.47)
and (9.48). Define the following functions:










(β∗1 − 1) (r + λ)
, (9.93)





− (Y F12)1−β∗1 D21β∗1 (r + λ− µ) . (9.94)





because Y F11 > Y
F
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Rewriting of (9.96) yields
2 (r − µ)σ2 ≥ 0. (9.97)
Therefore the lemma holds since we assumed that r > µ. 
Lemma 9.4 The constants ε1 and ε2 are both positive.
Proof of Lemma 9.4 From equation (9.56) it directly follows that ε1 > 0. The lemma
holds whenever the following statement is true:
(r − µ) (β1 − β∗1) + λ (β1 − 1) > 0. (9.98)
In order to prove that equation (9.98) holds, define the following function
Ω (λ) = (r − µ) (β1 − β∗1 (λ)) + λ (β1 − 1) . (9.99)
For λ = 0 we have that β1 = β
∗










)2) 32 > 0. (9.100)



























































)2 ≥ 0. (9.104)
This implies that for r ≥ µ equation (9.101) holds and thereby the lemma is proved. 
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Lemma 9.5 The constants φ1 and φ3 have the following signs: φ1 > 0 and φ3 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 9.5 We start with φ3. From Lemma 9.5 we know that ε2 > 0. There-
fore φ3 > 0.
Define
E1 (Y ) =
Y 1−β
∗
1 ((r − µ) (β1 − β∗2) + λ (β1 − 1)) (D10 −D12)
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) (β∗1 − β∗2)
, (9.105)
E2 (Y ) =
Y 1−β
∗
2 ((r − µ) (β1 − β∗1) + λ (β1 − 1)) (D10 −D12)
































r − µ −
λY F11D12
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ)
)
− (Y F11)β∗2−β∗1 E2 (Y ) , (9.107)
then it follows after some tedious calculations that





















(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) > 0. (9.108)
Thus φ1 is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 9.1 It is easy to verify that equation (9.24) does not have a root
if λ ≥ λ∗1. Assertion 2 can be concluded by taking a closer look at equations (9.24), (9.20),
(9.47), and (9.41). The closer λ comes to λ∗1 the smaller the negative term in (9.24)
becomes in absolute terms. This implies that Y F11 becomes larger. 
Proof of Proposition 9.2 From Proposition 9.1 we know that Y F11 does not exist for
λ ≥ λ∗1 and therefore φ2 does not make sense for λ ≥ λ∗1. First we prove that φ2 ≤ 0 if
equation (9.30) holds and λ < λ∗1. According to (9.65), (9.72), and (9.75) it is sufficient
to prove that
D11
r − µ −
λD12
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) −
D10
r + λ− µ ≤ 0. (9.109)
Equation (9.109) holds if
λ ≤ (r − µ) (D10 −D11)
D11 −D12 . (9.110)
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Using equation (9.30) it is not hard to show that
(r − µ) (D10 −D11)
D11 −D12 > λ
∗
1. (9.111)
Therefore equation (9.109) holds and φ2 is non-positive.
Let us show that φ2 can be negative when (9.30) does not hold. Set λ = 0, then
β1 = β
∗





r − µ < 0. (9.112)
Next we argue that φ2 can be positive when equation (9.30) does not hold. Define the
following function
F2 (Y ) = Y 1−β∗1 (r − µ) (D11 −D10)− λ (D12 −D11)






= φ2.When equation (9.30) does not hold, the first term in equation (9.113)
is positive. When λ approaches λ∗1 we know from Proposition 9.1 that Y
F
11 approaches
infinity. Taking a closer look at equation (9.113) we see that the second term goes faster
to zero than the first term. Thus for λ close enough to λ∗1 we have that φ2 is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 9.3 This proposition is easily verified by taking a closer look at
equations (9.23), (9.32), (9.40), (9.41), (9.84), and (9.85). 
Proof of Proposition 9.4 Define the function L as follows
L (Y ) = L11 (Y )− F11 (Y ) . (9.114)











Substitution of equations (9.23) and (9.29) in (9.115) gives for Y ∈ [Y F12 , Y F11] :
L (Y ) = (φ2 − δ2)Y β
∗




(r − µ)D10 − λ (D21 −D12)







= β∗1 (φ2 − δ2)Y β
∗




(r − µ)D10 − λ (D21 −D12)
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) . (9.117)
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(r − µ)D10 − λ (D21 −D12)






















λ (D12 −D11)− (r − µ) (D11 −D10)
(r + λ− µ) (r − µ) Y
F
11 .
From the proof of Proposition 9.2 we know that
λ ≤ (r − µ) (D10 −D11)
D11 −D12 . (9.120)
Equations (9.119) and (9.120) together with φ3 > 0 imply equation (9.115). 
Proof of Proposition 9.5 Define P (Y ) = Pr (TS < T |Y (0) = Y ). Then for Y < S
the function P must satisfy the following Bellman equation








Since P (0) = 0 and P (S) = 1 the solution of (9.121) equals (9.36). 
Proof of Proposition 9.6 Taking a closer look at equations (9.19) and (9.28) (for Y
large) we see that there exists a crossing point of L12 and F12 if
Y D10
r + λ− µ +
λ
r + λ− µ
Y D12
r − µ >
λ
r + λ− µ
Y D21
r − µ . (9.122)
Rewriting (9.122) gives (9.33). 
Proof of Proposition 9.7 This proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition
9.6, but then with equations (9.28) and (9.32). 
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Technologie Investeringen
Een Speltheoretische Reële Optie Benadering
Samenvatting
Technologie Investeringen
Investeringen van bedrijven bepalen voor een groot gedeelte de economische groei. Vooral
investeringen in nieuwe en efficiëntere technologieën hebben een grote impact. Gedurende
de laatste twee decennia wordt een groeiend percentage van alle investeringen gedaan in
informatie en communicatie technologieën. In de Verenigde Staten van Amerika betroffen
de investeringen in genoemde technologieën reeds in 1989 grofweg 50 procent van alle
nieuwe kapitaalinvesteringen van het bedrijfsleven (zie Kriebel (1989)). Door de snelle
technologische vooruitgang is de technologie investeringsbeslissing van een individueel
bedrijf een gecompliceerde zaak geworden. Neem de markt voor personal computers
als voorbeeld van de snelle technologische vooruitgang. In het begin van de jaren 90
introduceerde IBM de Pentium personal computer voor een introductieprijs die gelijk was
aan die van de 80286 personal computer in de jaren 80. Dit betekent dat bij gelijkblijvende
kosten in minder dan tien jaar tijd zowel de snelheid als de geheugencapaciteit met een
factor 20 verbeterde (zie Yorukoglu (1998)).
In het begin van de twintigste eeuw vertoonde de technologische ontwikkeling niet zo’n
snelle vooruitgang als in de afgelopen jaren. Daarom was in die tijd de technologie inves-
teringsbeslissing van een bedrijf voornamelijk een timing probleem, waarin het optimale
tijdstip om de bestaande technologie te vervangen bepaald moest worden. Bijvoorbeeld,
één van de technologie investeringsbeslissingen van een spoorwegmaatschappij betrof de
vervanging van stoom rangeerders door diesel rangeerders. Tot op de dag van vandaag
werken de meeste spoorwegmaatschappijen nog steeds met diesel rangeerders.
Tegenwoordig moet een bedrijf rekening houden met het feit dat de huidige generatie
informatie en communicatie technologieën over een paar jaar weer verouderd zijn. Dus de
investeringsbeslissing is niet langer alleen een vraag van wanneer een nieuwe technologie
239
240 Samenvatting
geadopteerd moet worden, maar ook een kwestie van welke technologie geadopteerd moet
worden. Met als gevolg dat, teneinde de technologie adoptie beslissing op een zinvolle
manier te analyseren binnen een theoretisch raamwerk, het belangrijk is om modellen te
bestuderen waarin meerdere technologieën beschikbaar komen. De timing van de inves-
tering is (nog steeds) erg relevant. De reden hiervoor is dat door de snelle technologische
ontwikkelingen van informatie en communicatie technologieën de prijzen van die produc-
ten vrij vlug dalen. Als voorbeeld zijn in Figuur 1.1 op pagina 2 de prijsontwikkelingen
van twee Intel Pentium III processors in Nederland weergegeven.
Een ander significant kenmerk van het laatste decennium is dat bedrijven meer en
meer geconfronteerd worden met competitie op hun afzetmarkten. Een reden is het open-
stellen van de door de overheid in stand gehouden markten met maar één aanbieder.
Voorbeelden in Nederland zijn het openen van de markten voor telecommunicatie, spoor-
wegen en energievoorziening. Tot september 1995 was KPN Telecom de enige aanbieder
van mobiele telefonie in Nederland. Door de Europese wetgeving, die liberalisatie van
onder andere de telecommunicatiemarkt voorschrijft, organiseerde de Nederlandse rege-
ring een zogenaamde schoonheidswedstrijd met als prijs een licentie om mobiele telefonie
aan te bieden. Libertel won die prijs en nam haar netwerk in september 1995 in gebruik.
Telfort werd actief op de markt in september 1998 en aan het eind van dat jaar begon-
nen ook Ben en Dutchtone met het aanbieden van hun diensten. Momenteel zijn deze
vijf spelers nog steeds actief op deze markt. Het mag duidelijk zijn dat KPN Telecom
haar investeringsstrategie drastisch heeft moeten wijzigen door de intrede van deze vier
opponenten.
Een andere reden voor de toename van het aantal oligopolistische markten is het (nog
steeds doorgaande) proces van fusies en overnames, dat door wetgeving niet zal leiden
tot markten met maar één aanbieder. Een voorbeeld uit de auto-industrie betreft het sa-
mengaan van Daimler en Chrysler in 1998. Uit de telecommunicatiemarkt kennen we de
overname van AirTouch door Vodafone (gedeeltelijk eigenaar van Libertel) in 1999 en het
recente (vijandelijke) bod van Vodafone op de aandelen van Mannesmann. Als Vodafone
slaagt in het overnemen van Mannesmann, dan moet het Orange (eigendom van Mannes-
mann) afstoten, omdat anders het marktaandeel van Vodafone in het Verenigd Koninkrijk
te groot wordt. Het resultaat van Vodafone’s aankondiging was dat vier potentiële kopers,
France Telecom, KPN Telecom, NTT DoCoMo en MCI Worldcom, zich gemeld hebben
voor Orange. De aankondiging eerder dit jaar van de voorgenomen fusie van de Deutsche
Bank en de Dresdner Bank is een voorbeeld in de financiële markt. De rechtzaak tussen
Microsoft en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika over Microsoft’s (veronderstelde) monopo-
liepositie is een voorbeeld van het ingrijpen van de regering. Het resultaat van deze fusies,
overnames en het ingrijpen van regeringen is dat op de lange termijn markten met maar
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één aanbieder en markten met heel veel aanbieders zullen verdwijnen. Voor een individu-
eel bedrijf is het daarom tegenwoordig absoluut noodzakelijk om het investeringsgedrag
van zijn concurrenten te betrekken bij zijn eigen investeringsbeslissing.
De bestaande literatuur aangaande de technologie investeringsbeslissing van een in-
dividueel bedrijf kan opgesplitst worden in twee categorieën. De modellen uit de eer-
ste categorie, de zogenaamde beslissingstheoretische modellen, analyseren de technologie
investeringsbeslissing van één bedrijf in afzondering. In de speltheoretische modellen
daarentegen worden de technologie investeringsacties van de concurrenten van het be-
drijf expliciet meegenomen. Uit de hierboven beschreven economische observaties kan
geconcludeerd worden dat er een sterke behoefte is aan het gebruik van speltheorie in
het theoretisch modelleren van de technologie investeringsbeslissing van een individueel
bedrijf. In deel I van dit boek komen beslissingstheoretische modellen aan de orde en in
de delen II en III worden twee verschillende speltheoretische modellen bestudeerd.
Investeren Onder Onzekerheid
Een investering is gedefinieerd als het doen van een onmiddellijke uitgave in verwachting
van toekomstige opbrengsten. Een groot gedeelte van alle investeringsprojecten bezitten
de volgende drie karakteristieken: onomkeerbaarheid, onzekerheid en de mogelijkheid tot
uitstel.
Een investering is onomkeerbaar als de bijbehorende investeringskosten verzonken kos-
ten zijn. Dat betekent dat het onmogelijk is om de investeringskosten terug te krijgen
nadat de investering is gedaan. Dit is zeker het geval voor investeringen in informatie en
communicatie technologieën. Het is onmogelijk om een personal computer van één jaar
oud te verkopen tegen de aankoopprijs. De meeste industrie- of bedrijfsspecifieke investe-
ringen zijn in het algemeen onomkeerbaar. De marketing en advertentieuitgaven van KPN
Telecom zijn bedrijfsspecifiek en zijn niet terug te draaien, want KPN Telecom kan dit
investeringsproject niet verkopen aan een ander telecommunicatiebedrijf. Een voorbeeld
van een industriespecifieke investering is het bouwen van een nieuw mobiel netwerk door
Libertel. Deze investering zal (op z’n minst gedeeltelijk) onomkeerbaar zijn. Als het voor
Libertel niet langer winstgevend is om dit netwerk te exploiteren zal het ook voor een
andere mobiele aanbieder niet winstgevend zijn. Door het zogenaamde lemons problem
(zie Akerlof (1970)) zijn een heleboel investeringen, die niet bedrijfs- of industriespecifiek
zijn, ook onomkeerbaar.
Een investeringsproject is (bijna) altijd onderhevig aan onzekerheid. Voor de meeste
investeringsprojecten zijn de toekomstige opbrengsten stochastisch, door bijvoorbeeld on-
zekerheid in marktaandeel en marktprijzen. Het is ook mogelijk dat de investeringskosten
onzeker zijn. Een voorbeeld betreft de kosten van de Oosterschelde stormvloedkering die
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veel hoger waren dan geraamd.
Uit technisch oogpunt is het bijna altijd mogelijk om een investering uit te stellen,
hetgeen een bedrijf flexibiliteit geeft. Economisch gezien kan het uitstel kostbaar zijn,
bijvoorbeeld omdat het bedrijf marktaandeel verliest, wanneer het niet direct investeert.
Aan de andere kant kan het bedrijf meer informatie over het project vergaren, wanneer
het besluit tot uitstel.
De netto contante waarde methode is de meest gebruikte (en aangeleerde) methode
voor het evalueren van investeringsprojecten. Volgens deze methode moet een investe-
ringsproject uitgevoerd worden indien de verwachte (verdisconteerde) contante waarde
van de opbrengstenstroom van het project groter of gelijk is aan de verwachte contante
waarde van de investeringskosten. Echter, de onderliggende aannames van de netto con-
tante waarde methode stroken niet met de hierboven genoemde karakteristieken van in-
vesteringsprojecten. De reden is dat de netto contante waarde methode aanneemt dat een
investeringsproject of omkeerbaar is, of wanneer het onomkeerbaar is, het een nu of nooit
beslissing is. Het resultaat is dat het toepassen van de netto contante waarde methode
tot sub-optimale investeringsbeslissingen leidt. Vooral het negeren van de mogelijkheid
tot uitstel is een belangrijke fout, omdat de meeste investeringsprojecten onomkeerbaar
zijn. De reële optietheorie slaagt erin deze zogenaamde optie waarde van het wachten
expliciet te waarderen.
In de reële optietheorie wordt de analogie tussen een investeringsproject van een bedrijf
en een financiële call-optie geëxploiteerd. Een financiële call-optie geeft de houder het
recht, maar niet de plicht, om een eenheid van het onderliggende derivaat (bijvoorbeeld
aandeel of obligatie) te kopen voor een gespecificeerde prijs (voor of) op een gespecificeerd
tijdstip. Vergelijkbaar met een financiële call-optie geeft een investeringsmogelijkheid een
bedrijf het recht, maar niet de plicht, om een bepaald investeringsproject uit te voeren. De
financiële optietheorie schrijft voor een optie pas uit te oefenen wanneer deze voldoende
diep in het geld is. Daarom moet een investeringsproject pas worden uitgeoefend wanneer
de netto contante waarde groter is dan de optie waarde van het wachten.
Investeren Onder Competitie
In de meeste reële optietheorie modellen wordt een bedrijf in afzondering bestudeerd. De
hierboven beschreven economische observaties pleiten voor het ontwikkelen en analyseren
van investeringsmodellen waarin expliciet strategische interacties worden meegenomen.
In de modellen waarin dat gebeurt, wordt gebruik gemaakt van speltheorie. Omdat
bedrijven over het algemeen niet samenwerken met hun concurrenten is de niet-coperatieve
speltheorie het meest van belang.
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Overzicht
Dit boek is opgesplitst in drie delen. Het eerste deel bevat twee beslissingstheoretische
technologie modellen met een reële optie aanpak. In deel II worden drie speltheoreti-
sche technologie adoptie modellen beschouwd. Tenslotte komen in deel III drie algemene
speltheoretische reële optie modellen aan de orde.
Beslissingstheoretische Modellen
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met een literatuuroverzicht van de beslissingstheoretische technologie
adoptie modellen. In het model van hoofdstuk 2 wordt de technologie adoptie beslissing
van één bedrijf geanalyseerd. Het bedrijf kan een betere technologie aankopen door het
doen van een onomkeerbare investering. De investeringskosten van een bepaalde tech-
nologie zijn niet tijdsafhankelijk. Met een betere technologie kan het bedrijf efficiënter
produceren en daarom meer winst maken. Nieuwe technologieën arriveren volgens een
stochastisch proces en de efficiëntie verbetering van een nieuwe technologie is ook sto-
chastisch. Eerst wordt het model aan de orde gesteld waarin het bedrijf maar één keer
mag investeren en daarna wordt het model besproken waarbij meerdere keren gëınvesteerd
mag worden. Dat laatste model is alleen oplosbaar indien de efficiëntie verbeteringen van
de nieuwe technologieën van tevoren bekend zijn. Tenslotte wordt de optimale investe-
ringsstrategie vergeleken met de netto contante waarde methode. Het blijkt dat de optie
waarde van het wachten niet genegeerd kan worden bij het maken van de investeringsbe-
slissing, hetgeen ook wordt aangetoond in een numeriek voorbeeld. In de appendix van
hoofdstuk 2 wordt een introductie tot de wiskundige techniek optimal stopping gegeven.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt het model uit hoofdstuk 2 uitgebreid door de investeringskosten
te laten dalen in de tijd. De efficiëntie verbeteringen van de nieuwe technologieën worden
bekend verondersteld. De optimale investeringsstrategie onder de restrictie dat het bedrijf
maar één keer mag investeren wordt afgeleid en vergeleken met de netto contante waarde
methode. Daarna wordt beargumenteerd waarom het niet mogelijk is om dit model op te
lossen voor het geval waarbij meerdere keren gëınvesteerd mag worden.
Speltheoretische Adoptie Modellen
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt eerst een literatuuroverzicht van de speltheoretische technologie
investeringsmodellen gegeven. Daarna wordt het meest belangrijke en deterministische
basismodel (zie Reinganum (1981) en Fudenberg en Tirole (1985)) uit dit onderzoeksveld
in detail besproken. Twee identieke bedrijven die actief zijn op een afzetmarkt kunnen
een onomkeerbare investering doen die hun eigen winst laat toenemen en de winst van
hun concurrent doet afnemen. De investeringskosten dalen in de tijd. Het investeringsspel
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wordt opgelost met behulp van zogenaamde timing spelen. Een introductie tot de timing
spelen wordt gegeven in de appendix van hoofdstuk 4. De speler die als eerste een zet
doet wordt de leider genoemd en de andere speler is de volger. Reinganum veronderstelt
in haar analyse dat één van de bedrijven de leiderrol van tevoren krijgt toegewezen. In
de analyse van Fudenberg en Tirole worden de rollen endogeen bepaald. Dit betekent dat
beide bedrijven leider kunnen worden door eerder dan de concurrent te investeren. Het
resultaat is dat in het evenwicht de waarde van de bedrijven gelijk zijn. Het resterende
gedeelte van hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de uitbreiding van het Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole
model die door Stenbacka en Tombak (1994) is gentroduceerd. Stenbacka en Tombak
veronderstellen dat de tijd tussen adoptie en succesvolle implementatie van de nieuwe
technologie stochastisch is.
Hoofdstuk 5 is een uitbreiding van het basismodel door het opnemen van twee nieuwe
technologieën en de mogelijkheid van opwaardering. In het begin van het spel is geen van
de twee identieke bedrijven actief op de afzetmarkt. Om direct actief te worden moet het
bedrijf een onomkeerbare investering doen in de vorm van het aankopen van de huidige
beste technologie. Het bedrijf kan ook besluiten om het actief worden uit te stellen en
de betere nieuwe technologie te kopen die beschikbaar komt op een van tevoren bekend
tijdstip. Verder is het ook mogelijk om de huidige beste technologie op te waarderen met
de betere nieuwe technologie. Er zijn leereffecten bij deze opwaardeerstrategie: de nieuwe
technologie is goedkoper indien het bedrijf met de huidige technologie heeft gewerkt. Twee
van de negen mogelijke scenario’s worden uitgewerkt.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt het model uit hoofdstuk 4 uitgebreid door het toevoegen van
onzekerheid in het aankomstproces van nieuwe technologieën en door het beschouwen
van meerdere nieuwe technologieën. Verder wordt in dit hoofdstuk aangenomen dat de
bedrijven maar één keer kunnen investeren. Na de introductie van een nieuw concept
binnen de timing spelen, namelijk de wachtcurve, wordt een algoritme voor het oplossen
van dit soort technologie investeringspelen gepresenteerd. Het algoritme wordt verhelderd
door het toe te passen op een specifiek voorbeeld.
Speltheoretische Reële Optie Modellen
Hoofdstuk 7 beschouwt een algemenere versie van het model beschreven in Nielsen (1999),
omdat de bedrijven al actief zijn op de afzetmarkt. Het afschaffen van de nieuwe markt
veronderstelling verandert de resultaten aanzienlijk. In het algemeen is het niet meer
waar dat de introductie van een nieuw bedrijf investeringen versnelt. Het model is de
stochastische tegenhanger van het Reinganum-Fudenberg-Tirole model en de resultaten
van het introduceren van stochastiek in dat model worden besproken.
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt het nieuwe markt model uit Nielsen (1999) bestudeerd, maar
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dan met asymmetrische bedrijven. De asymmetrie is gemodelleerd door aan te nemen dat
de investeringskosten van de bedrijven verschillend zijn. Zowel de casus van negatieve als
van positieve externaliteiten wordt geanalyseerd. Bij negatieve externaliteiten kan een
bedrijf de hoogste winst behalen wanneer de concurrent niet actief is. In tegenstelling tot
het geval van positieve externaliteiten waar de winst van een bedrijf hoger is wanneer de
concurrent ook actief is. Positieve externaliteiten ontstaan als gevolg van netwerk effecten
of wanneer de bedrijven complementaire goederen produceren. Aangetoond wordt dat ook
in het asymmetrische geval investeringen versneld moeten worden uitgevoerd vanwege de
introductie van een tweede bedrijf.
Hoofdstuk 9 combineert de hoofdstukken 2, 5 en 7. Twee identieke bedrijven kun-
nen actief worden op een afzetmarkt door het maken van een onomkeerbare investering.
In het begin is er slechts één technologie beschikbaar, maar op een onbekend tijdstip
in de toekomst wordt er een betere technologie uitgevonden. Beide bedrijven kunnen
slechts éénmaal investeren en de investeringskosten zijn constant in de tijd. Aangetoond
wordt dat de evenwichtsuitkomst vooral afhangt van de verwachte aankomstsnelheid van
de nieuwe technologie en dat een grotere onzekerheid in de afzetmarkt technologische
vooruitgang stimuleert.
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